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This thesis sets out an argument against the present interpretation of the concept of 
autonomy under the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) Article 8 
jurisprudence and proposes a new reading of the concept that is rooted in an 
acknowledgment and appreciation of human interdependence. 
Following the prevailing political, legal and socio-cultural ideas and ideals about 
autonomy, the ECtHR has chosen to furnish its recent Article 8 case law according to 
the values characteristic of the notion of individual autonomy – independence, self-
sufficiency, and the ability to conduct one’s life in a manner of one’s own choosing. 
Adopting this individualistic view on autonomy, the ECtHR sets normative standards 
for behaviour that the thesis challenges as being detrimental for the quality of 
interpersonal relationships. The work draws on sociological theory to argue that in 
modern individualised societies people are increasingly tied to each other – one has 
to be socially sensitive and to be able to relate to others and to obligate oneself, in 
order to manage and organise the complexities of everyday life. This also means that 
there are attendant obligations between individuals to be sensitive towards, and care 
for, each other. It is argued that an effective exercise of one’s autonomy becomes 
necessarily dependent on the existence of caring and trusting relationships. This in 
turn requires the ECtHR to adopt an appropriate conceptualisation of autonomy that 
embraces this knowledge and gives full effect to it. The concept of caring autonomy 
is proposed as a replacement for an individualistic concept of autonomy. It will be 
argued that this concept captures better the essentiality of human interdependence 
and the morality it calls for. The implications of this for the future direction of the 









One of the defining characteristics of human rights law in recent decades has been its 
relentless expansion. At least in Western countries the assertion of rights is thriving.1 
The expansion of human rights is typically seen as highly desirable, if not a 
necessary condition of human development.2 The vast body of international and 
domestic human rights law created in the last few decades is seen by many as the 
formal expression of normative changes that place human rights near the top of the 
political agenda and the individual person at the centre of the public life. The new 
order can be seen to represent “power to the people” in that human rights offer the 
oppressed, the excluded, and the victims of tyrannical governments, an opportunity 
to gain the “moral high ground” in the struggle for emancipation and freedom.3 In a 
way human rights have become the yardstick by which to measure human progress4 
and, therefore, any additional identification and acknowledgment of an individual 
right is generally taken as a celebratory progress in human rights protection.5  
                                                
1 The supervisory organ of the European Convention on Human Rights – the European Court of 
Human Rights – has been even declared to be a “victim of its own success.” See R. Ryssdal, “The 
coming of age of the European Convention on Human Rights”, (1996) 1 European Human Rights 
Law Review 18-29, at 26; L.R. Helfer, “Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: 
Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime”, (2008) 19 
European Journal of International Law 125-159, at 125. According to the European Court of Human 
Rights website, in 2011 64,500 new applications were presented to the Court. In January 2012 the 
Court was confronted with an accumulated case-load of 151,600 applications. Available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/11CE0BB3-9386-48DC-B012-
AB2C046FEC7C/0/STATS_EN_2011.PDF.  
2 L. Zucca, Constitutional Dilemmas: Conflicts of Fundamental Legal Rights in Europe and the USA, 
OUP, 2007, at xi. 
3 T. Evans, “International Human Rights Law as Power/Knowledge”, (2005) 27 Human Rights 
Quarterly 1046-1068, at 1065. 
4 M. Cartabia, “The Age of ‘New Rights’”, Straus Working Paper 03/10, available at 
http://nyustraus.org/index.html, at 2. 
5 See a publication issued by the United Kingdom Human Rights Lawyers’ Association and the Law 





However, at the same time when individuals and groups have become used to state 
almost every interest they have in terms of rights,6 the rights are penetrating all areas 
of human interaction,7 and the courtrooms are overloaded by new and unprecedented 
pleas,8 some concerns and feeling of discomfort towards rights have started to rise. 
Although few want to deny the importance of individual rights, many scholars have 
recently complained that their importance has been greatly overemphasised.9 Some 
say that the inflation of rights threatens the credibility of and the moral status of 
human rights.10 A related worry is that the greater the number of rights recognised, 
the more likely they will begin to contradict one another.11 And finally, and most 
importantly for this thesis, there is the worry that, although, the purpose of human 
rights might has been noble, putting the individual at the centre of political and social 
life, but unfortunately, the result is an excessive individualism and a society of self-
centred individuals.12 
The critics are concerned that while the human rights discourse makes claims for the 
pursuit of human dignity and freedom, it also provides the context where the 
individual, set apart from others and threatened by a society, state or government, 
creates social relations characterised by selfishness, gain and private interests, rather 
than the pursuit of human dignity and community.13 Since rights are claimed by 
individuals, it is said, rights promote and encourage a community whose members 
think of social problems in the most narrow, self-interested terms. Crucially, the 
                                                
6 Access to internet, for example, has been put forward as a human right. A. Wagner, “Is Internet 
Access a Human Right?”, The Guardian, Wednesday, 11 January 2012.  
7 Recently an idea that rights should regulate relationships between friends has been advanced. See 
E.J. Leib, Friend v Friend, OUP, 2011. 
8 See e.g. Case of Hatton and others v the United Kingdom (App.36022/97), Judgment of 8 July 2003. 
The applicants in Hatton submitted that the sleep disturbance, distress and ill health caused by night 
flights at Heathrow airport was a violation of their right to private life under Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  
9 For a general overview on the criticisms of rights see C.R. Sunstein, “Rights and Their Critics”, 
(1995) 70 Notre Dame Law Review 727-768; See also M. Cartabia, note 4 above. 
10 P. Alston, “Conjuring up new human rights: A proposal for quality control”, (1984) 78 American 
Journal of International Law 607-621; T. Campbell, “Human Rights: A Culture of Controversy”, 
(1999) 26(1) Journal of Law and Society 6-26. 
11 L. Zucca, note 2 above. 
12 J.H.H. Weiler, “The political and legal culture of European integration: An exploratory essay”, 
(2011) 9(3-4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 678-694, at 693. 
13 M.A. Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse, The Free Press, 1991; M.J. 
Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd ed, CUP, 1998; R. Dagger, Civic Virtues: Rights, 




insistence on rights has not resulted in a warmer and more caring society.14 We 
should be less concerned with our rights and more concerned with our 
responsibilities, the argument goes.15  
In his critique against the practice of European institutions, Joseph Weiler, for 
example, argues that while “we brandish human rights, with considerable 
justification, as one of the important achievements of our civilization,”16 the result is, 
paradoxically, “the matrix of personal materialism, self-centredness, Sartre style 
ennui and narcissism in a society which genuinely and laudably values liberty and 
human rights.”17 Following Weiler, the human rights vocabulary seems now to be 
frequently “lost-in-translation.”18 The inviolability of human dignity has become “the 
inviolability of the ‘I’, of the ego.”19 Since the language of rights, Weiler argues, “is 
not conducive to the virtues and sensibility necessary for real community and 
solidarity” and “it undermines somewhat the counterculture of responsibility and 
duty,” the culture of human rights “may produce unintended consequences on that 
very deep ideal that places individual at the centre and calls for redefinition of human 
relations.”20  
Similarly, Marta Cartabia, in her criticism against the enlarging number and scope of 
the new privacy rights that are now blooming in European courtrooms, raises 
concerns over whether liberal individual rights do not just offer an impoverished 
image of the human subject, but whether they also affect our human agency, our 
social behaviour: “Rights require not hurting others, but they do not prompt a 
positive move towards others: they fall short of encouraging care and concern about 
others.”21 
                                                
14 J.H.H. Weiler, “Europe – Nous coalisons des Ètats, nous n’unissons pas des hommes”, available at 
http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/2009Colloquium.Session9.Weiler.pdf, at 27; M. Cartabia, note 
4 above, at 31.  
15 M.A. Glendon, note 13 above, at 76-108. 
16 J.H.H. Weiler, note 14 above, at 27. 
17 J.H.H. Weiler, note 14 above, at 32. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 J.H.H. Weiler, note 14 above, at 31. 




These criticisms contain the seeds of inspiration for this thesis. They point to 
exploring and questioning whether the expansion of human rights is always a good 
thing. Are certain rights always appropriate in certain contexts? Are human rights 
always generating positive effects in the societies in which they are so highly 
valued? From a different angle they raise questions about the importance of the 
vocabulary of the human rights language and its impact on shaping the relationships 
we are involved in and the society we live in. Does the language of human rights 
sometimes cause such “unintended consequences” in terms of the behaviour of 
individuals, thereby making it problematic for a harmonious and caring social co-
existence? 
Whereas these kind of concerns and questions may seem somewhat familiar within 
the United States of America scholarship, where the idea of a constitutional right to 
privacy involving decisional autonomy and covering intimate personal decisions and 
relationships has animated the public debate for decades now, scrutinising its 
descriptive accuracy and normative desirability,22 it is a relatively unexplored 
territory in the context of the European human rights jurisprudence. Nearly all those 
offering commentary on the case law of the supervisory organ of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(hereafter also the ECHR or the Convention), the European Court of Human Rights 
(hereafter also the ECtHR or the Court), have viewed the inclusion of new rights or 
the broad interpretation of old ones as beneficial to the development of the 
Convention and to the human rights protection in general.23 The main question is 
how wide the scope or nature of one or another right is. As far as the criticism goes, 
the critics have been mostly concerned with the worry that the judges of the ECtHR 
will exercise illegitimate judicial discretion if they interpret the Convention in a 
creative way.24 Critical questions about the underlying normative purposes and 
                                                
22 See e.g. M.A. Glendon, note 13 above; M.J. Sandel, note 13 above; J.L. Cohen, Regulating 
Intimacy: A New Legal Paradigm, Princeton University Press, 2002. 
23 See e.g. J. Marshall, Personal freedom through human rights law? Autonomy, identity and integrity 
under the European Convention on Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009. 
24 See e.g. L.R. Helfer, “Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights”, 




effects of the Convention rights have remained, however, modest or completely 
unaddressed.25   
Against this background this thesis asks about the value and justification of the 
concept of autonomy as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights under 
its Article 8 jurisprudence.26 The thesis inquires whether the concept of autonomy as 
expressed in the Court’s reasoning is an appropriate model for interpersonal 
relationships. It asks about the potential impact that the practice of the Human Rights 
Court, expressed and shaped though its autonomy-based case law, has on the 
dispositions or behaviour of the individuals, and from there on, on the social 
relationships these individuals are involved in.  
I think that it is of upmost importance to ask these kinds of questions in the context 
of the practice of the Human Rights Court. It is informed by the idea that law is part 
of the cultural environment that shapes and impacts the dispositions and behaviour of 
those operating within its sphere.27 In other words, the thesis rests on the premise that 
besides law’s regulatory functions, it also has expressive functions that can serve as 
conveying or promoting socially valued attitudes, norms and mores. This is to make 
a difference between what the law says as opposed to what it does.28 While the 
former affects behaviour “expressively” by making statements, the latter controls 
behaviour directly by its sanctions.29 Or to put it in another way, it is to say that “law 
has an expressive influence on behaviour independent of the effect created by its 
sanctions.”30 Of course, as Jason Mazzone notes, law often makes statements and 
controls behaviour at the same time: in regulating individuals, law also expresses 
what sort of behaviour is appropriate for them or those similarly situated. But even 
                                                
25 One of the excellent exceptions is M-B. Dembour, Who Believes in Human Rights? Reflections on 
the European Convention, CUP, 2006. Dembour reviews five critiques of rights – the realist, 
utilitarian, Marxist, particularist and feminist critique – and explores how their insights are reflected in 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
26 Article 8 provides for a right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence. 
27 J.H.H. Weiler, note 14 above, at 6.  
28 R.H. McAdams, “An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law”, (2000) 79 Oregon Law Review 339-
390, at 339. 
29 C.R. Sunstein, “On the Expressive Function of Law”, (1996) 144 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 2021-2053, at 2024. 




when it is mixed with regulation, an element of expression may nonetheless be 
present – and worthy of separate analysis.31  
In its expressive functions the law, then, can be seen essentially as instrumental for 
instilling certain values into the citizens and providing “guidance” for how to behave 
according to these values.32 McAdams claims that law changes behaviour by 
signalling the underlying attitudes of a community or society, and “because people 
are motivated to gain approval and avoid disapproval, the information signalled by 
legislation and other law affects their behaviour.”33  
Following this, we can start to see the Human Rights Court performing what the 
theorists call “law’s expressive functions:” the ECtHR judgments going beyond 
telling parties how they must behave and making statements that potentially have a 
more general effect in terms of change in their behaviour. From this perspective, 
through the implementation of autonomy in its case law, the Human Rights Court 
defines human relations, the way individuals relate to each other and to their 
community, sometimes apart from the direct outcomes of a particular case for the 
parties concerned. The way the Human Rights Court interprets autonomy is, hence, 
crucial to our normative understanding about how to relate to each other in 
interpersonal relationships, to our perceptions to matters of life and death, and what 
we should expect from ourselves and from the state. 
During the five decades of its existence,34 the Court has been the primary instrument 
in interpreting the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention.35 For many the 
ECHR system represents a success-story of individuals’ human rights protection,36 
upholding the “strongly developed European value system, concretized by the ECHR 
                                                
31 J. Mazzone, “When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law’s Expressive Function”, (1999) 49 
Syracuse Law Review 1039-1066, at 1040. 
32 L.A. Kornhauser, “No Best Answer?”, (1998) 146 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1599-
1637, at 1624. 
33 R.H. McAdams, note 28 above, at 340. 
34 The first members of the ECtHR were elected by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of 
Europe in 1959. The first session of the Court took place in 23-28 February 1959. 
35 The ECHR was opened for signature in Rome on 4 November 1950 and entered into force in 
September 1953. Text available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/CadreListeTraites.htm 
36 L.R. Helfer, note 24 above; A. Moravcsik, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic 
Delegation in Postwar Europe”, (2000) 54(2) International Organizations 217-252, at 218-219; L.R. 
Helfer, A-M. Slaughter, “Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication”, (1997) 107 Yale 




and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR”.37 The growing and diverse body of case law is 
said to have transformed Europe’s legal and political landscape.38 Many European 
states have – indirectly or directly – incorporated the Convention into domestic law, 
whereby the domestic constitutional jurisdictions are informed by the values 
emerging from the Convention rights. The analysts note that the legal commitments 
and enforcement mechanisms entered into under the ECHR have established such a 
consistent compliance that “ECHR judgments are now as effective as those of any 
domestic court.”39 Consequently the Convention has become to represent an 
“abstract constitutional identity”40 for the entire European continent and the ECtHR 
has effectively become the constitutional court for greater Europe.41  
Indeed the Court itself has interpreted the Convention not as a set of reciprocal 
promises among nations, but as a “constitutional instrument of European public 
order”.42 In the light of these observations, it is important to take notice of the high 
relevance this institutional human rights framework enjoys as a legal restraint and 
influence for the forty-seven contracting states, and more importantly, for the lives of 
more than eight hundred or so million people that live in Europe. As such, the Court 
must be regarded as one of the most important mechanisms in Europe through which 
normative ideas about human rights are both formulated and applied. As Mowbray 
argues, judgments from Strasbourg have resulted in nothing short of the “evolution 
of societies”.43 Given the growing body of literature referring to the constitutional 
character of the ECHR and its role as an instrument of the European value system 
                                                
37 E. de Wet “The Emergence of International and Regional Value Systems as a Manifestation of the 
Emerging International Constitutional Order”, (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law 611-
632, at 611.  
38 L.R. Helfer, note 1 above, at 126. C. Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire, Routledge-Cavendish, 
2007, at 25. Douzinas argues that the Convention introduced a radical innovation that has changed 
legal civilisation. Traditional international law a states-based law with no place for individuals. But 
under the ECHR, aggrieved Europeans after exhausting the domestic remedies can submit an 
application to the ECtHR alleging that their rights have been violated by the actions of their state. In 
the course of the judicial investigation the plaintiff is put on an equal footing with the defendant state. 
At the end of the process, the state is obliged to comply with any adverse findings of the Court. 
39 A. Moravcsik, note 36 above, at 218. 
40 S. Greer, “What’s Wrong with the European Convention on Human Rights?”, (2008) 30 Human 
Rights Quarterly 680-702, at 684. 
41 Ibid.; See also S. Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights, CUP, 2006. 
42 Case of Loizidou v Turkey (App.15318/89), Judgment of 23 March 1995, para 27. 
43 A. Mowbray, “The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights”, (2005) 5(1) Human Rights 




(European public order) whose norms correspondingly include a strong ethical 
underpinning, the decisions of the ECtHR contribute undoubtedly both to the 
integration of its norms into states’ positive law, and most importantly for present 
purposes, to the formation of individuals’ value systems.44  
If the Human Rights Court holds that the right to autonomy applies in a variety of 
interpersonal relationships, including that of reproduction, assisted suicide and 
abortion, the real-world consequences may be much smaller than is conventionally 
thought. But the attention European society pays to the Court’s pronouncements is 
connected to the expressive or symbolic character of these pronouncements. When 
the Court makes a decision, it is often taken to be speaking on behalf of the nations’ 
basic principles and commitments. The expressive effect of the Court’s judgments, 
or its expressive function, is often at stake here.45 As Jeremy Waldron argues: 
“society does not become well-ordered by magic. The expressive disciplinary work 
of law may be necessary as an ingredient in the change of heart on the part of its 
citizens that a well-ordered society presupposes.”46 
I consider it, therefore, of utmost importance to discuss and analyse the significance 
and power of the concept of autonomy in modern European human rights law. Law 
is a powerful means of structuring human relations, and it is also an important way in 
which concepts like autonomy take shape in the world. Thus, when the Human 
Rights Court chooses a concept of autonomy to decide cases under its Article 8 
jurisprudence, it, simultaneously, articulates principles that constrain and influence 
how we construct our interpersonal relationships. The principles and values that the 
Court expresses and legitimises assume, in this way, an aspirational function 
regarding how we think individuals should orient their behaviour.47 The obvious 
appeal and frequent invocation of personal autonomy in cases pertaining to various 
interpersonal relationships make it, therefore, essential to better understand the 
                                                
44 See e.g. E. Wicks, “The Rights to Refuse Medical Treatment under the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, (2001) 9 Medical Law Review 17-40, at 19-20; 
45 C.R. Sunstein, note 29 above, at 2028. 
46 J. Waldron, “Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate”, (2010) 123 Harvard Law Review 
1597-1657, at 1623. 




workings of the particular concept of autonomy that the ECtHR has chosen to 
endorse as a human right. 
My argument presented in this thesis is the following. The thesis argues that the 
concept of individual autonomy – the ability to conduct one’s life in a manner of 
one’s own choosing – that the ECtHR has adopted to interpret the guarantees 
provided by Article 8, provides an impoverished image of the human condition and 
is an inappropriate model to regulate interpersonal relationships in the contexts of 
reproduction or medical decision-making. The thesis considers it to be potentially 
detrimental for the quality of interpersonal relationships in these areas. It is further 
argued that in modern individualised societies, where people are increasingly 
uncertain and insecure about the actions of others, an effective exercise of one’s 
autonomy becomes necessarily dependent on the existence of caring and trusting 
relationships. This entails the appreciation that there are attendant obligations 
between individuals to be sensitive towards, and care for, each other. This, in turn, 
requires the ECtHR to adopt an appropriate conceptualisation of autonomy that 
embraces this knowledge and gives full effect to it. The concept of caring autonomy 
is proposed as a replacement for an individualistic concept of autonomy. It will be 
argued that this concept better captures the essentiality of human interdependence 
and the morality it calls for.  
The thesis is presented in five substantive chapters.  
Chapter 1 examines the meaning and origin of the concept of autonomy as adopted 
by the Human Rights Court. It is argued that whereas it seemed like an 
uncontroversial choice for the Court to choose the concept of individual autonomy as 
the underlying principle for the interpretation of Article 8 guarantees, this consensus 
might be misplaced. Nothing in the Convention system prescribes that individual 
autonomy is fundamentally linked to Article 8 or that it was the only choice available 
to the Court. As the analysis shows, two other concepts of autonomy – caring 
autonomy and principled autonomy – have been, albeit implicitly, considered by the 
ECtHR.  
Chapter 2 considers whether the decision of the Human Rights Court to choose 




this chapter is that the individual autonomy-based practice now developing under the 
European Court of Human Rights Article 8 jurisprudence (a) fosters a particular type 
of individual – an independent and isolated yet active and flexible individual with a 
self-protective stance towards others around him or her, and; (b) directs human 
relations into formalism and proceduralism guided by contract-based models of 
interaction. It is argued that since one’s personal sphere is very often, in one way or 
another, closely interconnected with that of family members, friends, etc., promoting 
the virtues of an isolated individual potentially turns human relations to non-
emotional, calculated places of alienation and combat. The concept of individual 
autonomy is, hence, found to be ethically inadequate with potentially detrimental 
consequences to interpersonal relationships.  
Chapter 3 argues that the concept of individual autonomy is inadequate to regulate 
interpersonal matters from the social perspective – interdependence rather than 
independence, in-insufficiency rather than self-sufficiency, characterises the way we 
organise and deal with the complexities of everyday life. Drawing from sociological 
literature, it is argued that by advocating an image of a self-sufficient individual, the 
Human Rights Court has misunderstood what it means to live in a highly 
individualised society. In an increasingly individualised world, one has to be socially 
sensible and to be able to relate to others and to obligate oneself, in order to manage 
and organise the complexities of everyday life. This also means that there are 
attendant obligations between individuals to be sensitive towards, and care for, each 
other. The capacity for autonomous life becomes increasingly dependent on the 
existence of trusting relationships. 
Chapter 4 evaluates the capacity of individual autonomy to establish and foster trust-
promoting practices. Considering the somewhat sceptical view towards law’s 
capacity to enhance trust, the chapter first explores the relationship between trust and 
law. Although it is rather common to perceive trust and law as opposites, it is 
suggested that a more appropriate approach is to treat them as complements. Law can 
positively support trust and encourage good behaviour through its expressive 
functions. Based on a critical analysis of the ECtHR autonomy-related case law, the 




related case law through the reasoning of the Human Rights Court – is more likely to 
result in reduction of trust rather than increase in trust in interpersonal relationships. 
In other words, the individualistic concept of autonomy is considered to be an 
inadequate component for dealing with lack of trust and needs to be reconsidered.  
Chapter 5 proposes that in order to cultivate practices of trust, to enhance social 
cohesion and strengthen trustworthiness in interpersonal relationships, the European 
Court of Human Rights should take the approach of advocating the language of 
caring autonomy – a concept of autonomy informed by the insights of the ethics of 
care. Building on the works of care ethicists, caring autonomy is based on the idea 
that we are both, unique, autonomous individuals and at the same time embedded in 
nested dependencies. It sees free choice and moral obligations and responsibility as 
complementary to each other and thus mutually interdependent.48 Caring autonomy 
that does not deny the importance of the values of independence and self-
determination, but regards equally highly qualities of attentiveness, responsiveness 
and empathy in autonomous decision-making, is argued to be a better basis for 
building trust in interpersonal relationships.  
 
                                                
48 A.I. Tauber, “Sick Autonomy”, (2003) 46(4) Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 484-495, at 490. 





 CHOOSING AUTONOMY 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Respect for personal autonomy is not expressly articulated in any of the substantive 
rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. Despite this 
absence in the written text of the Convention, over the past decade there has emerged 
a developing body of case law where autonomy features in the European Court of 
Human Rights language either as an important principle underlying the interpretation 
of the Article 8 guarantees1 or as a right of its own under Article 8 jurisprudence.2 
The supervisory organ of the European Convention on Human Rights now regularly 
uses the term autonomy when deciding cases about assisted dying, sexuality and 
reproductive rights; matters pertaining to one’s identity, self-determination, 
fulfilment of choices, and control over one’s body and mind. Accordingly, choices 
about when and how to die,3 whether to become or not to become a parent,4 and how 
far should the State’s responsibility reach in providing appropriate services in order 
                                                
1 Case of Van Kück v Germany (App.35968/97), Judgment of 12 June 2003; Case of Gillan and 
Quinton v the United Kingdom (App.4158/05), Judgment of 12 January 2010. Article 8 states the 
following:  
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such 
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health and morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.  
2 Case of Kalacheva v Russia (App.3451/05), Judgment of 7 May 2009; Case of R.R. v Poland 
(App.27617/04), Judgment of 26 May 2011.  
3 Case of Pretty v the United Kingdom (App.2346/02), Judgment of 26 April 2002; Case of Haas v 
Switzerland (App.31322/07), Judgment of 20 January 2011; Case of Koch v Germany (App.497/09), 
Judgment of 19 July 2012. 
4 Case of Evans v the United Kingdom (App.6339/05), Judgment of 10 April 2007; Case of  Dickson v 
the United Kingdom (App.44362/04), Judgment of 18 April 2006. 
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to become a parent5; to what extent a person is entitled to control her image6 and to 
have a say in deciding her nationality,7 have become claims about one’s autonomy in 
human rights language.8 In a word, within a decade, autonomy has become a notional 
basis for a cluster of causes of action that the Court captures under the diverse field 
of application of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
tendency to recognise more rights and to interpret existing rights more broadly has 
provoked some commentators even to argue that an autonomy-based understanding 
of human rights, at least implicitly, now underlies much contemporary thinking in 
human rights law.9 A publication available on the Human Rights Court’s website that 
is meant to help applicants to qualify their claims, explains the scope of Article 8 
accordingly: “Article 8 seeks to protect three areas of autonomy – private life, family 
life and one’s own correspondence.”10  
While the European Court of Human Rights now regularly uses the term autonomy 
when deciding cases under its Article 8 jurisprudence, and the judges of the 
Strasbourg Court as well as the commentators of its case law treat autonomy as an 
important legal value, none of these institutions or personnel fully explains what it 
means. There is a wide literature on autonomy in legal, moral and political 
philosophy11 and in medical law and ethics,12 but as a human rights concept, 
autonomy’s content is much less researched. This is explicable, on the one hand, due 
                                                
5 Case of S.H. and others v Austria (App.57813/00), Judgment of 3 November 2011. 
6 Case Reklos and Davourlis (App.1234/05), Judgment of 15 January 2009. 
7 Case of Ciubotaru v Moldova, (App.27138/04), Judgment of 27 April 2010. 
8 The latest additions to ‘autonomy’ case law include: Case of Jehovah’s witnesses of Moscow v 
Russia (App.302/02), Judgment of 10 June 2010; Case of Vördur Olafsson v Iceland (App.20161/06), 
Judgment of 27 April 2010; Case of Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland (App.41615/07), Judgment 
of 6 July 2010. 
9 K. Möller, “Two Conceptions of Positive Liberty: Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of 
Constitutional Rights”, (2009) 29(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 757-786. 
10 Available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/F6DC7D2E-1668-491E-817A-
D0E29F094E14/0/COURT_n1883413_v1_Key_caselaw_issues__Art_8__The_Concepts_of_Private_
and_Family_Life.pdf  
11 Key literature includes: J.B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral 
Philosophy, CUP, 1998; G. Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, CUP, 1988; C. 
Mackenzie, N. Stoljar (eds), Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and 
the Social Self, OUP, 2000; J.S. Taylor (ed), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy 
and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, CUP, 2005.  
12 See e.g. O. O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, CUP, 2002; S.A.M. McLean, Autonomy, 
Consent and the Law, Routledge-Cavendish, 2010; C. Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death: The 
Tyranny of Autonomy in Medical Ethics and Law, Hart Publishing, 2009; A.I. Tauber, Patient 
Autonomy and the Ethics of Responsibility, The MIT Press, 2005.  
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to the very recent addition of the concept to the European human rights 
jurisprudence. On the other hand, it seems that the importance of autonomy and its 
inclusion in the European human rights law has been taken somewhat for granted, 
leaving the need for detailed reflection upon its meaning unimportant. Since the 
landmark decision in Pretty v the United Kingdom13 in which the European Court of 
Human Rights first explicitly adopted an autonomy-based reasoning of Article 8 
rights – covering the right to conduct one’s life in a manner of one’s own choosing – 
autonomy’s conceptual and normative presuppositions have largely remained 
unquestioned and unchallenged. Apart from some brief remarks within case notes 
such as on how the import of autonomy into Article 8 “threatens to stretch 
unreasonably its bounds,”14 the overall reaction among academics to the inclusion of 
autonomy has been relatively calm acceptance.15 Yes, the expansion of Article 8 
rights was noted, but it was nothing the commentators were surprised by or hesitant 
about. Autonomy is, and has always been, they seemed to assume, a natural element 
                                                
13 Case of Pretty v the United Kingdom (App.2346/02), Judgment of 26 April 2002. 
14 J. Keown, “European Court of Human Rights: Death in Strasbourg – assisted suicide, the Pretty 
case, and the European Convention on Human Rights”, (2003) 1 The International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 722-730, at 729. 
15 That is not to say that the different ethical and legal issues surrounding autonomy in these cases did 
not provoke a healthy feedback. See e.g.: H. Biggs, “A Pretty Fine Line: Life, Death, Autonomy and 
Letting It B”, (2003) 11 Feminist Legal Studies 291-301; R. English, “Autonomy and the Human 
Rights Convention”, (2002) New Law Journal 152; H.J.J. Leenen, “Assistance to Suicide and the 
European Court of Human Rights”, (2002) 9 European Journal of Health Law 257-281; B. Hewson, 
“Abortion in Poland: A New Human Rights Ruling”, (2007) Conscience 34-35; S.H.E. Harmon, N. 
Sethi, “Preserving Life and Facilitating Death: What Role for Government after Haas v 
Switzerland?”, (2011) 18 European Journal of Health Law 355-364. Perhaps especially popular 
among the commentators, providing thought-provoking material about the meaning and place of 
autonomy in bioethics and human rights law, was Evans v the United Kingdom. See e.g.: S. Sheldon, 
“Revealing Cracks in the ‘Twin Pillars’?”, (2004) 16 Child and Family Law Quarterly 437; J.K. 
Mason, “Discord and Disposal of Embryos”, (2004) 8(1) Edinburgh Law Review 84-93; A. Alghrani, 
“Deciding the Fate of Frozen Embryos”, (2005) 13 Medical Law Review 244-256; T. Annett, 
“Balancing Competing Interests Over Frozen Embryos: The Judgment of Solomon?”, (2006) 14 
Medical Law Review 425-433; C. Lind, “Evans v United Kingdom – Judgment of Salomon: Power, 
Gender and Procreation”, (2006) 18 Child and Family Law Quarterly 576; S. Chan, M. Quigley, 
“Frozen Embryos, Genetic Information and Reproductive Rights”, (2007) 21(8) Bioethics 439-448; C. 
Morris, “Evans v United Kingdom: Paradigms of Parenting”, (2007) 70 Modern Law Review 992-
1002; A. Smaijdor, “Deciding the Fate of Disputed Embryos: Ethical Issues in the Case of Natallie 
Evans”, (2007) 4 Journal of Experimental and Clinical Assisted Reproduction 2; K. Wright, 
“Competing Interests in Reproduction: The Case of Natallie Evans”, (2008) 19 King’s Law Journal 
135-150. 
Chapter 1 Choosing autonomy 
 
22 
of the Convention, something to be contained and protected under Article 816 or even 
under some other article of the Convention.17  
This general agreement on autonomy’s instinctive place in the Convention system is 
coupled with the consensus on the values inherent in the concept of autonomy. The 
common opinion seems to say that when the ECtHR uses autonomy, it invokes the 
liberal individualistic notion of it.18 Pursuant to this view – and also conceded by this 
chapter – autonomy under the ECtHR practice means that each individual has the 
right to choose how to be and become the kind of person she wants to be, and to have 
her own self-chosen lifestyle. Autonomy is about living a self-authored life: living 
according to values that are one’s own. As such, the protection of autonomy rights is 
often seen as a true and noble aspiration, one of the positive aspects of modern 
society, based as it is on the notion of the emancipation of the individual.19 The 
individual person with his or her needs and desires becomes the central motif.20 Its 
idealistic resonance makes it an attractive cause with which to be identified. Who 
could disagree with the aim and promise to empower people to make decisions for 
themselves in the context of abortion, reproduction or assisted suicide?21 
                                                
16 A. Pedain, “The Human Rights Dimension of Dianne Pretty Case”, (2003) 62(1) Cambridge Law 
Journal 181-206, at 189; J. Coggon, “Varied and Principled Understandings of Autonomy in English 
Law: Justifiable Inconsistency or Blinkered Moralism” (2007) 15 Health Care Analysis 235-255, at 
237. 
17 J. Marshall, “A right to personal autonomy at the European Court of Human Rights”, (2008) 3 
European Human Rights Law Review 337-356, at 338; G. Gomery, “Whose autonomy matters? 
Reconciling the competing claims of privacy and freedom of expression”, (2007) 27(3) Legal Studies 
404-429; S. Sorial, “Free Speech, Autonomy, and the Marketplace of Ideas”, (2010) 44 Journal of 
Value Inquiry 167-183; E. Wicks, “The Rights to Refuse Medical Treatment under the European 
Convention on Human Rights”, (2001) 9 Medical Law Review 17-40.  
18 See e.g. A. Campbell, H. Lardy, “Transsexuals – the ECHR in Transition?”, (2003) 53(3) Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly 209-253, at 215; S. Wheatley, “Human Rights and Human Dignity in the 
Resolution of Certain Ethical Questions in Biomedicine”, (2001) 3 European Human Rights Law 
Review, 312-325, at 313; L. Loucaides, “Personality and Privacy under the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, in Essays on the Developing Law of Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishing, 
1995, at 175; S. Cowan, “The Headscarf Controversy: A Response to Jill Marshall”, (2008) 14 Res 
Publica 193-201, at 195. 
19 B. de Vries, L. Francot, “Information, Decision and Self-Determination: Euthanasia as a 
Case Study, (2009) 6(3) SCRIPTed 558-574, at 559.  
20 M. Cartabia, “The Age of ‘New Rights’”, Straus Working Paper 03/10, available at 
http://nyustraus.org/index.html, at 10. 
21 This is not to ignore the various, mostly communitarian and feminist, criticisms against autonomy 
and rights culture in general. However, these criticisms have animated public debate mostly in the 
United States. In Europe the critique of human rights is still rather limited. 
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The aim of this chapter is to start to shake up the somewhat “sacred” status the 
concept of individual autonomy holds in the Western liberal thought. The main 
purpose here is to abstract the Human Rights Court’s Article 8 jurisprudence from its 
paradigmatic assumption about autonomy having just one core meaning – that of 
individual autonomy. My central claim is that individual autonomy is not the only 
possible concept of autonomy the Human Rights Court could have – or indeed, 
should have – chosen to regulate intimate matters in interpersonal relationships. As 
the next chapters argue, the individualistic concept of autonomy is in several ways 
problematic and, in the end, an inappropriate tool to regulate interpersonal 
relationships in the contexts of, e.g. reproduction or medical decision-making. It 
structures human relations into a contract-based form, where values of independence 
and self-sufficiency are paramount (Chapter 2). Drawing from sociological literature, 
it will be further argued that advocating an image of the self-sufficient individual 
misunderstands what it means to live in a highly individualised society. In an 
increasingly individualised world, one has to be socially sensible and to be able to 
relate to others and to obligate oneself, in order to manage and organise the 
complexities of everyday life. This also means that there are attendant obligations 
between individuals to be sensitive towards, and care for, each other. The capacity 
for autonomous life becomes increasingly dependent on the existence of trusting 
relationships (Chapter 3). In this thesis it is argued that this kind of insight requires 
the ECtHR to adopt an appropriate form of autonomy that embraces this knowledge. 
But as I claim, the capacity of individual autonomy to establish and foster trust-
promoting practices is inadequate (Chapter 4). The concept of caring autonomy, as I 
develop in the last chapter of the thesis (Chapter 5), is proposed to be better suited to 
capture the essentiality of human interdependence and the morality that it calls for. 
In the present chapter, I will begin the argument by demonstrating that in addition to 
individual autonomy, two other concepts of autonomy have been, albeit implicitly, 
considered by the ECtHR. This discussion serves three core purposes. First, it 
challenges the assumption that only one core meaning of autonomy can be of 
relevance under the European human rights law. Second, it shows how each concept 
of autonomy emphasises different values. We have different conceptions of 
autonomy based on how we choose to think about the individual, the individual’s 
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relationships to others and about wider community. Each of these forms of 
autonomy, thus, represents and expresses different values about the individual and 
her relationship to others around her, values that have important consequences when 
autonomy is used as a justification for human rights. Following from that, third, it 
makes it clear that when the ECtHR uses autonomy to substantiate its judgments, it 
simultaneously chooses a particular way of organising relationships. By choosing a 
particular concept of autonomy, the Human Rights Court guides us to behave in 
certain ways that are deemed appropriate for an autonomous person, and, 
correspondingly to guide us away from other behaviours towards each other which, I 
argue, are far more representative of social practices, human expectations and moral 
obligations.  
The second part of the chapter deals with the question of whether the Court had any 
real choice to adopt any other concept than that of individual autonomy. As the 
supervisory organ of an international treaty, the Court is bound to follow certain 
interpretation methods and techniques when furnishing the open-ended Convention 
articles. In the context of autonomy rights, three of those methods are relevant: 
dynamic interpretation, comparative interpretation and interpreting the Convention in 
the light of its object and purpose. It will be argued that although they all provide 
convincing explanations of why individual autonomy is the most obvious choice to 
furnish the Article 8 jurisprudence, the argument that individual autonomy is 
intrinsic to Article 8 rights is nonetheless unjustified. Nothing in the Convention 
system prescribes that individual autonomy is fundamentally linked to Article 8 or 
that it is the only choice available to the Court. Rather, the three interpretative 
methods should be seen as guiding the Court to choose and defend a concept of 
autonomy that is responsive to the challenges of the modern Western societies; that 
is open, yet critical to the concepts of autonomy adopted in different context and 
different jurisdictions; and that embraces the whole picture of the object and purpose 
of human rights protection. 
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1.2. Choosing autonomy – The European Court of 
Human Rights in between caring, principled and 
individual autonomy  
A common opinion says that autonomy’s inclusion into the European human rights 
law began with the ground-breaking decision of Pretty v the United Kingdom.22 
Based on “an important extension of Article 8,” the commentators noted the case as 
“the first foundation for a specific legal right to autonomy in law.”23 In fact, some 
rated “autonomy”, and how far it extends in law, as highly as the key issue of the 
case.24  
In many ways these scholars are right. Pretty did become the most authoritative case 
and precedent concerning the development of the subsequent autonomy-related 
ECtHR case law,25 and it introduced the particular content the Court attributed to the 
concept – that of individual autonomy. However, I aim to challenge the – largely 
implicit – assumption that the concept of autonomy as articulated in Pretty was the 
only option available to the Court. I want to suggest that before opting to endorse the 
concept of individual autonomy as the “ability to conduct one’s life in a manner of 
one’s own choosing,”26 for the purposes of solving the issues under Article 8 
jurisprudence, two other possible concepts of autonomy presented themselves first. 
These are what I will call, hereinafter, caring autonomy and principled autonomy.  
At the heart of caring autonomy is the centrality of relationships and the 
understanding that we are all interdependent on each other. Caring autonomy entails 
acting in ways that are guided by the ethics of care – fulfilling commitments that 
                                                
22 Case of Pretty v the United Kingdom (App.2346/02), Judgment of 26 April 2002. 
23 J. Montgomery, “Law and the Demoralisation of Medicine”, (2006) 26 Legal Studies 185-210, at 
208; B. Rudolf, “European Court of Human Rights: Legal Status of Postoperative Transsexuals”, 
(2003) 1(4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 716-721, at 719. 
24 H. Biggs, note 15 above, at 297. 
25 Among others see: Case of Van Kück v Germany (App.35968/97), Judgment of 12 June 2003, para 
69; Case of Campagnano v Italy (App.77955/01), Judgment of 23 March 2006, para 53; Case of E.B. 
v France (App.43546/02), Judgment of 22 January 2008, para 43; Case of Daróczy v Hungary 
(App.44378/05), Judgment of 1 July 2008, para 32; Case of S. and Marper v the United Kingdom 
(App.30562/04 and 30566/04), Judgment of 4 December 2008; Case of Schlumpf v Switzerland 
(App.29002/06), Judgment of 8 January 2009, para 100; Case of S.H. and others v Austria 
(App.57813/00), Judgment of 1 April 2010, para 58; Case of Kurić and others v Slovenia 
(App.26828/06), Judgment of 13 July 2010; Case of R.R. v Poland (App.27617/04), Judgment of 26 
May 2011. 
26 Pretty v the United Kingdom, para 62. 
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particular contexts of relationships require and that form the basis for the existence 
of trusting relationships.27 Principled autonomy requires acting on certain sorts of 
principles that can be principles or laws for all, measured by reference to some 
purportedly universal standard of values. Principled autonomy is based on Kantian 
philosophical treatment of autonomy as dignity.28  
It is important to differentiate between these different understandings of autonomy 
since each of them reflects different ways of thinking about what constitutes 
autonomy as a legal matter. Different concepts of autonomy reflect different 
underlying perceptions about individuals and their relationship to others around 
them; i.e. about what autonomy demands from us and from others. As such, the 
discussion serves as part of the groundwork for this thesis for choosing and 
defending a concept of autonomy that best responds to and suits the contemporary 
challenges regarding interpersonal relationships and decisions within those domains. 
In other words, it is a starting point for my endeavour to think about what concept of 
autonomy is most suitable to conceptualise interpersonal relationships and, in the 
end, the wider social community. Within these lines we can start to evaluate what 
autonomy means and should mean in European human rights law. 
In the paragraphs that follow, I will show how the jurisprudence on autonomy within 
the ECtHR did not, in fact, begin with Pretty, nor, indeed, with a conceptualisation 
of individual autonomy. Rather, I will show that before Pretty there is evidence that 
the Court could have gone another way, that is, that it recognised elements of caring 
and principled autonomy as briefly defined above. This suggests that the current 
conceptualisation of autonomy need not be the last word from the ECtHR, nor should 
it be – as the rest of this thesis will argue.  
1.2.1 Overlooking caring autonomy 
The very first judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in which the term 
“autonomy” occurred, was the case of Johansen v Norway,29 where the applicant 
                                                
27 The essence of the ethics of care and its main features are discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 5. 
28 O. O’Neill, note 12 above, at 83; J. Coggon, note 16 above, at 240. 
29 Case of Johansen v Norway (App.17383/90), Judgment of 7 August 1996. 
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disputed the authorities’ decision to take her daughter into care and deprive her of 
parental rights. Without attaching to the notion of personal autonomy any direct legal 
meaning in the context of the applicant’s Article 8 rights, the Court considered the 
notion of personal autonomy as an important aspect of a child’s development. A safe 
and stable environment was crucial to developing a healthy personhood. Considering 
the rather incidental use of the concept of autonomy in the reasoning of this 
judgment, it would be arbitrary to draw much out of it in terms of the Court’s 
position towards the concept of autonomy. Crucially, the case never became an 
authority in terms of the Court’s interpretation of “autonomy”. I propose, however, 
that the circumstances of the case, and the occurrence of the concept of autonomy in 
this context, presented the Court with a good opportunity to articulate more clearly 
about autonomy in terms of interdependence rather than independence, and about the 
necessity of constructive and trusting relationships for autonomy to flourish 
throughout one’s life. Regrettably the idea of caring autonomy remained 
underdeveloped in the Court’s reasoning, but it was nonetheless present and 
recognised for the purposes of human rights protection.30  
In December 1989 the applicant gave birth to her second child, baby daughter S. At 
that point in her life, Ms Johansen, had had a rather complicated past. She had given 
birth to her first child, a son, when she was very young. She had then lived with a 
man who mistreated her and her son. On several occasions the social welfare 
authorities were involved to assist her in the upbringing of her son, who at one point 
was placed in children’s psychiatric clinic for treatment and was thereafter 
temporarily sent to a foster home. In the meanwhile the relationship between the 
welfare authorities and the applicant did not evolve in good terms. When baby 
daughter S was born, the authorities decided that it was in the child’s best interest to 
be taken provisionally into care. The authorities considered that the applicant’s 
physical and mental state of health did not allow her to take proper care of her 
daughter. Pursuant to the further examination of the case, the welfare authorities 
                                                
30 For a short analysis about whether the ECtHR has in its overall case law accommodated a 
perspective which reflects the ethics of care see M-B. Dembour, Who Believes in Human Rights? 
Reflections on the European Convention, CUP, 2006, at 197-201. Dembour’s conclusion is that very 
little trace can be found of such ethics in the Strasbourg case law.  
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recommended that the baby be placed in a foster home with a view to adoption and 
to deprive the applicant of all her parental responsibilities. The Oslo City Court, 
overseeing the case, decided to uphold the recommendations. The applicant’s 
daughter was placed with foster parents and Ms Johansen did not have any access to 
her baby from that point forward. Before turning to the Human Rights Court, all Ms 
Johansen’s appeals against the care decision and the deprivation of parental 
responsibilities were rejected. Crucial to these decisions was not whether the 
applicant was now in a better position to take care of her child – all instances agreed 
that Ms Johansen’s situation had improved considerably – but whether it would be in 
the child’s best interest to be removed from the foster home to live with her mother. 
The domestic courts relied heavily on the experts’ arguments that reuniting mother to 
her child in this case would destroy the security, stability and the stimulating 
conditions the foster home provides for the child and, therefore, it would not be in 
the child’s best interest to be returned to her mother’s care. An important passage of 
an expert’s opinion presented in the domestic proceedings and later also relied on by 
the ECtHR read as follows:  
As the child was in the middle of a phase of development of personal 
autonomy, it was crucial that she live under secure and emotionally 
stable conditions, such as obtained in the foster home. In short term there 
can be no doubt that the child would react with sorrow and emotion if she 
were now to be removed from her foster home. In the long run it is likely 
that if she were removed at this stage of her development she would 
carry with her into her future life an experience of insecurity vis-à-vis 
other people, including those who represent close and dear relations.31 
The ECtHR, deciding the case under an alleged violation of Article 8, considered 
that there was an interference of the applicant’s right to respect for family life, but 
that the taking of the applicant’s daughter into care and the maintenance in force of 
the care decision was based on reasons which satisfied Article 8(2) requirements.32 
The Court followed the welfare authorities’ assessment about Ms Johansen being 
uncooperative with them concerning her son’s upbringing and her own treatment, 
and therefore, that there was a high probability that the applicant was unfit to take 
                                                
31 Johansen v Norway, para 27 and 72. 
32 Johansen v Norway, para 73. 
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proper care of her daughter. In support of the argument that it was in the child’s best 
interest to stay in the foster home, the Court agreed, again, with the domestic 
authorities that returning the child to her mother would entail a particular risk to her 
“development of personal autonomy.”33  
As to the second strand of the complaint – the deprivation of parental rights and 
access – the Court found these measures, however, to be in violation of Article 8. 
Here, the Court took under consideration the improved conditions of the applicant’s 
lifestyle; the fact that the short contacts she had had with her daughter right after her 
birth were conducted in a manner not open to criticism; and that the difficulties the 
welfare authorities had experienced with the applicant concerned mainly the 
upbringing of her son.34 The complete deprivation of the applicant of her family life 
with her child was in the opinion of the ECtHR, accordingly, unjustified.  
So what does this case say about autonomy? I think two points are especially 
important. First, throughout the decision the emphasis was on the protection of the 
development of the child’s autonomy. The development of her autonomy is directly 
linked and dependent on the circumstances and lifestyle she lived in – most 
importantly, dependent on the people with whom she lived. Leaving aside the 
question to whether the mother’s lifestyle conditions were actually such as to be 
detrimental to the development of the child’s autonomy, I think the Court expressed 
here something fundamental concerning the notion of autonomy. In my perspective, 
what the Court said was that autonomy begins with an assumption of human 
connectedness. Human beings become who they are – their identities, their 
capacities, their desires – through the relationships in which they participate.35 In 
other words, the surroundings and the relationships one is engaged in are crucial for 
the development of one’s autonomy. As the case brings to light, a relationship with a 
                                                
33 Johansen v Norway, para 72. 
34 Johansen v Norway, para 82-83.  
35 In the academic literature this aspect of autonomy resonates in the writings of communitarian and 
feminist authors, who prefer to see autonomy in relational terms. At their heart is a “shared conviction 
… that persons are socially embedded and that agents’ identities are formed within the context of 
social relationships and shaped by a complex of intersecting social determinants.” C. Mackenzie, N. 
Stoljar (eds), note 11 above, at 4. See also A. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd 
ed, Gerald Duckworth & Co Ltd, 2007; J. Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, 
Autonomy, and Law, OUP, 2011.  
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parent can harm or encourage a child’s autonomy. It is instrumental in forming the 
individual’s desires, beliefs and emotional attitudes, and her capacity for self-
reflection and self-knowledge.36 
This relational aspect of autonomy does not, however, apply only to the very young 
whose autonomy is clearly still in the phase of development. Although not explicitly 
expressed as such in the judgment, Ms Johansen’s autonomy was quite similarly 
affected in this case. Her relationship with the welfare authorities had an important 
impact on her autonomy, on her chances to have a family life with her daughter. 
Having come from a troubled background herself, with an abusive partner and lack 
of education, questions can be raised whether the welfare system operated as such as 
to improve her chances to stay together with her daughter, or it was just “easier” for 
the authorities to deal with the situation by taking her child into care. In any case, 
what can be read from the judgment is that the relationship between the applicant and 
the welfare authorities lacked cooperation and trust. Ms Johansen’s autonomy was to 
that extent limited.  
This brings me to the second point that the case makes about autonomy. Namely, the 
concept of autonomy as it is used in the context of Johansen has a strong 
collaborative element.37 An appropriate respect for one’s autonomy will require 
those in position of responsibility, such as parents of young children, to respond 
sensitively to the experiential world of those in their care, to deploy their power and 
influence to restore and strengthen the autonomy of those they care for.38 This 
suggests, for autonomy to flourish, the parties to the relationship have, depending on 
the context, corresponding duties and commitments to fulfil. Respect for the 
daughter’s autonomy demanded that her mother take good care of her and constrain 
her decisions in tune with her daughter’s safe upbringing. According to the domestic 
authorities and the ECtHR, the applicant did not or could not fulfil the obligations 
and responsibilities the mother-daughter relationship demanded when the baby was 
                                                
36 J. Herring, “Relational Autonomy and Rape”, in S. Day Scalter et al. (eds), Regulating Autonomy: 
Sex, Reproduction and Family, Hart Publishing, 2009, at 57. 
37 I borrow this usage from A. Donchin, “Autonomy, Interdependence, and Assisted Suicide: 
Respecting Boundaries/Crossing Lines”, (2000) 14(3) Bioethics 187-204.  
38 A. Donchin, note 37 above, at 191-192. 
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born. However, since the mother’s health and living conditions had improved over 
the years, she was given by the Human Rights Court – I think rightly so – a chance to 
be reunited with her daughter. At this stage, again, the responsibilities of the welfare 
authorities arise to provide care and help for the mother to collaborate and assist her 
in this endeavour. Essentially, the duty of the welfare authorities can be seen as 
assisting her in enhancing her autonomy.    
Essentially, what this case reveals is that an important part of the human condition is 
made of relationships, responsibilities and care. It acknowledges that without all 
those elements there can be no effective exercise of autonomy. It infers that the 
capacity for autonomous action entails the functioning of constructive and trusting 
relationships. If this is the case, then the job for the Human Rights Court in 
protecting one’s autonomy is to find a way to facilitate these kinds of relationships. 
This implicit thinking about autonomy Johansen reveals must be made explicit, and 
must become the preferred way to conceptualise the protection of autonomy under 
the Convention.39    
1.2.2 Discarding principled autonomy 
A year later, in Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v the United Kingdom,40 the Court was 
confronted with the question whether the prosecution and conviction for physically 
injurious sadomasochistic acts, conducted privately among consenting adults, was in 
breach of Article 8. The form of autonomy that emerged from this case requires 
living in accordance to standards of rationality and morality that are shaped by the 
community. Autonomy here means guiding the individual and the society towards 
particular “dignified” choices. Although this particular concept of autonomy still 
figures occasionally in the dissenting opinion of the individual Judges of the ECtHR, 
it has never gained proper ground in the majority opinions. I agree in this respect 
with the majority. Principled autonomy has a strong backwards-looking aspect. It 
tries to (re)establish “traditional boundaries” that in a pluralistic era are neither social 
                                                
39 See Chapter 5. 
40 Case of Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v the United Kingdom (Apps.21627/93;21826/93;21974/93), 
Judgment of 19 February 1997. 
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nor cultural realities any more.41 It carries the risk where courts may try to uphold 
paternalistic policies that prevent individuals from choosing a vocation or a way of 
life that might be “undignified” in the view of those in the position of power. 
The applicants in Laskey were members of a group of men who, over a period of ten 
years, engaged in activities involving the commission of violent acts against one 
another for the purpose of deriving sexual gratification from the giving and receiving 
of pain. All these activities – e.g. maltreatment of the genitalia (with, for example hot 
wax, sand paper, fish hooks and needles) and ritualistic beatings (using either bare 
hand or variety of implements, like stinging nettles and spiked belts) were 
consensual and were conducted in private for no apparent purpose other than the 
achievement of sexual gratification. In the course of investigation into other matters, 
the police came into possession of a number of video films, which were made during 
sadomasochistic encounters involving the applicants and some other homosexual 
men. As a result the applicants were charged with a series of offenses, including 
assault and wounding, convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. The applicants 
appealed, since they did not agree with the officials that their actions were criminal. 
Relying on Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention they argued that they had the 
right to express their sexual personality and that their conviction amounted to an 
unlawful and unjustifiable interference to their right to respect for their private life. 
The Court, delivering the case, noted that “personal autonomy of the individual” was 
of consideration when drawing an appropriate boundary around the limits of state 
interference in situations “where the victim consents.”42 But clearly the Court was 
not quite comfortable in accepting that a reasonable individual would voluntarily and 
autonomously choose to participate in such sexual activities. Since neither of the 
parties disputed that prosecution and conviction for participation in sadomasochistic 
acts was an interference with the applicants’ rights to express their sexual 
personality, the Court could not find a reason to examine this question of its own 
motion. It seems, however, that the Court would have gladly liked to address this 
particular question, and possibly even to end the case as non-pertinent to one’s 
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private life. In any case, the Court found it necessary to point out that “not every 
sexual activity carried out behind closed doors necessarily falls within the scope of 
Article 8”43 and it was “open to question” whether the activities of the applicants 
(which included the recruitment of new “members”, the provision of several 
specially equipped “chambers”, and the shooting of many videotapes which were 
distributed among the “members”) “fell entirely within the notion of “private life”.”44  
Judge Pettiti’s separate concurring opinion in this judgment perhaps expresses best 
the Court’s overall concerns. Judge Pettiti echoed first the majority’s statement that 
not “every aspect of private life automatically qualifies for protection under the 
Convention,” the “fact that the behaviour concerned takes place on private premises 
does not suffice to ensure complete immunity and impunity”, and that “not 
everything that happens behind closed doors is acceptable”. He went on to suggest 
that an appropriate use of Article 8 was one that enabled, regardless of sexual 
orientation, the “protection of a person’s intimacy and dignity, not the protection of 
his baseness or the promotion of criminal immoralism.”45  
The majority of the Human Rights Court did not go as far as Judge Pettiti in their 
reasoning, holding back to judge the activities under question as outright undignified 
and immoral. By avoiding connecting the protection of autonomy to the participants’ 
presumably informed wishes, desires and aspirations,46 the Court instead focused on 
the potential and actual seriousness of the injuries inflicted on the participants. 
Consequently, for reasons to protect the public health, the Human Rights Court 
unanimously found that there was no breach of the Convention. On occasions the 
Court described the acts, however, as (genital) torture,47 arguably “undermining the 
respect which human beings should confer upon each other”,48 and in no way 
“trifling or transient.”49 Such immoral acts, the Court seemed to infer, could not 
                                                
43 Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v the United Kingdom, para 36. 
44 Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v the United Kingdom, para 36. 
45 Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v the United Kingdom, Concurring opinion of Judge Pettiti. 
46 C. Nowlin, “The Protection of Morals Under the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”, (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 264-286, at 284. 
47 Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v the United Kingdom, para 9 and 40. 
48 Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v the United Kingdom, para 40. 
49 Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v the United Kingdom, para 45. 
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violate someone’s autonomy, because no autonomous person would choose to 
behave in those ways.50  
What the Court was arguably contemplating in this case was the idea that autonomy 
is ultimately tied with morality and it depends on specific ideals of appropriateness. 
Only those who display the desired traits of the model moral citizen are worthy of 
respect. This form of autonomy resonates best with what the academic literature has 
reflected as Kantian autonomy51 or what Onora O’Neill has termed principled 
autonomy.52 Principled autonomy is a form of autonomy that requires living in a 
certain way. It requires the person’s decision-making to accord with some objective 
set of ideals53 that are said to constitute the “good life” – that makes human life 
flourish as well as for the individual as for the community. Rooted in Kantian 
thought, principled autonomy requires agents to consider their reason for action, and 
only to pursue a course of action if it could be made a universal law. That is, if it 
could be a successful maxim for all agents to follow. Therefore, if a person chooses 
to act in a way that is incompatible with universalisable ideals, that person is not 
acting autonomously. Similarly to caring autonomy, discussed above, principled 
autonomy may require behaving, for example, with self-control, but this self-control 
is guided by standards of rationality and morality that are shaped by the community, 
not by the nature of particular relationships the individuals participate in, and by the 
responsibilities and attitudes that aim to foster trust in those relationships.  
One of the obvious problems with principled autonomy is in determining what the 
“universal law” is. This approach seems to require some pre-existing assumptions 
about what amounts to ethical behaviour. In highly differentiated, pluralist, and 
                                                
50 Laskey has most often been read, and criticised, as a conservative indictment of private homosexual 
acts. See L.J. Moran, “Laskey v the United Kingdom: Learning the Limits of Privacy”, (1998) 61 The 
Modern Law Review 77-84; C. Nowlin, note 46 above. A positive reading of this judgment is 
provided by Paul Johnson, who sees it as evidence of a more general willingness to extend the 
normative concepts of intimacy and dignity to (some) homosexual private behaviours and to deem 
them protectable. P. Johnson, “‘An Essentially Private Manifestation of Human Personality: 
Constructions of Homosexuality in the European Court of Human Rights”, (2010) 10(1) Human 
Rights Law Review 67-97, at 78. 
51 K. Veitch, The Jurisdiction of Medical Law, Ashgate, 2007, at 56; J. Coggon, note 16 above, at 240; 
C. Foster, note 12 above, at 7. 
52 O. O’Neill, note 12 above.  
53 J. Coggon, note 16 above, at 240. 
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multicultural civil societies, a single overarching conception of the good, or a single 
substantive collective identity upon which we all agree is, however, hard to 
substantiate.54 Probably, this is also one of the reasons why the proponents of 
principled autonomy determine what amounts to ethical behaviour with a tune of 
confidence, rather than providing explanations why certain acts are considered 
immoral or undignified. The underlying rationale seems to be here that “we” all 
know what the right thing is to do or what is best for everybody else.  
For example, rejecting the arguments that seek to employ individual autonomy as a 
basis for gaining access to assisted reproductive techniques, O’Neill insists that  
An adequate future for children and their long dependence must aim to 
ensure that each child is born not just to an individual who seeks to 
express himself or herself, but to persons who can reasonably intend and 
expect to be present and active for the child across many years.55 
Deciding who can be a responsible aspiring parent seems pretty straightforward and 
“prosaic” for O’Neill: it is whether there are reasonable grounds to think that any 
child brought into existence can expect to have at least an adequate future, and cared 
for by a “good enough” family.56 According to O’Neill, a decision to reproduce 
would be “irresponsible” for single parents, those who are chronically ill or addicted, 
very young or very old, individuals without long-term and stable cohabitation and 
collaboration with others, and the incapable or uncommitted, since “childhood is 
long and life uncertain, and children need parents who are reliably present and 
active.”57  
O’Neill’s position echoes well in the dissenting opinion of Dickson v the United 
Kingdom.58 The applicants of this case were husband and wife, Kirk (born in 1972) 
and Lorraine (born in 1958) Dickson. They met each other when they were both in 
prison through a prison pen-pal network. They got married and wanted to have 
children together. Since Kirk was serving a life sentence for murder and Lorraine 
                                                
54 J.L. Cohen, Regulating Intimacy: A New Legal Paradigm, Princeton University Press, 2002, at 49. 
55 O. O’Neill, note 12 above, at 62. 
56 Ibid., at 67. 
57 Ibid., at 62 
58 Case of Dickson v the United Kingdom (App.44362/04), Judgment of 4 December 2007, Joint 
dissenting opinion of Judges Wildhaber, Zupančič, Jungwiert, Gyulumyan and Myjer. 
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was in her forties, they applied for facilities for artificial insemination. Their request 
was refused based on the argument to maintain the public confidence in the penal 
system and to protect the welfare of the child conceived. The Grand Chamber of the 
Human Rights Court decided, however, to uphold the complaint. The majority of the 
Judges of the Grand Chamber found that the Responding State placed a too high 
“exceptionality” burden on the complainants to justify their “exceptional” 
circumstances for being eligible for artificial insemination facilities. 
The dissenting Judges were not satisfied with the Court’s reasoning. They especially 
criticised the Court for not taking into consideration the specific circumstances of the 
case – the couple established a pen-pal relationship while both were serving prison 
sentences; they had never lived together; there was a 14-year age difference between 
them; the man had a violent background; the woman already had three children from 
previous relationships and was at an age where natural or artificial procreation was 
hardly possible and in any case risky; and any child which might be conceived would 
be without the presence of a father for an important part of his or her childhood 
years.59 In terms of principled autonomy, what the dissenting Judges were saying 
was that under these particular circumstances no responsible and reasonable parent 
could autonomously have chosen to have a child. Reasonable choice here would 
apparently “require more than mere forwarding of sperm from a distance in 
circumstances which preclude the donor from participating meaningfully in any 
significant function related to parenthood.”60 Although clearly concerned about the 
welfare of the child, the dissenting Judges were simultaneously judgmental of the 
particular lifestyle and living conditions of the applicants. Perhaps it was not the 
intention of the Judges, but this kind of reasoning could carry the risk of becoming 
paternalistic and creating new forms of domination and privilege – only men and 
women who fit into certain standards are considered morally autonomous and worthy 
of protection.   
 
                                                
59 Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Wildhaber, Zupančič, Jungwiert, Gyulumyan and Myjer. 
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1.2.3 Choosing individual autonomy 
After Laskey, a somewhat similar problem recurred in front of the Strasbourg judges 
in 2002, in Pretty v the United Kingdom,61 where Dianne Pretty complained that her 
husband was not allowed by the English laws to assist her to die. Unlike in Johansen 
and Laskey, in this case the notion of personal autonomy was explicitly linked to the 
protection of Article 8 rights and with the corresponding analysis of the case. Given 
the widely held position to consider Pretty as the case to mark the introduction of the 
concept of autonomy into the ECtHR case law, and its status as one of the landmark 
cases for interpreting autonomy under the European human rights law, we can 
consider individual autonomy as expounded in this case as the Court’s presently 
preferred choice of furnishing autonomy. 
In November 1999 Mrs Pretty was diagnosed with motor neurone disease. Since then 
her condition deteriorated rapidly, leaving her paralyzed from the neck down. She 
had only months to live. She was frightened and distressed by the prospect of the 
cruel final stages of her disease, and in order to avoid that, she wished to be able to 
control how and when she died and thereby be spared known suffering and 
indignity.62 Yet because of her disease she was unable to end her life herself. She 
wanted help from her husband. Although he was allegedly willing to help his wife, it 
was a crime to assist somebody to commit suicide according to section 2(1) of the 
English Suicide Act 1961.63 Hence the 1961 Act stood in Mrs Pretty’s way to choose 
and decide when and how to die.  
In her claim under the Article 8 rights,64 Mrs Pretty submitted that Article 8 of the 
Convention guarantees the right to self-determination, encompassed by the right to 
                                                
61 Case of Pretty v the United Kingdom (App.2346/02), Judgment of 26 April 2002.  
62 Pretty v the United Kingdom, para 8. 
63 S.2(1) of the Suicide Act reads: A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the suicide of 
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make decisions about one’s body and what happened to it. She maintained that she 
was a mentally competent adult, free from pressure and that she had made a fully 
informed and voluntary decision about whether, how, and when to die. Therefore she 
should not suffer under the consequences of the inflexibility of the law imposed on 
her.65 Although the Court agreed that the evidence did not establish that she was 
vulnerable, nonetheless it ultimately found that since the states were entitled to use 
the criminal law to regulate activities that were detrimental to the lives and safety of 
others, the interference with Mrs Pretty’s private life was justified as “necessary in a 
democratic society” (Article 8(2)). Section 2 of the 1961 Act was to safeguard life by 
protecting the weak and vulnerable, and it was the vulnerability of the class, which 
provided the rationale of the law in question.66 To hold section 2 incompatible with 
the Convention would expose “the weak and vulnerable and especially those who are 
not in a condition to take informed decisions against acts intended to end life or to 
assist in ending life.”67   
The conclusion of the Human Rights Court, that the prohibition of assisted suicide 
was not incompatible with any of the Convention articles raised, rendered the case 
unsuccessful for Mrs Pretty and unsatisfactory for those who saw it as the Court’s 
failure to protect thereby her individual autonomy.68 So far it seems that nothing had 
really changed compared to Laskey: the life and safety of other individuals 
prohibited in both of these cases certain individual acts. What made Pretty so special 
then?  
The high precedential value of this particular Strasbourg ruling lies in two 
interconnected aspects: (a) in clear and explicit admission by the ECtHR that Mrs 
Pretty’s Article 8 rights were engaged, and (b) in the particular articulation of the 
content of her rights.  
                                                                                                                                     
Suicide under the European Convention on Human Rights: a Critique”, (2003) European Human 
Rights Law Review 65-91; H.J.J. Leenen, note 15 above; A. Pedain, note 16 above.  
65 Pretty v the United Kingdom, para 72. 
66 Pretty v the United Kingdom, para 78. 
67 Pretty v the United Kingdom, para 74. 
68 See e.g. M. Freeman, “Denying Death its Dominion: Thoughts on the Dianne Pretty Case”, (2002) 
10 Medical Law Review 245-270; D. Morris, note 65 above; A. Pedain, note 16 above. 
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Already at the outset the Court added an important sentence to its otherwise standard 
definition of the “private life” to determine the applicability of Article 8 in this case. 
According to the Court 
 [t]he concept of “private life” is a broad term not susceptible to 
exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and psychological integrity 
of a person. It can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual's physical 
and social identity. Elements such as, for example, gender identification, 
name and sexual orientation and sexual life fall within the personal 
sphere protected by Article 8. Article 8 also protects a right to personal 
development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with 
other human beings and the outside world. Although no previous case 
has established as such any right to self-determination as being 
contained in Article 8, the notion of personal autonomy is an important 
principle underlying the interpretation of its guarantees.[Emphasis 
added]69  
The notion of personal autonomy is firmly recognised in this consideration, but there 
is more. The reference to Article 8 guarantees in general shows that personal 
autonomy is not only a component of the right to private life, but also a component 
of the three other rights mentioned in Article 8: the right to respect for family life, 
the right to one’s home and the right to correspondence. What this arguably means is 
that in all of these contexts the respect of one’s autonomy comes to play a central 
part. The way the Court interprets autonomy accordingly says a lot about what this 
respect demands from oneself and from the others in a wide spectre of circumstances 
concerning one’s private life.  
In determining whether Mrs Pretty’s personal autonomy was affected in this case, the 
English courts’ opinion was that Article 8 was directed to the protection of personal 
autonomy while the individual was alive but did not confer a parallel right to decide 
when and how to die.70 In Lord Bingham’s view “any attempt to base a right to die 
on Article 8 founders in exactly the same objection as an attempt based on Article 2, 
namely that the alleged right would extinguish the very benefit on which it is 
supposedly based.”71 The language of Article 2,72 as the House of Lords judges said, 
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71 Ibid., at 818. 
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reflected the sanctity of life, and therefore “it could be not interpreted as conferring a 
right to self-determination in relation to life and death and assistance in choosing 
death.”73 This viewpoint expressed by the House of Lords resonates with the concept 
of autonomy discussed in the previous section – principled autonomy based on 
Kant’s philosophy – which demands acting after set standards of morality. This 
interpretation gives value to a general requirement for respect for the human person 
as a subject endowed with dignity and inalienable rights, and, to use Kant’s 
language, a subject who should be treated as an “end in itself.” As several 
commentators have pointed out, Kant himself would maintain that dignity of human 
beings renders suicide, assisted or not, morally impermissible:74 
If he destroys himself in order to escape from a difficult situation, then he 
is making use of his person merely as means so as to maintain a tolerable 
condition until the end of his life. However, a human is not a thing and 
hence is not something to be used merely as a means; one must in all 
one’s actions always be regarded as end in itself. Therefore, I cannot 
dispose of a human being in my own person by mutilating, damaging or 
killing him.75 
The Strasbourg Court took, however, a different turn and was “not prepared to 
exclude” the possibility that preventing Mrs Pretty from exercising her choice to 
avoid what she considered an undignified and distressing end to her life, constituted 
an interference with her right to respect for private life as guaranteed by Article 8.76 
There is no similar hesitation on the part of the Court as was present in Laskey about 
whether the acts under issue were representing such human “baseness” as to render 
Article 8 inapplicable. As an important note, the Court stressed that it is under 
Article 8 that notions of the quality of life take on significance:  
The very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity and 
human freedom. Without in any way negating the principle of sanctity of 
                                                                                                                                     
72 Article 2(1) provides right to life: Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
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life protected under the Convention, the Court considers that it is under 
Article 8 that notions of the quality of life take on significance. In an area 
of medical sophistication combined with longer life expectancies many 
people are concerned that they should not be forced to linger on in old 
age or in states of advanced physical or mental decrepitude which 
conflict with strongly held ideas of self and personal identity.77  
“Human dignity” and “sanctity of life” are present here, but “autonomy” is not linked 
to them. This reasoning indicates an acknowledgement that “the principle of personal 
autonomy in the sense of the right to make choices about one’s own body”,78 applies 
to deciding on ending one’s life based on our own assessment of our quality of life. 
This suggests that autonomy as adopted in Pretty is based on a subjective (quality of 
life) valuation of life, rather than on some objective set of ideals (sanctity of life). 
Autonomy in this individualistic sense allows one to make a decision for any reason, 
rational or irrational, or no reason at all: 
[t]he ability to conduct one’s life in a manner of one’s own choosing may 
also include the opportunity to pursue activities perceived to be 
physically or morally harmful or dangerous for the individual 
concerned.79 
The precise nature of the activities required by the applicant to pursue her private life 
is arguably not a decisive factor for the applicability of Article 8(1), or the invocation 
of one’s autonomy rights in general. Interference with conduct, albeit private, of a 
life-threatening nature impinged on by the State’s compulsory or criminal measures 
could be, nevertheless, interference under Article 8(1), that required justification in 
terms of Article 8(2). In short, the scope of protection afforded to personal autonomy 
under the Convention included the making of autonomous choices even in matters of 
life and death.80 The value of individual autonomy lies in the ability to choose and 
not in the consequences of the choice. Others should not interfere in the choices we 
make either in our “best interest” or to prevent harm to us, provided that we are 
deemed competent to make such choices.81 
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The concept of autonomy elaborated in this judgment by the ECtHR fits best with the 
term of individual autonomy as it is used in the literature to signify the freedom of 
the individual to act as they choose and to determine the shape of our own lives.82  In 
the words of Kim Atkins: 
Autonomy, in the liberal tradition, is generally understood as self-
determination: the freedom to pursue one’s conception of the good life, 
just as long as it does not impinge upon another’s identical freedom. On 
this view, each subject is best placed to judge what is good for him or 
her.83 
Since in the next chapter I will elaborate more closely on certain normative aspects 
of individual autonomy as presented in the ECtHR Article 8 case law, I will limit 
myself here with just some of the main elements of it to recap the idea of autonomy 
Pretty delivers: 
- Importance is placed on the capacity of the chooser: the judgment particularly 
emphasises that Mrs Pretty was a mentally competent adult, free from pressure 
and who had made a fully informed and voluntary decision. Individual 
autonomy is posited as a feature of individuals in that it is taken to mean either 
independence from others or, at least, a capacity for independent decisions and 
action.84 
- As long as the chooser is competent, the content of the choice itself is irrelevant. 
This form of autonomy focuses on the procedural conditions of one’s choices, 
how a decision is made rather that what is decided. As long as certain necessary 
conditions of the decision-making process are in place, the choice counts as 
autonomous, regardless of the value (or lack of value) of the object chosen.85 To 
put it another way, this form of autonomy endorses what has been called 
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subjective valuation of life’s worth.86 As such, the emphasis is on self-
sovereignty, with little attention to the quality of choices that might result and 
their effect on others or the rights holder herself.  
1.3. What informs the ECtHR? – The origins of the 
legal concept of individual autonomy  
The discussion above argued that at least three different concepts of autonomy were 
available to the Human Rights Court to furnish the case law under its Article 8 
jurisprudence. Out of those three concepts the Court chose individual autonomy. As I 
noted earlier this choice seemed self-evident and uncontroversial. But why? There 
must be something else other than the concept’s philosophically idealistic appeal. I 
propose that there is a common assumption – equally among the judges as among the 
commentators – that the individual autonomy-based understanding of Article 8 rights 
exists on multiple justifications rooted in the principles and techniques that are either 
built into the Convention system or have been grafted on to it by the Convention 
system. Namely, as the supervisory organ of an international treaty, the Human 
Rights Court is guided by methods of interpretation the Court uses to furnish the 
broadly worded and open-textured Convention articles. Some of those rules are set 
by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; the others have emerged as 
“internal” principles through the Court’s own case law. Through these methods of 
interpretation the Court does not only imbue meaning into the words and phrases of 
the Convention, but the methods also play a key role to render the judicial discretion 
and creativity the Court exercises in its decision-making legitimate.87 In other words, 
these principles of interpretation delimit the Court’s capacity to develop its own 
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approach of what law is at a specific point in time.88 Hence, if individual autonomy 
is clearly and decisively resulting from the Court following its principles of 
interpretation, we have a weak case to propose anything different within the 
parameters of this institutional framework. But as this section argues nothing in the 
Convention system prescribes that individual autonomy is the only choice that can 
be, or should be, taken by the Court. Individual autonomy may seem the most 
obvious option to adopt, but this choice is hardly as straightforward as it is seems.  
In the context of the autonomy-related case law we can talk about three main sources 
and justifications for adopting individual autonomy as the underlying concept of 
Article 8 rights. These three sources are respectively interlinked with three methods 
of interpretation – dynamic interpretation, comparative interpretation and 
interpretation in light of the object and purpose of the Convention. Accordingly, first, 
following the dynamic interpretation, the concept of autonomy derives from changes 
in society. Second, following comparative interpretation, individual autonomy’s 
animating force comes from certain domestic law developments. This includes 
taking into account the practice of domestic courts. Third, individual autonomy is 
derivative from the underlying object and purpose of the Convention. These 
principles of interpretation do not fall into a particular order or hierarchical system, 
but the Court sees the task of interpretation as a single complex exercise intended to 
ensure that the purpose and object of the Convention is fulfilled.89 Therefore, 
although discussed here separately, these sources cannot be seen as isolated from 
each other, they are overlapping, complementary and reinforcing each other. I will 
review them now in turn. 
1.3.1 The “living instrument” argument  
Article 8 is known for its far-reaching scope and dynamic nature.90 Over the years 
the Court has interpreted the right to private life in a progressive and evolutionary 
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manner, extending the span of the right beyond its original privacy concern – threats 
to private space, especially to one’s home, and the right to have personal information 
kept secret. Thus, from very early in the history of the Convention, interferences with 
Article 8(1) were found in cases involving lawful searches of individuals’ homes91 
and places of work,92 the “tapping” of private telephones,93 the photographing of 
individuals,94 and the collection95 and retention and subsequent use of personal 
information.96 In the meanwhile, Article 8 has been interpreted as applying in an 
ever-widening range of contexts, the Court bringing “more and more rights and 
possibilities within the ambit of Article 8”97 – personal security, organisation of 
family life and relationships, sexual mores, and some business activities have been 
included under the protected interests of Article 8.98 With the inclusion of the notion 
of personal autonomy that “is an important principle underlying the interpretation of 
its [Article 8] guarantees”99, the influx of new rights under Article 8 case law has 
been especially active. In addition to admitting such arguably quite ambiguous rights 
as “a right to personal development”,100 “right to self-determination”,101 “right to 
identity”102 and “right to autonomy”,103 we can now identify a more concrete set of 
rights derived from case law. Among others, the Strasbourg Court has explicitly 
named the following: a right to respect for the decision to become a parent in a 
                                                                                                                                     
Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd ed, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998, Ch 
7; C. Ovey, R.C.A. White, note 89 above, Ch 11; L.G. Loucaides, note 18 above, Ch 4; N.A. 
Moreham, “The Right to Respect for Private Life in the European Convention on Human Rights: A 
Re-examination”, (2008) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 44-79. 
91 Case of X v Federal Republic of Germany (App.6794/74), Decision of 10 December 1975. 
92 Case of Niemietz v Germany (App.13710/88), Judgment of 16 December 1992. 
93 Case of Huvig v France (App.11105/84), Judgment of 24 April 1990. 
94 Case of Friedl v Austria (App.15225/89), Judgment of 26 January 1995. 
95 Case of X v Belgium (App.9804/82), Decision of 7 December 1982.  
96 Case of Leander v Sweden (App.9248/81), Judgment of 26 March 1987. 
97 Case of E.B. v France (App.43546/02), Judgment of 22 January 2008, dissenting opinion of Judge 
Mularoni. 
98 On this generally, see D. Feldman, “The developing scope of Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights”, (1997) 3 European Human Rights Law Review 265-274. 
99 Pretty v the United Kingdom, para 61. 
100 Van Kück v Germany, para 69. 
101 Case of Daróczy v Hungary (App.44378/05), Judgment of 1 July 2008, para 32. 
102 Reklos and Davourlis, para 39. 
103 Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow and Others v Russia, para 134; Kalacheva v Russia, para 27; Case 
of A, B and C v Ireland (App.25579/05), Judgment of 16 December 2010, para 212. 
Chapter 1 Choosing autonomy 
 
46 
genetic sense;104 the right of a couple to conceive a child;105 the right to choose the 
circumstances of becoming a parent;106 a right to choice in matters of child 
delivery;107 rights of the parents and children to be together in a family 
environment;108 right to the protection of one’s image;109 the right to decide on the 
continuation of pregnancy;110 and the right to obtain available information on one’s 
health condition.111  
The far-reaching scope of Article 8 and its jurisprudential developments are often 
explained by reference to one of the key interpretational methods of the Convention 
– that of dynamic or evolutive interpretation, adopted by the Court as early as 1978 
in the case of Tyrer v the United Kingdom.112 In this case the applicant had been 
subjected, when 16 years old, to judicial corporal punishment. Three strokes of the 
birch were administered to his bare posterior by a police officer for assaulting a 
fellow pupil. The basic issue for the Court was whether the birching amounted to 
“degrading treatment” contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. The Government of 
the Isle of Man, where the punishment had been imposed, argued that judicial 
corporal punishment was acceptable to the inhabitants of the island. However, the 
Court held that: 
[t]he Convention is a living instrument which…must be interpreted in the 
light of the present-day conditions. In the case now before it the Court 
cannot but be influenced by the developments and commonly accepted 
standards in the penal policy of the member States of the Council of 
Europe in this field.113 
Since the precedential case of Tyrer, the “living instrument doctrine” has enabled the 
Court to creatively update the interpretation of a number of Convention articles in 
varied situations. It has used it to justify a higher standard of protection, and to 
reduce the width of the margin of appreciation allowed to states by certain provisions 
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of the Convention.114 But, by reference to dynamic interpretation, it has also derived 
new rights from those expressly enshrined in the Convention. Besides the notoriously 
wide interpretation it has given to Article 8, it has used the “living instrument 
doctrine” also to adopt an extensive interpretation regarding the applicability of the 
right to a fair trial in Article 6(1),115 or the concept of “possessions” in Article 1 of 
the First Protocol.116  
The commonly accepted rationale behind the evolutive interpretation is that for the 
Convention text from the mid-twentieth century to keep its relevance for today’s 
societies, it needs to adapt itself to changing social ideals and values. The very 
textual nature of the Convention requires positively that the articles are interpreted 
with wide latitude and creativity. As the former judge of the Court, Christos Rozakis, 
explains:  
The very text of the Convention requires a specification of the concepts 
and notions contained therein, while the passing of time in a rapidly 
evolving world requires such specification in each instance to be given 
its current meaning, the one which is acceptable in European societies at 
the time of the application of a rule by the ECtHR./…/Hence, in order to 
keep abreast of new developments of societal habits and morals, the 
ECtHR is obliged to detect the mentalities that have emerged and to 
adapt the relevant concepts accordingly.117 
What this means for Article 8 is that interests will be recognised and protected by the 
right to respect for private life as and when they are required by the civic life, its 
progressive social ideals and changing perceptions.118 Changes in social realities are 
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those that mandate, and perhaps demand even, the Court to reconsider or change its 
jurisprudence in particular situations to particular direction.  
1.3.1.1 Autonomy and social change 
This relationship between law and social change was clearly present in the Pretty 
judgment. The Human Rights Court emphasised the link between the right to make 
choices on one’s quality of life and the development of medical technologies arguing 
that the increasing sophisticated body of medical knowledge, which allows longer 
life expectancy, should not mean that people are “forced to linger on in old age or in 
states of advanced physical or mental decrepitude which conflict with strongly held 
ideas of self and personal identity.”119 The Court’s recognition of the impact of the 
continual advancement of medical knowledge upon perceptions and experiences of 
death and the dying process is an acknowledgement that respect for autonomy 
comprises a social component regarding quality of life issues. As put by one of the 
case commentators, advances in medical technology, changes in social and cultural 
mores, increases in educational opportunities and people’s income, and the high 
value attached to the individual autonomy in Western societies positively demand 
now that people have greater input into medical decision-making and control over 
life and death decisions.120  
Indeed, developments, which allowed autonomy and the autonomous individual to 
rise into prominence under the Convention system, may be seen in the consequence 
of diverse processes of social change.121 Medical developments are one aspect of it. 
They have helped in changing our view on life in respect of its duration and its 
quality. As Ulrich Beck has said: What is considered “health” and “disease” loses its 
pre-ordained “natural” character and becomes a quantity that can be produced in the 
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work of medicine.122 Birth control, organ transplantation, genetic technology, among 
others, allow us to control decisions about the beginning and end of life. “Life” and 
“death” in this view are no longer permanent values and concepts beyond the reach 
of human beings. All this seems to facilitate a shift from the belief that the beginning 
and end of life is the domain of God to the idea that it is or at least can be the domain 
of human decision-making and autonomy.  
Related to this are the process of secularisation and the decline of tradition, the 
falling off of religious and traditional beliefs and practices, emancipating the 
individual from set prescriptions about how to live his or her life. Following these 
developments, recent decades have, accordingly, seen remarkable changes in the 
domains of family life and reproduction, and evidenced profound shifts in the 
cultural meaning of gender and sexual relations. Again, these processes of 
secularisation and detraditionalisation have diversified the ways of life open to 
individuals and extended the space available for individual decision and choice, with 
law being the formal aspect, which enables the material manifestation of self-
determination.123 
The important place that the social change factor holds in autonomy-related Article 8 
case law can be further evidenced in two cases, decided just a couple of months after 
Pretty, concerning the claims of transsexual people who were unable to live in 
conformity with their chosen sex. The applicants of Christine Goodwin v the United 
Kingdom124 and I. v the United Kingdom125, both postoperative male to female 
transsexuals, claimed that the authorities’ had violated their right to private life 
(Article 8) and the right to marry (Article 12) in not legally recognising a 
postoperative transsexual as belonging to her new sex. In a “surprise turnabout”126 
the Court concurred with the applicants’ claims about their right to have their new 
identity recognised by law, emphasising its commitment to the importance of the 
notion of personal autonomy as an interpretative principle of Article 8:  
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Under Article 8 of the Convention, where the notion of personal 
autonomy is an important principle, protection is given to the personal 
sphere of each individual, including the right to establish details of their 
identity as individual human beings.127 
Arguably underlying this particular consideration to the right to personal 
autonomy,128 the Court turned away from its previously established case law 
concerning postoperative transsexuals,129 according to which the respondent 
government’s margin of appreciation extended to legal recognition of people who 
had chosen to have their sex changed. Having regard to the “changing conditions” 
and the need to interpret the Convention “in the light of present-day conditions”130, 
the Court in Goodwin and I. no longer found that the scientific community’s 
continuing debate about the exact nature of transsexualism, the absence of common 
European approach to resolving questions relating to transsexuals or the wider 
impact of making changes to the birth register, were decisive factors in determining 
the case. But what were the changed social conditions that put the individual’s right 
to establish details of her identity at the very centre of this debate? 
First, there was the argument about medical developments. While it remained the 
case that a transsexual cannot acquire all the biological characteristics of the assigned 
sex, the Court noted that “with increasingly sophisticated surgery and types of 
hormonal treatments, the principal unchanging biological aspect of gender identity is 
the chromosomal element.”131 Since chromosomal anomalies may arise also 
naturally, the Court did not, however, consider it significant enough for the purposes 
of legal attribution of gender identity. Additionally it was noted that gender re-
assignment surgery was also lawfully provided by the NHS services, which 
recognised the condition of gender dysphoria.132 What is important about the Court’s 
discussion about medical developments is the latter’s capacity to open up space for 
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personal autonomy and decision-making in matters pertaining to one’s gender. 
Something that was determined by strict biological facts has been opened up for 
choice, even if that choice is restricted by “numerous and painful interventions 
involved in such surgery.”133 
Next, the Court gave importance to the increased social acceptance of transsexuals, 
evidenced inter alia, by the growing legal recognition of the new sexual identity of 
postoperative transsexuals in other jurisdictions.134 Again, this indicates social trends 
towards recognition that perhaps there does not exist a straightforward line between 
whether one was created to be a man or a woman, but that there may be different and 
competing criteria for designating an individual as male or female.135 Increasingly 
one’s sexuality or gender can be perceived not, predominately, as a matter of 
biological fact, but as a matter of personal choice. 
We have seen now that social and scientific developments have played an important 
part in bringing autonomy to the fore – the liberation of the individual from 
traditional ties coupled with scientific progress, opens up the space for the increased 
freedom of choice and individual creativity. Besides developments in medicine and 
change in social attitudes towards e.g. gender and sexuality, there is more. Increased 
educational options, growth in people’s income, increasing cultural ideals about 
being independent and being in control of one’s life – there is a variety of social 
factors that have arguably similarly contributed to the infiltration of the ideas of 
individual autonomy into the Convention system. I will address some of these 
aspects more thoroughly in Chapter 3. The point to be made here is that individual 
autonomy’s ascendancy in human rights law in this sense is part of the spirit of the 
age. The influx of autonomy rights and the individualistic interpretation given to 
them at the same time contributes and conforms to the idea or ideology of the pursuit 
of self-sufficiency as the organising principle of Western postmodern societies. Since 
society values individual autonomy it has become an interest that is subject to 
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protection under the Convention system. This much might seem obvious, however, 
as the following argument shows, it is an impoverished position. 
Although I think the Court is right to “take into account contemporary realities and 
attitudes not the situation prevailing at the time of the drafting of the Convention in 
1949-1950,”136 and thereby acknowledge the importance of autonomy in 
contemporary Western societies, it cannot just assume the characteristics of society. 
The Court needs to be sensitive to the new challenges of individualised societies, and 
when needed, act as a corrective of the “natural” order.137  
Drawing from the works of sociologists, Chapter 3 demonstrates that there are 
several misconceptions about the idea and ideal of the free and autonomous 
individual, which assumes that individuals alone can master the whole of their lives. 
The individual of the 21st century is not a “monad, but is self-insufficient and 
increasingly tied to others.”138 The prevailing liberal model of the autonomous self 
the Court adheres to not only misrepresents what is happening in the society, but 
crucially contributes to the ideal of independence and self-realisation at the cost of 
social alienation, growing insecurity and distrust towards others. 
1.3.2 The ECHR: a system in constant dialogue 
The adoption of the concept of individual autonomy in the examination of Article 8 
claims can be further understood if it is put in the broader picture of materials that 
are not part of the Convention, but which can be used in the exploration of its values 
and evolving material scope. This “dialogue” between the ECtHR and other bodies 
has become a technique common in recent years.139 The Court increasingly takes 
note of non-Convention materials in cases that involve controversial social and 
political issues, or when it seeks support to reverse its past case law. The Convention 
system, as Judge Rozakis suggests in this context, is “in constant dialogue with other 
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legal systems,”140 taking into consideration the decisions of other “brother” courts, or 
influential domestic courts ranking high in the conscience of the legal world. This 
method of interpretation is driven, on the one hand, by the aim of the ECtHR as an 
international body to protect, provide for and integrate human rights in Europe. On 
the other hand, the approach aims to enrich the protection of human rights with 
principles and values that presumably have acquired universal dimensions.141 
The dialogue of the ECtHR with other legal orders can be seen to have affected the 
development of Article 8 autonomy-based case law in two main forms. First, through 
the process of detecting the domestic legal parameters of a case before it, the 
inspirational source for adopting individual autonomy has been the Respondent 
State’s practice. In this case, arguably, the most influential has been the way English 
courts have interpreted autonomy. This can be ascribed, at least partially, due to the 
fact that one of the most influential early autonomy-related case laws originated from 
the United Kingdom.142 The second source of inspiration seems to derive from the 
dialogue with the international legal order – courts operating in domestic legal orders 
outside Europe. In this case we can talk primarily about the dialogue with the courts 
of the United States of America and with the Canadian Supreme Court.  
One more instance of dialogue serves to be mentioned here – dialogue with domestic 
legal systems of States party to the Convention, to which the ECtHR resorts in order 
to decipher the state of law prevailing at a particular moment on the European 
continent concerning the matter before the Court. However, in terms of choosing the 
way to interpret autonomy, it has played a rather modest part. The Court uses this 
form of dialogue to decipher whether there exists some kind of a consensus in 
European countries about certain aspects of the matter, without going into detail how 
one or another country has actually interpreted autonomy. 
In the following I will give a very brief overview of the North-American and English 
law on autonomy corresponding to that of the scope of Article 8. Thereafter, I will 
consider some of the most authoritative autonomy-related cases of the ECtHR, and 
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argue that it is the impact of Anglo-American law on autonomy that has most 
decisively shaped the Court’s choices and preferences on furnishing autonomy under 
its Article 8 case law.143 The close resemblance to what has already for decades been 
taking place in common law countries has prompted some of the commentators even 
to note on the Pretty case accordingly: “The novelty about the case was its form, the 
legal battles fought by Mrs Pretty were not entirely new.”144  
1.3.2.1 Autonomy in the domestic arena 
Autonomy might be a late addition under the Convention system and in the practice 
of the Strasbourg Court, but the concept has figured in the judgments of domestic 
courts for a while now. It is precisely because of the high value attached to the 
individual’s autonomy that privacy rights started to expand in the 1960-70s in North 
American courtrooms.145 After its debut in cases on contraception and abortion,146 
“the new privacy jurisprudence” developed around matters of reproductive rights, 
sexuality and intimate personal relationships.147 The new constitutional privacy 
analysis in the United States articulated the concept of a right to personal privacy as 
an individual right to decisional autonomy (to pursue one’s conception of the good), 
control over access to personal information, and a new conception of the scope of 
individual privacy that now applies to aspects of the domain of morals (including 
health and safety) that were formerly the special preserve of state regulation.148 The 
concern of the new privacy rights was on the freedom of the individual, not the 
particular quality of the choice resulting from that freedom, nor the well-being of the 
right holder. As Eberle says: “As alone individuals, Americans are then free to 
choose the values with which to constitute themselves and govern. And these values 
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become central to personal dignity and autonomy.”149 In America, personal 
autonomy is essentially the right to choose. 
Similar developments took place across the ocean in the United Kingdom, in the 
English legal arena. In one of the most authoritative English medical law cases, 
Sidaway v. Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley 
Hospital and Others,150 the appellant became severely disabled as a result of the 
operation that was meant to relieve persistent pain in her neck, right shoulder and 
arms. Mrs Sidaway sued in negligence, alleging that the surgeon had failed to 
disclose to her the aforementioned risks. In order to establish whether there had been 
a breach of the surgeon’s duty of care to his patient, Lord Scarman was of the 
opinion that one could not simply refer to “the current state of responsible and 
competent professional opinion and practice at the time.”151 Rather, “the right to self-
determination” – “a basic human right protected by the common law” – entailed a 
duty for a doctor to warn the patient of the material risks inherent in the treatment 
proposed so that the patient could make up her own mind in light of the relevant 
information.152  
A similar example of the interpretation of autonomy can be found in a statement of 
Lord Donaldson in Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment):153  
The patient’s interest consists of his right to self-determination – his right 
to live his own life how he wishes, even if it will damage his health or 
lead to his premature death….It is well established that in the ultimate 
the right of the individual is paramount.154 
What we can see in Lord Scarman’s and Lord Donaldson’s opinion is a reiteration of 
some of the familiar aspects of what is commonly understood by individual 
autonomy: self-determination; living one’s own life in accordance with one’s values; 
individual’s control over the information pertaining to her treatment. Subsequent 
judicial developments have proceeded in the same vein. If anything, individual 
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autonomy’s importance has been growing in common law jurisdictions. Kenneth 
Veitch has put it accordingly: “It is the atomistic, right-bearing individual that has 
dominated both the academic medical literature and, at least ideologically the 
[English] courts over the last quarter century or so.”155  
1.3.2.2 Autonomy and the comparative method 
Several autonomy-related ECtHR cases illustrate the point how this developing case 
law is influenced by the reasoning already adopted by the above-discussed domestic 
courts. Pretty, again, provides a good starting point.  
First, in a rather unusual way, the Court gave an extensive reproduction of Lord 
Bingham’s opinion in the House of Lords decision.156 Although, as discussed above, 
the Court departed in one crucial aspect from the House of Lords decision,157 the 
latter’s language still manages to impact the way the Court frames autonomy:  
[t]he imposition of medical treatment, without the consent of a mentally 
competent adult patient, would interfere with a person’s physical 
integrity in a manner capable of engaging the rights protected under 
Article 8(1) of the Convention. As recognised in domestic case law, a 
person may claim to exercise a choice to die by declining to consent to 
treatment which might have the effect of prolonging his life.158  
An important legal implant here to be noted is that of the legal doctrine of consent. In 
the following autonomy-related case law it occurs as one of the central elements to 
guarantee the protection of one’s autonomy. 
Next, in support of its argument that Mrs Pretty’s Article 8 rights were engaged, the 
Human Rights Court seems to have been inspired by a decision of the Canadian 
Supreme Court, Rodriguez v the Attorney General of Canada,159 where “comparable 
concerns arose regarding the principle of personal autonomy in the sense of the right 
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to make choices about one’s own body.”160 Like Mrs Pretty, Ms Rodriguez had been 
diagnosed with an incurable progressive disease affecting her nervous system. In 
order to avoid the stress and loss of dignity caused by the prospect of a painful death, 
Ms Rodriguez wanted her doctors to help her end her life at the time of her choosing. 
Since aiding or abetting suicide was contrary to Section 241(b) of the Criminal Code, 
she applied for an order to declare the provision invalid on the grounds that it 
contravened Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.161 The 
Canadian Supreme Court was not unanimous to hold that the Criminal Code’s 
provisions withstood the constitutional challenge. For the dissenting minority the law 
drew an arbitrary distinction between suicide (which was decriminalised) and 
assisted suicide, thus denying a choice to some that was available to others.162 What 
both, the majority and minority agreed to, was that Section 241(b) infringes Mrs 
Rodriguez’s right to liberty and security of the person as articulated in Section 7 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Despite Article 8 containing no 
separate reference to personal liberty or security, arguably the decisive connecting 
link between these cases was their mutual concern with the underlying value of 
personal autonomy.163 Later, the Court relied, inter alia, on this Canadian case also 
to find support for its conclusion that States have the right to control through their 
criminal laws activities prejudicing the life and security of a third person.164   
In Evans v the United Kingdom,165 – another authoritative case among the ECtHR 
Article 8 autonomy-based case law – concerning the applicant’s right to respect for 
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the decision to become a parent in a genetic sense, the ECtHR followed the path 
similar to Pretty. The Court gave an extensive overview of the domestic proceedings 
of the case. This included citations of the High Court Judge, as well as the reprint of 
extracts from the Court of Appeal’s judgment. In addition to that, the Evans 
judgment included the domestic discussion concerning the regulation of the 
medically assisted reproduction preceding the adoption of the relevant legislature. 
All these instances emphasised the primacy of consent of both parties participating in 
assisted reproduction. Underlying the importance of consent was the consideration 
that it was necessary to uphold the principle of self-determination or personal 
autonomy – “the each person’s right to be protected against the interference with 
their private life.”166 In a large part the Human Rights Court was, in its own decision, 
replicating the language of the English authorities.  
As to the dialogue with foreign jurisdictions outside Europe, several cases from the 
United States courts’ practice and an Israeli Supreme Court case concerning 
medically assisted reproduction were brought out for comparison.167 However, only 
the Israeli Supreme Court decision in Nachmani v Nachmani168 was mentioned in the 
Court’s own reasoning to highlight the difficulties of balancing the equal (autonomy) 
rights of the parties to assisted reproduction.  
We also see in several more recent cases how the terminology of consent, control 
and self-determination has become inseparable for the interpretation of autonomy. So 
in Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v Russia169 the Court explained the essence of the 
autonomy in the sphere of medical assistance in the following way: 
The freedom to accept or refuse specific medical treatment or to select an 
alternative form of treatment, is vital to the principles of self-
determination and personal autonomy… [F]or this freedom to be 
meaningful, patients must have the right to make choices that accord with 
their own views and values, regardless of how irrational, unwise or 
imprudent such choices may appear to others….[a]lthough the public 
interest in preserving the life or health of a patient was undoubtedly 
legitimate and very strong, it had to yield to the patient’s stronger interest 
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in directing the course of his or her own life….[f]ree choice and self-
determination were themselves fundamental constituents of life and that, 
absent any indication of the need to protect third parties – for example, 
mandatory vaccination during an epidemic, the State must abstain from 
interfering with the individual freedom of choice in the sphere of health 
care, for such interference can only lessen and not enhance the value of 
life.170 
In Reklos and Davourlis v Greece,171 the effective protection of a person’s image 
entailed obtaining the consent of the person concerned, or the latter would have no 
control over any subsequent use of the image.172 In Ternovszky v Hungary173 the 
applicant’s right to personal autonomy entailed the existence of legal and 
institutional environment that enabled the mother to form an (informed) choice as to 
the circumstances of giving birth.174   
I do not challenge the importance of the comparative method of interpretation to the 
development of the ECtHR case law – this kind of communication of knowledge is 
material in an increasingly globalised world, where human activities are not curtailed 
any more by national boundaries. Nevertheless, in the context of the ECtHR new 
autonomy-based case law, it seems that the “dialogue” between the Court and the 
“foreign” institutions has been sometimes rather one-sided. The preferences and 
choices made in the English and North American courtrooms have been seemingly 
indiscriminately transplanted into the Human Rights Court’s “autonomy” language. 
In determining the content of the concept of autonomy, the Court has neglected its 
usual critical manner to make interpretative choices out of respect for what the 
Convention grants,175 and it has relied instead on the domestic characterisation of the 
notion of autonomy. 
In this way the Court seems to ignore what a highly contested issue the concept of 
autonomy is at the moment in American constitutional law as well as in its primary 
field of application – in medical law and bioethics. Individual autonomy has recently 
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come under attack from a variety of perspectives, particularly from feminist and 
communitarian sides.176 Some scholars speak even of the tyranny of autonomy in 
medical ethics and law.177 Others have argued that the informed consent 
requirements are ethically inadequate means for protecting autonomy.178 All in all, 
more and more voices express doubt about whether individual autonomy is in fact an 
appropriate model for life. While there has been detected some signs that American 
law on autonomy is moving away from the view of individuals as mere lone rangers 
and toward a conception of persons who may exercise rights in ways that connect to 
community,179 the ECtHR case law has allegedly “even leapfrogged the homeland 
country of individual freedoms on the road towards individual autonomy, free choice 
and privacy rights.”180   
In the next chapter I will address more concretely the potential shortcomings of this 
legal transplantation to matters pertaining to interpersonal relationships and to one’s 
personal life. There are difficulties and consequences of importing autonomy as it is 
used in domestic medical law cases into human rights law, where sometimes 
excessive weight is placed on quite minimal and even implausible conceptions of 
individual autonomy.  
1.3.3 Back to the future 
The final general perception concerning individual autonomy I want to address in 
this chapter, supported by the case law and its commentators, is the understanding 
that there is nothing “new” about the alliance between autonomy and Article 8, or 
autonomy and the Human Rights Convention in general. In R.R. v Poland,181 for 
instance, the Court stated that it had already been established in Bruggeman and 
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Scheuten v Germany182 – an abortion case decided in 1977 – that the choice of a 
pregnant woman to continue her pregnancy or not belongs to the sphere of private 
life and as a matter of autonomy.183 Commentators have, equally, found no difficulty 
in discerning traces of autonomy in earlier case law, seeing it as part of the Court’s 
long-established role under Article 8 to promote and protect the free development of 
individual personality.184 Trends towards the increasing importance of personal 
autonomy have been detected in “pre-Pretty” cases concerning the rights of sexual 
minorities, victims of sexual violence, rights of prisoners, etc.185  
This position is further endorsed by the relatively disorganised use of the language of 
autonomy in the case law of the Human Rights Court, where autonomy has been 
collaterally, albeit for somewhat dubious reasons, referred to as a “principle 
underlying the interpretation of Article 8 guarantees”,186 as a distinct “right to 
personal autonomy”187, and finally, as a “sphere of personal autonomy within which 
everyone can freely pursue the development and fulfilment of his or her personality 
and to establish and develop relationships with other persons and the outside 
world.”188 In addition to that, often the case law now combines autonomy with 
notions already long in use in the Court’s practice, such as the protection of one’s 
identity and integrity. Yet again, one is left with no real guidance about whether the 
principle of autonomy has always been the basis for the protection of identity and 
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integrity rights,189 or if the right to personal autonomy is in fact a special right, a 
derivative or an extension of these “older” notions.190 Be that as it may, mixing 
autonomy with concepts of identity and integrity only magnifies the impression that 
autonomy is and always has been part of the Convention system, even if not 
explicitly expressed in the written text of the Convention. 
1.3.3.1 The object and purpose of the Convention: A 
libertarian bill of rights? 
The roots for the understanding that regards individual autonomy and the Convention 
as being closely and consistently connected could be found in the idea that any 
interpretation of the Convention rights need to be seen in the light of the object and 
purpose of the Convention itself. The Preamble to the Convention is to be considered 
here as one of the most important sources of inspiration. Already in Golder v the 
United Kingdom191 the Court recognised the Preamble as part of the context of the 
substantive text and indicative of its object and purpose.192  
As noted earlier, the Convention does not mention “autonomy.” The Preamble does, 
however, make a reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. According 
to Article 1 of the Declaration all human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights. Relying on this reference, scholars have argued that the ECHR “expresses 
an unwavering commitment to the principle of respect for human dignity”193 and 
human dignity is understood as embracing within it respect for individual autonomy. 
Respect for individual autonomy and human dignity in this sense are considered 
“sufficiently close to be linked together under this [human dignity] principle rather 
than allocated their own separate ethical spaces.”194  
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In Strasbourg this association between dignity and individual autonomy first 
occurred in the language of dissenting judges. In 1990 Judge Martens, in his 
dissenting opinion on the Cossey judgment195 about the legal recognition of the rights 
of transsexuals, considered respect for human dignity and human freedom to be “the 
principle which is basic in human rights and which underlies the various specific 
rights spelled out in the Convention.”196 Human dignity and human freedom meant 
for Judge Martens that “a man should be free to shape himself and his fate in the way 
that he deems best fits his personality.”197 Judge Martens defended this position 
further in his partially dissenting opinion in Kokkinakis v Greece,198 where the 
Human Rights Court upheld the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness for proselytising 
in violation of Greek criminal law. He explained the content of these underlying 
principles of the Convention in the following way: 
[S]ince respect for human dignity and human freedom implies that the 
State is bound to accept that in principle everybody is capable of 
determining his fate in the way that he deems best – there is no 
justification for the State to use its power to “protect” the proselytised. 
…[E]ven the “public order” argument cannot justify use of coercive State 
power in the field where tolerance demands that “free argument and 
debate” should be decisive.199   
In Judge Martens’ view, the object and purpose of the Convention required respect 
for an individual’s capacity to make choices about intimate matters without 
interference by the State and also without the State’s protection from undue 
influence. The fundamental object of human rights relates to respect for the 
individual as a free and independent agent, able to make autonomous choices. A 
similar position was endorsed in the dissenting opinion of Judge Van Dijk in 
Sheffield and Horsham v the United Kingdom,200 where he refers to the “fundamental 
right to self-determination” – “not separately and included in the Convention, but… 
at the basis of several of the rights laid down therein” – and “a vital element of the 
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“inherent dignity”, which according to the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, constitutes the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world.”201  
Whereas the Court has never in so many words explained the association between 
human dignity, human freedom and individual autonomy, it has on several occasions 
now explicitly acknowledged that the “very essence of the Convention is respect for 
human dignity and human freedom.”202 As noted earlier, this statement took an 
important place in the Pretty judgment, and it has been used now in several other 
more recent autonomy-related cases,203 prompting a shared opinion that the role of 
human dignity and human freedom is to further individual autonomy, in the sense of 
advancing individual liberty based upon the choice of the individual.204 On this 
reading, the function of human dignity and human freedom is to reinforce claims to 
self-determination rather than to limit free choice; it is a conception of individual 
empowerment rather than of social or collective constraint.205  
From this viewpoint autonomy comes as close as possible to reflect the liberal 
paradigm of individual and individual rights.206 Within liberal political theory, 
autonomy is considered to be an individual right and this rationalism provides the 
core assumption about the relationship with the state. Liberalism, in this context, 
depends on the ability of an autonomous individual to make rational decisions about 
her own life and government should interfere as little as possible in the lives of its 
citizens.207 It is worked out in a myriad of civil-political rights, which have been laid 
down in international treaties and in national documents, such as bills of rights, 
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constitutions and ordinary legislation. All of these instruments have emphasised the 
importance of individual self-determination and the limited role of the state which 
stays away from interference with the private sphere of the individual or, if 
necessary, demands action from the state to guarantee the exercise of self-
determination. Furthermore, the protection of self-determination is perceived as the 
global legal-normative core of our society. Costas Douzinas has put it in this way: 
“A key claim of liberalism is that it does not impose a conception of the good life, 
but allows people to develop and carry out their own life-plans, through the use of 
rights.”208 The purpose of ECHR as any other human rights treaties is, therefore, seen 
to protect the autonomy of individuals against the majoritarian will of their state.209  
Given the intimate connection between this kind of liberalism, autonomy and 
rights,210 it is natural that one might wish to ask: is this not the issue then that the 
Court has been concerned with all along – maybe not expressed as autonomy, but 
certainly enumerated as “individual rights”? Are not all civil liberties in the end 
autonomy-related?211  
I believe that this kind of perspective provides a questionably narrow and one-sided 
picture on autonomy, dignity and on the purpose and object of human rights 
protection under the Convention system. Without going into the wide literature 
dedicated to the understanding of the concept of human dignity,212 which is 
sometimes characterised as “something of a loose cannon, open to abuse and 
misinterpretation,”213 based on Section 1.2.2 of this chapter, the point can be made 
that the relationship between dignity and autonomy can be seen as something very 
different as proposed so far in this present section. Following principled autonomy, 
based on the Kantian understanding of human dignity, an autonomous person worthy 
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of respect, acts in accordance with principles that can be principles for all. In that 
respect dignity means not only the individual dignity of the person, but the dignity of 
man as species.214 That sort of dignity is not at the disposal of the individual, but is to 
serve also higher community values. Personal claims of autonomy are thus to be 
exercised “within the holistic conception of personhood that includes attributes of 
self-determination, equal worth, and respect, but also bounds and responsibility.”215 
This is the sort of dignity that also underlies the constitutional jurisprudence of 
number of European states including France, Hungary and most notably Germany.216 
The point being made here is that a convincing argument can be made that human 
dignity demands rather respecting communitarian values than committing to an 
individualistic conception of autonomy.217 I want to suggest that, either way, the 
object and purpose of the European Convention on Human Rights remains one-sided 
and inadequate. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not 
only say that all human beings are born free and equal in human rights. It also says 
that all human beings are endowed with reason and conscience and should act 
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. This second sentence of Article 1 has 
remained regrettably in the background compared to the first sentence. As the 
chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis demonstrate, it supports a formula for the 
interpretation of autonomy that is much more suitable for the twenty-first century 
than concentrating solely on the respect for the individual and his or her 
individualistic rights. Caring autonomy, as discussed in Section 1.2.1, above, already 
provided a starting point, in this respect, to think about autonomy in terms of 
relationships, trust and caring. Or to say it in terms of Article 1 of the Declaration of 
Human Rights – the exercise of autonomy should happen with reason, conscience 
and in the spirit of brotherhood.  
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Using the context of the Human Rights Court’s case law, this chapter outlined three 
different concepts of autonomy – caring autonomy, principled autonomy and 
individual autonomy – as representing three different normative understandings 
about ourselves and our relationships to others. Caring autonomy recognises human 
beings as interdependent and considers important fulfilling commitments that 
particular contexts of relationships require. Principled autonomy requires acting on 
certain sorts of principles that can be principles or laws for all, measured by 
reference to some purportedly universal standard of values. Individual autonomy 
means that each individual has the right to choose how to be and become the kind of 
person she wants to be, and to have her own self-chosen lifestyle. Individual 
autonomy is about living a self-authored life: living according to values that are 
one’s own. 
Concurrently it was argued that these different concepts of autonomy represented 
three different choices open for the Court for interpreting autonomy under its Article 
8 jurisprudence. The chapter argued that out of the three concepts the Court chose 
individual autonomy. For many European human rights law commentators this 
choice seemed to be rather self-evident and uncontroversial. Further to individual 
autonomy’s philosophically idealistic appeal, I proposed that this unanimity is based 
on the assumption that the individual autonomy-based understanding of Article 8 
rights exists on multiple justifications rooted in principles and techniques that are 
either built into the Convention system or have been grafted on to it by the 
Convention system. Considering the adoption of individual autonomy in the light of 
dynamic interpretation, comparative interpretation and interpretation in light of the 
object and purpose of the Convention, it was found that the inclusion of the concept 
under the Convention system has proceeded in an uncritical and potentially 
misconceived manner. Moreover, nothing in the Convention prescribes that 
individual autonomy can and should be the most suitable model to underlie the 
interpretation of Article 8 guarantees. In fact, considering that the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights casts light on the object and purpose of the 
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Convention, the concept of autonomy should not just concentrate on individual 
wishes and desires, but it should be considerate also towards others and their needs. 
A critical analysis of the autonomy-related ECtHR Article 8 case law is, therefore 
pertinent and needed. The next chapter, accordingly, proceeds to analyse the possible 
impact the practice of the Human Rights Court, expressed and shaped through its 
autonomy-based case law, has on the dispositions or behaviour of individuals, and 
therefore, on the social relationships these individuals are involved in. In other 
words, it questions whether the individualistic concept of autonomy is an appropriate 
tool to regulate interpersonal relationships in the contexts of, e.g. reproduction or 
medical decision-making. 
 





EXPRESSIONS OF INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Individual autonomy has developed into a core value of European human rights 
protection. There is an increasing recognition of the individual autonomy-based 
understanding of the European Convention on Human Rights Article 8 rights. A 
wide array of matters pertaining to private and family life, matters related to health, 
dying, reproduction, etc., are being approached as affairs of individual autonomy – 
that of personal choice and control. The previous chapter argued that despite 
individual autonomy being perhaps the most obvious choice for regulating matters 
under the Article 8 jurisprudence – supported by social and technological 
developments, influences from other jurisdictions and its close resonance with the 
liberal understanding of human rights protection – it was not the only possible choice 
available for the Court within the European Human Rights Convention framework. 
The aim of this chapter, along with the two upcoming chapters, is to make the case 
why this choice – the adoption of the concept of individual autonomy to underlie the 
interpretation of Article 8 guarantees – is unsuitable for the protection of private life 
of the European Convention on Human Rights.  
While in the next chapter I argue that the concept of individual autonomy is 
inadequate to regulate interpersonal matters from the social perspective – 
interdependence rather than independence, in-insufficiency rather than self-
sufficiency, characterises the way we organise and deal with the complexities of 
everyday life – my focus for the present chapter is on the role of the European Court 
of Human Rights to foster this, greatly idealised yet impoverished, image of 
individual independence and self-sufficiency. The chapter, hence, asks what possible 
impact does the practice of the Human Rights Court, expressed and shaped through 
its autonomy-based case law, have on the dispositions or behaviour of the 
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individuals, and from there on, on the social relationships these individuals are 
involved in. In other words, the underlying purpose here is to investigate how the 
expansion of “individual autonomy rights” onto the specific areas of life and 
particular relationships affects human relations and the capacity it provides for 
autonomy to remodel them. And, at an even more basic level, recognition of some of 
the implications the autonomy-related case law involves refashioning our 
understanding and perceptions about ourselves, our relations to others and about 
society in general.  
My central claim in this chapter is that the individual autonomy-based practice now 
developing under the European Court of Human Rights Article 8 jurisprudence does 
the following: (a) fosters a particular type of individual – an independent and isolated 
yet active and flexible individual with a self-protective stance towards others around 
him or her, and; (b) directs human relations into formalism and proceduralism guided 
by contract-based models of interaction. Although the Court does not adumbrate 
these characteristics per se, it proves to be effective for retaining control over 
personal affairs and in the battles against other subjects of autonomy. Yet while 
one’s personal sphere is very often, in one way or another, closely interconnected 
with that of the family members, relatives, close friends etc., promoting the virtues of 
an isolated individual potentially turns human relations to non-emotional, calculated 
places of alienation and combat.    
Drawing from insights of moral philosophy and ethics, I further contend that this 
kind of normative picture of individual conduct is highly problematic in the context 
of personal relationships. The “moral space” in which interpersonal relationships 
reside is not necessarily coincident with a set of rules that govern interactions 
between state and individual or between that of the strangers. This picture of 
morality might work adequately as long as we are in fact talking about interactions 
about strangers, especially strangers whose relationship is adversarial. The concept 
of individual autonomy may fit into the relationship of state versus individual, but it 
acts differently when applied to medical or family settings. It overlooks many kinds 
of questions that are crucial to morality, and ignores the features of personal 
relationships that make them personal and worth having. Hence, by exalting a rather 
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thin and limited conception of autonomy into the centrepiece of more and more areas 
of personal life, there is not just the worry that it gives us a distorted picture of 
human condition, there is also the worry that something valuable gets lost. Placing 
autonomy at the heart of doctor-patient relationships, or regulating the relationships 
within the family or partnership circle, substitutes the, so far, implicit expectations of 
care with explicit contractual rules of calculability and self-defensiveness. Because 
of these inherent limits, individual autonomy cannot be constitutive of social life and 
interpersonal relationships. 
The inquiry into the expressions of autonomy under the ECtHR practice – with the 
special focus on its impact on human relations – is divided into two main sections. 
The first point of inquiry is the vision of human nature or human character purported 
by individual autonomy through the ECtHR case law. My aim is to identify the 
identity of the subjects of autonomy rights as they result in the decisions of the 
ECtHR. What is being asked is: what kind of a person is shaped and formed under 
the ECtHR jurisprudence? What are the necessary characteristics of the subject of 
autonomy and what is the effect of those characteristics on our understanding about 
ourselves and our relations to others? Who is the “human” of autonomy rights? For 
these purposes I frame my argument around three cases pertaining to assisted 
reproduction.1 Since reproduction is intrinsically an endeavour that involves the 
participation of more than a single person, I think the cases provide an especially 
good case study to investigate what kind of human being is implied in the Court’s 
reasoning and what is the impact of this picture of a human person on interpersonal 
relationships. However, other autonomy-based cases could have been taken from the 
Article 8 jurisprudence to illustrate the same issues. This line of reasoning is not only 
particular to matters of reproduction. 
Based on an abortion case,2 the second part of the chapter focuses on the way the 
Human Rights Court structures interpersonal relationships through the safeguards it 
provides to secure respect for individual autonomy. My claim is that as the result of 
                                                
1 Case of Evans v the United Kingdom (App.6339/05), Judgment of 10 April 2007; Case of Dickson v 
the United Kingdom (App.44362/04), Judgment of 4 December 2007; Case of S. H. v Austria 
(App.57813/00), Judgment of 3 November 2011. 
2 Case of Tysiąc v Poland (App.5410/03), Judgment of 20 March 2007. 
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the reasoning provided by the Court, personal relationships become potentially more 
adversarial and antagonistic. 
2.2. Legal images of an autonomous person 
The account of autonomy, e.g. individual autonomy, which has gained prominence 
under the ECtHR Article 8 case law, presents itself largely as a descriptive term.3 By 
this I mean that an individual’s right to respect for autonomy does not rest on an 
assessment of the moral quality of his or her actions or choices (“the ability to 
conduct one’s life in a manner of one’s own choosing may also include the 
opportunity to pursue activities perceived to be of a physically or morally harmful or 
dangerous nature for the individual concerned”4). The ECtHR Article 8 case law is 
based on the presumption that how individuals act, or the reasons why they choose to 
act, is, from the moral point of view, irrelevant, provided they act autonomously – 
that is, with sufficient understanding and freedom from outside control (“a mentally 
competent adult who knows her own mind, who is free from pressure and who has 
made a fully informed and voluntary decision”5).6 Indeed, such views on autonomy 
are sometimes called “value-neutral” accounts in that they attempt to define 
autonomy without direct reference to the content of the value systems that define and 
motivate agents.7 Autonomy is viewed as a property of individuals, and specifically 
as a form of individual independence.8 The existence of autonomous choice depends 
on compliance with what might be called “technical, non-ethical tests for mental 
competence”9 and on standards set for the decision-making process, e.g. informed 
consent procedures in medical practice. It is not the particular choice that makes it 
                                                
3 J.P. Safranek, “Autonomy and Assisted Suicide: The Execution of Freedom”, (1998) 28(4) Hastings 
Center Report 32-36, at 32. 
4 Case of Pretty v the United Kingdom (App.2346/02), Judgment of 29 April 2002, para 62. 
5 Pretty v the United Kingdom, para 72. 
6 K. Veitch, The Jurisdiction of Medical Law, Ashgate, 2007, at 69; J.P. Safranek, note 3 above, at 32; 
C. Mackenzie, “Relational Autonomy, Normative Authority and Perfectionism”, (2008) 39(4) Journal 
of Social Philosophy 512-533, at 512. 
7 J. Christman, “Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social Constitution of Selves”, 
(2004) 117 Philosophical Studies 143-164, at 151; P. Droege, “Life as an Adjunct: Theorizing 
Autonomy from the Personal to the Political”, (2008) 39(3) Journal of Social Philosophy 378-392, at 
381. 
8 N.C. Manson, O. O’Neill, Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics, CUP, 2007, at 18. 
9 K. Veitch, note 6 above, at 69. 
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worthy of respect, but rather the act of choosing; the actions of will rather than their 
result. In other words, the focus is on “how a decision is made, rather than what is 
decided.”10 
Without specifying the moral character of any particular act, this view of autonomy 
then promises an individual to live a life after his or her version of the “good” – 
whatever it is at a particular moment – requiring duties of restraint to prevent the 
State from imposing particular values. In practice, however, as I will show, this 
illusion of State neutrality disguises normative commitments to certain standards of 
moral behaviour or character that are considered essential components of 
autonomous action. In other words, in order for an individual to have a justiciable 
right to live a life of her own choosing, she or he must first meet certain standards of 
normality and character traits that are deemed appropriate for an autonomous person 
exercising an autonomous choice. In other words, if you want to have your choices 
respected you need to conform to certain characteristics and dispositions. Therefore, 
in terms of assessing the moral quality of an individual’s behaviour, the difference 
between individual autonomy compared to other forms of autonomy (e.g. caring 
autonomy and principled autonomy, both briefly discussed in the previous chapter) is 
marginal since in actuality they all define certain standards for moral behaviour.  
These points – the way the Human Rights Court moulds the behaviour, conduct and 
character of individuals according to the ideal of individual autonomy – are 
illustrated in the next section by reference to three reproduction cases from the 
practice of the ECtHR.  
2.2.1 When the other is on the way  
2.2.1.1 Evans v the United Kingdom 
This case arose out of a claim made by Ms Evans arguing for her right to respect for 
her decision to become a parent in a genetic sense. Ms Evans and her partner at the 
time, Mr Johnston, had commenced a procedure for in vitro fertilisation. Shortly 
thereafter, Ms Evans was diagnosed with pre-cancerous tumours in both ovaries, 
                                                
10 P. Droege, note 7 above, at 381. 
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which meant  that they had to be removed. The hospital advised her that it would be 
possible before the necessary operation to “harvest” her eggs, fertilise them with the 
gametes of her partner and freeze the embryos, in order to keep alive her hope to 
bear a child in the future. In the United Kingdom, such a procedure is regulated by 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (the 1990 Act),11 provisions of 
which allow both parties to withdraw their consent at any time before the 
implantation of the embryos in the uterus. Though Ms Evans was interested in 
whether it was possible to freeze her unfertilised eggs, she was informed that this 
procedure, which had a much lower chance of success, was not performed at the 
clinic. Also, her partner reassured her that he was committed to having a baby with 
her. Two years later, however, the relationship broke down. As a result, Mr Johnston 
asked the clinic to destroy the embryos. In these circumstances Ms Evans 
commenced court proceedings requiring Mr Johnston to restore his consent and 
arguing, inter alia, that the relevant legislation was incompatible with her human 
rights.  
In particular, she claimed that the regulatory framework of the 1990 Act constituted a 
breach of her freedom from interference in her private life under Article 8 of the 
ECHR by requiring that the clinic not treat her without the on-going consent of her 
former partner. The applicant stressed that the female’s role in IVF treatment was 
much more extensive and emotionally involving than that of a male. Her emotional 
and physical investment in the process far surpassed that of the man and justified the 
promotion of her Article 8 rights. The applicant was also not satisfied that the 1990 
Act operated in a way where her rights and freedoms in respect of creating a baby 
were dependent on her former partner’s whim. Since Mr Johnston had given Ms 
Evans belief that he wished to be the father of her children, and that the relationship 
between them would continue, Ms Evans had relied on that statement and opted to 
create embryos using his gametes, instead of freezing eggs. Hence, Mr Johnston 
should not be allowed to withdraw his consent. All of the court instances, however, 
rejected her request. At the final stage of her appeal the Grand Chamber of the 
                                                
11 Though the 1990 Act is now amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, the 
references made here are to the 1990 Act as the one in force during the dispute.  
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ECtHR found on the 10th of April 2007 against Ms Evans by a majority of thirteen to 
four. The reasons for this unanimous understanding of the law were the following. 
According to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR the central dilemma in the case was 
that it involved a conflict between the Article 8 rights of two private individuals. 
Both of the rights under question – the right to respect for the decision to become a 
parent and the right to respect for the decision not to become a parent – concerned 
the right to respect for choices made by individuals with regard to their private life, 
encompassing aspects of “an individual’s physical and social identity, including the 
right to personal autonomy, personal development and to establish and develop 
relationships with other human beings and the outside world.”12  
Hence, both parties claimed respect for the same right, arguably of the same 
intensity,13 regulated in the same way by the statutory requirement of consent. The 
Court was accordingly faced with a problem of how to resolve identical rights of two 
individuals within one and the same relationship. How did the Court proceed? 
The majority of the Grand Chamber of the Human Rights Court noted the strong 
policy considerations in the current situation that had persuaded the State to adopt a 
rule permitting no exceptions to the requirement of consent by both gamete providers 
continuing up to the point of implantation of the embryo. The rationale for this was 
“respect for human dignity and free will” and “to ensure a fair balance between the 
parties to IVF treatment.”14 In addition to the public interest for upholding the 
primacy of consent, the Court was convinced that the consent requirements were 
implemented in this case accurately also in practice. The Grand Chamber found that 
the clinic carrying out the IVF treatment had properly explained to Ms Evans the 
consent provisions and obtained thereafter her written consent as required by law. 
Whereas the Court was aware that the applicant’s medical condition pressured her to 
make a decision quickly and under extreme stress, she must have nevertheless 
                                                
12 Evans v the United Kingdom, para 71.  
13 Evans v the United Kingdom, para 80: “While the applicant contends that her greater physical and 
emotional expenditure during the IVF process, and her subsequent infertility, entail that her Article 8 
rights should take precedence over J’s, it does not appear to the Court that there is any clear consensus 
on this point.”  
14 Evans v the United Kingdom, para 89.  
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known, according to the Court, that “these would be the last eggs available to her, 
that it would be some time before her cancer treatment was completed and any 
embryos could be implanted, and that, as a matter of law, J would be free to 
withdraw consent to implantation at any moment.”15  
The Grand Chamber was satisfied that the domestic rules were clear and brought to 
the attention of the applicant, and that no violation of Article 8 of the Convention 
occurred.16  
Four of the seventeen judges dissented.17 Contrary to the majority opinion, the 
dissenting judges were much more sympathetic towards Ms Evans, her desires and 
her particular condition. They agreed with Ms Evans’ contention that part of the 
purpose of reproductive medicine was to provide a possible solution for those who 
would otherwise be infertile. According to the dissenting judges, that purpose was 
frustrated if there was no scope for exceptions in special circumstances. The minority 
considered it important that (a) it was Ms Evans’s very last chance to have a 
genetically related child; (b) Mr Johnston, knowing well this fact, gave her an 
assurance that he wanted to be the father of her child and (c) Ms Evans’ situation 
made it rather unreasonable to expect her to contemplate the probability of Mr 
Johnston withdrawing his consent. Under these circumstances they found that Ms 
Evans’ right to decide to become a genetically related parent should have weighed 
heavier than that of Mr Johnston’s decision not to become a parent. 
After having outlined the circumstances and the Court’s position on the case, we can 
now tackle the question posed for this chapter: what kind of a human being is 
implied in the reasoning of the autonomy-based judgments of the ECtHR? 
2.2.1.2 Autonomous person – detached and independent  
In order to come up with some answer to the question posed, I start with the context 
of the case – reproduction. Reproduction is a process that typically requires the 
                                                
15 Evans v the United Kingdom, para 88.  
16 Evans v the United Kingdom, para 92.  
17 Evans v the United Kingdom, Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Türmen, Tsatsa-Nikolovska, 
Spielmann and Zmiele. 
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involvement of two individuals, one of each sex, to create a new offspring. The 
content of both the right to respect for a decision to become a parent and not to 
become a parent is, hence, unavoidably constitutive of a relationship. No matter 
which party makes a decision, it affects, in one way or another, the other party. 
Echoing Onora O’Neill in this matter, reproduction is intrinsically not an individual 
project.18 Technological advancements and the repeated insistence on reproductive 
autonomy not to restrict access to assisted reproductive technologies have 
substantially, however, challenged the relational character of procreation.   
It is true that assisted reproductive technologies have significantly altered the essence 
of the process of procreation – it is possible now to break down very clearly the 
different stages of the process (collecting semen/eggs, creating an embryo, embryo 
implantation in the uterus), to involve third parties (using ova or sperm from the 
donors or employing a surrogate mother), or to create an impression that it is, in 
effect, a purely individual project (a single woman using the sperm of an unanimous 
donor). In line with this understanding, Elaine Sutherland, for instance, argues that 
since donated gametes are frequently used without the participants knowing the 
identity of the others, it consequently eliminates the “problem” of the other party, 
e.g. the corresponding duty of the donor to procreate: “It is simply the fact that 
gametes are available that raises the prospect of an individual pursuing the 
opportunity to procreate.”19   
Parallel to the progress in medicine and technology, several influential philosophers 
and bioethicists express the idea that reproduction is a key component of individuals’ 
life plans and that individuals should, as much as is possible, be free to determine 
their own fates and settle the questions about reproduction by themselves.20 These 
scholars see procreation as involving the freedom to choose one’s own lifestyle and 
                                                
18 O. O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, CUP, 2002, at 65. 
19 E.E. Sutherland, “‘Man Not Included’ – Single Women, Female Couples and Procreative Freedom 
in the UK”, (2003) 15(2) Child and Family Law Quarterly 155-171, at 162.  
20 R. Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom, 
Vintage Books, 1994, at 166; J. Robertson, Children of Choice: Freedom of the New Reproductive 
Technologies, Princeton University Press, 1994, at 30; E. Jackson, “Conception and the Irrelevance of 
the Welfare Principle”, (2002) 65 The Modern Law Review 176-203. 
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the way to express one’s deeply held beliefs and morals.21 Without going into the 
extensive literature dedicated to the scope and limits of reproductive or procreative 
autonomy,22 the point I want to make here is that the possibilities created by new 
technologies coupled with increasing appeals to autonomy in reproduction matters, 
contributes to the idea that reproduction is essentially an individual matter – an 
important form of self-expression of one’s individual autonomy.  
Indeed, the Human Rights Court in Evans seemed to be persuaded by the fact that 
since it is now technically possible to keep human embryos in frozen storage, it gives 
rise to “an essential difference between IVF and fertilisation through sexual 
intercourse.”23 This difference made it for a State legitimate, “and indeed 
desirable,”24 to set up an appropriate legal scheme. The United Kingdom solution to 
this “essential difference” was centred on the doctrine of consent. Written consent of 
each gamete provider was needed concerning the treatment provided by the clinic, 
and most importantly, each of the gamete providers was provided with the “power 
freely and effectively to withdraw consent up until the moment of implantation”.25 
To sum it up with the words of Ruth Deech, the former chair of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority: “[the] British attitude is very insistent on 
consent as the key to dignified and independent use of a person’s genetic material. 
The preservation of bodily integrity and control over one’s own genetic material is 
paramount.”26  
Following the British line of thought in Evans, the Court arguably then suggests that 
reproduction is about two separate choices of two separate individuals. The 
                                                
21 J. Harris, “Rights and Reproductive Choice”, in J. Harris, S. Holm (eds) The Future of Human 
Reproduction: Ethics, Choice and Regulation, Clarendon Press, 1998, 5-37, at 35. 
22 See e.g. M.H. Shapiro, “Illicit Reasons and Means for Reproduction: On Excessive Choice and 
Categorical and Technological Imperatives”, (1996) 47 Hastings Law Journal 1081-1221; J.A. 
Robertson “Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family”, (1996) 47 Hastings Law Journal 
911-933; J.A. Laing, “Artificial Reproduction, the “Welfare Principle”, and the Common Good”, 
(2005) 13 Medical Law Review 328-356; R. Sparrow, “Is it “Every Man’s Right to Have a Baby If He 
Wants Them”? Male Pregnancy and the Limits of Reproductive Liberty”, (2008) 18(3) Kennedy 
Institute of Ethics Journal 275-299. 
23 Evans v the United Kingdom, para 84. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Evans v the United Kingdom, para 79. 
26 R. Deech, “The legal regulation of infertility treatment in Britain” in S.W. Katz et al. (eds) Cross 
Currents: Family Law and Policy in the US and England, OUP, 2000, at 175. 
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interrelatedness and dependence on each other concerning any decision taken in this 
relationship and during the course of things was, indeed, not part of the Court’s 
reasoning. Its implicit presence was rather recognised as an obstacle for the 
employment of the Court’s standard adjudication methods27 as “each person’s 
interest is entirely irreconcilable with the other’s, since if the applicant is permitted 
to use the embryos, J will be forced to become a father, whereas if J’s refusal or 
withdrawal of consent is upheld, the applicant will be denied the opportunity of 
becoming a genetic parent.”28 The case was all about two separate, independent, 
autonomous decision-makers; about “two individuals, each of whom is entitled to 
respect for private life.”29  
It is hard to agree with this position. Although developments in medical technology 
and changing social mores make it increasingly commonplace to assume that 
reproduction can be solely an individual matter, I think it crucially overlooks one of 
the core purposes of procreation – that it is undertaken exactly because it creates 
close human connections and bonds. The choice to reproduce is, therefore, linked at 
every stage – from making the decision to exercising the decision – to that of 
autonomy of another person or the person to be. While it is even noted in Evans that 
the protection of Article 8 encompasses the right to establish and develop 
relationships with other human beings and the outside world,30 it remains unclear 
what kind of an impact this relational aspect of Article 8 or that of autonomy has on 
protecting the choices made in these relationships in practice. It seems that there is 
none. The Court’s direction towards supporting the understanding of an individual as 
an independent decision-maker is, on the other hand, vividly present. The language 
the majority is using refers to completing the status of a person, rather than of a 
relationship: e.g. “being a parent” rather than “having a child”.  
 
                                                
27 For an excellent analysis on these matters see J. Bomhoff, L. Zucca, “The Tragedy of Ms Evans: 
Conflicts and Incommensurabilty of Rights”, (2006) 2 European Constitutional Law Review 424-442. 
28 Evans v the United Kingdom, para 73. 
29 Ibid., para 69. 
30 Ibid., para 71. 
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2.2.1.3 Autonomous person – self-sufficient and in 
control 
In order to fulfil one’s wishes and decisions – to become or not to become a parent – 
independence as detachment is not alone, however, enough. One has to have the 
capacity to make one’s own way in the world. In pursuit of this ideal, independence 
requires self-sufficiency and insulation of the risks.31 
There is the will and interest of Ms Evans to have a child genetically related to her. 
Her wish is not about becoming a mother in a social, legal or even physical sense, 
since there is no rule of domestic law or practice to stop her from adopting a child or 
even giving a birth to a child originally created in vitro from donated gametes.32 She 
is determined to pursue the goal of becoming a mother in a genetic sense. However, 
as the case indicates, she lost her guard at one point and made herself vulnerable to 
Mr Johnston. Since egg freezing has a much lower chance of success and her partner 
reassured her about his intentions of having a child with her, she decided to trust 
him. That did not fit well with the ideal of individual autonomy as independence and 
self-sufficiency and the consent procedures guaranteeing it. Upholding Mr 
Johnston’s autonomy rights – his decision not to become a parent – the Human 
Rights Court noted that although the applicant was pressed to take the decision and 
was under a lot of stress, she knew that those were her last eggs available to her and 
that Mr Johnston was free to withdraw his consent to implantation at any moment.33   
We can repeat this exercise looking from the standpoint of Mr Johnston. Being in 
control of his own life story similarly drove Mr Johnston’s interest. In that sense Mr 
Johnston’s and Ms Evans’ positions did not differ much. The key thing for him was 
to be able to choose when, and if, and with whom he would have a child.34 At the 
time of the creation of embryos he was in a relationship with Ms Evans. He might 
have had some hesitations about going through the IVF, but he possibly knew also 
that uncovering his doubts might make Ms Evans leave him, since she was so 
                                                
31 B. Hoffmaster, “What Does Vulnerability Mean?”, (2006) 36(2) Hastings Center Report 38-45, at 
42. 
32 Evans v the United Kingdom, para 72. 
33 Evans v the United Kingdom, para 88. 
34 BBC news, “Woman loses final embryo appeal”, 7 April 2007, available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/6530295.stm.  
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determined to have a child of her own.35 Yet the context eventually changed and he 
fell out of love with Ms Evans. And the modern individual’s argument goes that if 
you make a decision in one context, but then the context changes, the decision made 
will not be binding any more. The binding character of the decision would otherwise, 
in Bauman’s words, “severely limit the freedom one needs to relate anew.”36 In a 
world that “is in flux, spinning ever faster, compulsively initiating, revising, 
rearranging, and discarding its relationships,”37 it was only natural that he “had been 
doing his best to reassure the applicant that he loved her and wanted to be the father 
of his children; giving the truthful expression of his feelings at that moment, but not 
committing himself for all time.”38  
Interestingly, after Evans was decided, the arguments pro individual autonomy got 
even stronger, but in this time in an effort to reach a solution where the both parties 
could exercise their autonomy and choices, independently from each other.39 In his 
comment on Evans case Lind, for example, expresses his discontent about the case in 
the following way:  
[b]ecause of for a woman in Evans’ position, who wishes to have 
children who are genetically hers but discovers that she requires 
treatment that will render her infertile, the only realistic option is to 
create and store embryos, which, under current UK law, leaves her 
dependent upon the continued consent of the male gamete donor for her 
reproductive decision-making. A man facing infertility, in contrast, has 
the option of freezing and storing his sperm, over which he will retain 
unilateral control until he makes a final decision to use it for the creation 
of embryos.[Emphasis added.]40 
This rather confirms my point that the Court’s reasoning urges people to take control 
over their lives. Every person is shaping his or her own life; everyone is a separate 
                                                
35 See Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd and others, [2003] EWHC 2161 (Fam), para 61. 
36 Z. Bauman, Liquid Love: On the Frailty of Human Bonds, Polity Press, 2003, at viii. 
37 See M. Kohn, Trust. Self-Interest and the Common Good, OUP, 2008, at ix.  
38 Evans v the United Kingdom, para 21. 
39 N. Priaulx, “Rethinking Progenitive Conflict: Why Reproductive Autonomy Matters”, (2008) 16 
Medical Law Review at 194-195. See also E. Jackson, “Degendered Reproduction”, (2008) 16 
Medical Law Review 346 
40 C. Lind, “Evans v United Kingdom – judgments of Solomon: power, gender and procreation”, 
(2006) 18 Child and Family Law Quarterly 576. 
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(human) rights holder and author of her own life. Individual autonomy is first and 
foremost about owing duty for oneself to succeed.  
I think the language of the dissenting judges, on the other hand, grasps much better 
the contextual nature of the case. They were dissatisfied that the majority did not 
give any weight to the fact that Ms Evans’ partner gave her an assurance that he 
wanted to be the father of her child, and relying on that she acted in good faith.41 
Further to that they noted that an embryo is a joint product of two people, and the act 
of destroying an embryo also involves destroying the applicant’s eggs.42 According 
to the dissenting judges, the creation of the embryos should have been, then, the 
decisive moment from which point on Mr Johnston is not able to rescind his consent. 
In Chapter 5 I will come back to this suggestion and propose my own viewpoint of 
how the case should have been decided in the light of caring autonomy that 
incorporates the importance of interpersonal relationships and the corresponding 
responsibilities people have towards one another. For the time being, the point I want 
to stress here is that while, for the majority of the Grand Chamber, the case was 
about two independent individuals pursuing their separate wishes, the minority saw 
the case beyond the formal contractual sense and took into account the context of the 
situation and the relationship in which the individual lives.  
2.2.2 When the other is ignored 
To illustrate the point that, through the interpretation of individual autonomy, the 
Court implicitly fosters normative ideals of independence and self-sufficiency, I 
proceed with two more examples: Dickson v the United Kingdom43 and S.H. v 
Austria.44 Like Evans, Dickson and S.H. both concern the question of the “right to 
respect for the decision to become a parent.”45 Unlike in Evans, however, in Dickson 
and S.H. there was no dispute between the parties themselves. Each respective 
couple in these two cases wished to have a child together. I want to show that even 
                                                
41 Evans v the United Kingdom, para 8 of the dissenting opinion. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Case of Dickson v the United Kingdom (App.44362/04), Judgment of 4 December 2007. 
44 Case of S. H. v Austria (App.57813/00), Judgment of 3 November 2011. 
45 Dickson v the United Kingdom, para 66; Evans v the United Kingdom, para 71-72. 
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under the circumstances where the issue was clearly about a joint and mutual 
enterprise, the Court’s language and reasoning in these judgments separated that 
enterprise into individual units. Whereas the Dickson case focused mainly on Kirk 
Dickson’s “right to become a genetic parent” and Lorraine Dickson and her part in 
this endeavour was greatly missed by the Court, in S.H. the emphasis was on the 
couples’ wishes and desires to have a child, and all possible repercussions on the 
chid were ignored.  
2.2.2.1 Dickson v the United Kingdom 
Although I briefly mentioned Dickson in the previous chapter, the detailed 
parameters of the case were largely not introduced.46 Therefore I will clarify the 
details of the case here.  
Kirk Dickson was serving a life sentence in prison when he met Lorraine via the 
prison pen-pal network. Lorraine was at the time also serving a prison sentence. 
After she was released, she and Kirk got married. They wanted to have children 
together. Since conjugal visits were not allowed in prison and Kirk was also not 
allowed to visit home, there was no opportunity for them to conceive naturally. 
Considering that Lorraine would be 51 by the time Kirk had his first chance to be 
released from the prison, the couple applied for artificial insemination facilities. The 
Secretary of State’s policy was that the requests for artificial insemination treatment 
by prisoners were granted only in exceptional circumstances. The Dicksons’ request 
was refused based on three main arguments. First, their relationship was not tested 
within a normal environment. Second, there were concerns about the moral and 
material welfare of the future child, e.g. due to prolonged absence of the father. 
Third, the argument was raised about the importance of maintaining public 
confidence in the penal system.47  
The Dicksons appealed, but unsuccessfully. The national courts found that public 
and private interests had been correctly weighed by the authorities, and that the goals 
underlying the policy were lawful. The Dicksons appealed, thereafter, to the Human 
                                                
46 Ch 1, Section 1.2.2. 
47 Dickson v the United Kingdom, para 13. 
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Rights Court, arguing that the refusal of access to artificial insemination facilities 
breached their rights under Article 8 and/or Article 12 of the Convention. The Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR upheld their appeal and concluded that the balancing of 
interests at the national instances had not been fair. The Grand Chamber did not 
agree with the Government’s suggestion that losing the opportunity to beget children 
as a result of the imprisonment was an inevitable consequence of imprisonment. 
According to the Grand Chamber, there were no security issues involved in granting 
access to artificial insemination facilities, nor did it give rise to any financial or 
administrative requirements on the State.48 Next, the Court held that, although 
maintaining public confidence in the penal system was a justified argument that 
supported the policy, the evolution of European penal policy was towards the 
increasing importance of the rehabilitative aim of the punishment. The latter required 
the rights of the prisoner not to be set aside.49 As a final point, the Court considered 
that while the welfare of the child was relevant as a matter of principle and that the 
State has a positive obligation to ensure the effective protection of children, these 
interests could not prevent the applicants from attempting to conceive a child.50 The 
Grand Chamber concluded that although the policy did not contain a blanket ban, 
there was no room for proportionality assessment, and the policy was incompatible 
with the Article 8 right. 
Although a large part of this judgment seems to deal with the questions of penal 
policy rather than addressing directly the issue of the right to be able to beget a child 
under the Convention, Dickson, nevertheless, makes at least two points in terms of 
characterising the image of the person.  
First, the judgment depends wholly on Article 8. Although the Dicksons were 
married and their aim was to found a family together, the Court did not raise the need 
to examine the case under Article 12 of the Convention.51 Of course, Article 12 is 
                                                
48 Dickson v the United Kingdom, para 74. 
49 Dickson v the United Kingdom, para 75. 
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known to be of very restricted application,52 its wording implying that only married 
heterosexual couples can claim the right to found a family.53 But was not that 
precisely the case with the Dicksons? It was not about a single person or an 
unmarried couple seeking to found a family via assisted reproduction, but a “proper” 
married couple whose mutual wish was to have a child together.54 Moreover, as 
Eijkholt notes, traditionally, the ambit of Article 8 did not relate to the “mere desire 
to found a family,” but required family life that “was already in existence.”55 So why 
did the Court find under these circumstances that it was more appropriate to ground 
the protection of reproduction under Article 8? Or more importantly – what 
implications might such reasoning have for our understanding about the subject of 
autonomy rights? 
I suggest that by examining the case uniquely in light of Article 8, the Human Rights 
Court confirms its position developed in Evans that reproduction can be projected as 
primarily an individual matter. In other words, it confirms the idea of seeing human 
beings as essentially being separate from each other. Relationships exist, but they are 
not treated as constitutive. 
In fact, following the judgment, one could argue that the Dicksons would possibly be 
better off without each other. As Helen Codd notes, if Lorraine wanted to, she could 
                                                                                                                                     
Convicted Criminals in the United States and the United Kingdom: Is Child Welfare Becoming the 
New Eugenics?”, (2003) 82 Oregon Law Review 1033-1065, at 1062; A. Alghrani, J. Harris, 
“Reproductive Liberty: Should the Foundation of Families Be Regulated?”, (2006) 18(2) Child and 
Family Law Quarterly 191-210, at 197. 
52 C. McGlynn, “Families and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights: Progressive 
Change or Entrenching Status Quo?”, (2001) 26(6) European Law Review 582-598, at 591. 
53 See also case of Rees v the United Kingdom (App.9532/81), Judgment of 17 October 1986, para 49: 
“[t]he right to marry guaranteed by Article 12 refers to the traditional marriage between persons of the 
opposite biological sex,” and the article is “mainly concerned to protect marriage as the basis of the 
family.” Arguably this position is somewhat relaxed now pursuant to Goodwin v the United Kingdom, 
where the Court seemed to have expressed the idea that the right to found a family is not tied to 
marriage. See A. Campbell, H. Lardy, “Transsexuals – the ECHR in Transition”, (2003) 53(3) 
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 209-253, at 226-227; S.L. Cooper, “Marriage, Family, 
Discrimination and Contradiction: An Evaluation of the Legacy and Future of the European Court of 
Human Rights’ Jurisprudence on LGBT Rights”, (2011) 12(10) German Law Journal 1746-1763.  
54 Of course one could argue, as did Judge Bonello in his concurring opinion of the Chamber 
judgment (Case of Dickson v the United Kingdom (App.44362/04), Judgment of 18 April 2006) that 
“family” implies more than “mere forwarding of sperm from a distance in circumstances which 
preclude the donor from participating meaningfully in any significant function related to parenthood.” 
But if do deny certain married couples the right to found a family, why to let them get married in the 
first place.  
55 M. Eijkholt, “Right to Procreate is not Aborted”, (2008) 16 Medical Law Review 284-293, at 289. 
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seek to become pregnant by assisted insemination by a donor, or apply to adopt, as a 
single parent.56 She was either given a chance to have a child with Kirk via assisted 
reproduction or she would not be able to procreate within marriage. Similarly, if Kirk 
would want to realise his (individual) autonomy, he would be better off to find a 
younger woman.57 
The second aspect I would like to address here confirms the first. The case is very 
much focused on Kirk Dickson and basically neglects the involvement of Lorraine 
Dickson, who was equally affected by the refusal of artificial insemination. The 
Grand Chamber discusses at length the questions whether the loss to beget a child is 
an inevitable consequence of imprisonment, whether allowing prisoners guilty of 
serious offences to conceive children would undermine the public confidence in the 
prison system, and whether the absence of a parent for a long time would have a 
negative impact on a child, reminding us only once that the second applicant was at 
liberty and was also expected to participate in the child’s upbringing.58  
It could be argued that being married to a prisoner means that you are automatically 
and directly affected by your husband’s or wife’s prisoner status. But even if one is 
affected by it, this does not mean that his or her needs can be completely subsumed 
by it. It is important to include the prisoners’ partners in the discussion so that their 
mutual situation is addressed, not just the prisoner’s situation. 
2.2.2.2 S.H. and others v Austria 
In S.H. and others, the applicants – two couples – disputed the provisions of the 
Austrian Artificial Procreation Act that prohibited some techniques of artificial 
procreation using ova and sperm from donors. Heterologous fertilisation, banned by 
Austrian laws, was the only medical technique by which they could successfully 
conceive children. The applicants argued that a decision of a couple wishing to make 
use of artificial procreation is an expression of one’s private life and that the 
                                                
56 H. Codd, “Regulating Reproduction: Prisoners’ Families, Artificial Insemination and Human 
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limitations to the use of artificial fertilisation set by the legislation was an unlawful 
interference to their Article 8 rights. The applicants further emphasised the special 
importance of a right to procreation, which should conduce to remove all legal 
barriers to the techniques of artificial reproduction. 
The Austrian laws on artificial procreation were aiming to balance three underlying 
interests – the interests of human dignity, the freedom of procreation and the well-
being of children. The laws wanted to prevent the forming of unusual parental 
relations such as a child having more than one biological mother, in order to protect 
the right of each child to a biological identity. The aim of the legislation was also to 
prevent the possible exploitation of women and the commercialization of ova, sperm, 
embryos and uterus. In this regard, the Austrian Government stressed that the central 
issue for them  
[w]as not whether there could be any recourse at all to medically and 
technically assisted procreation and what limits the State could set in 
that respect, but to what extent the State must authorise and accept the 
cooperation of third parties in the fulfilment of couple’s wish to 
conceive a child.59  
A further goal pursued by the national legislation was to avoid the risk of artificial 
fertilisation being used for selective eugenic reproduction. For all these reasons the 
Austrian legislation maintained a cautious approach to heterologous fertilisation, in 
particular when the donation of ova and surrogate motherhood is involved. In the 
Austrian legislation the “wish of a child” – to use the Court’s language – was valued 
and supported, but it was not considered as an absolute trump.60 
As third party interveners, Germany and Italy both supported the Austrian concerns 
about the possible problems of splitting motherhood into two categories: genetic and 
biological. This was, according to the interveners, problematic as well in terms of the 
child’s welfare (the possible negative impact on the child’s psychological and social 
development), and also as causing potential conflicts between the genetic and the 
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biological mother (for example in case of an illness or handicap of the child). 
Additionally, the concern of women’s exploitation was raised as well.61 
In a rather unusual way, instead of basing its reasoning on present day evidence 
(November 2011 at the time judgment), the European Human Rights Court based its 
examination of the case on the scientific state and social consensus as it existed in 
1998 in Austria, when the dispute was considered by the Austrian Constitutional 
Court. This aspect was critical to the outcome of the judgment. This led the Grand 
Chamber of the Court to find that the Responding State was not, at that time (1998), 
exceeding its margin of appreciation and no violation of Article 8 was found.62  
However, considering the way the Court constructed the case and the weight it gave 
to the parents’ “right to have a child”, it is likely that if the case had been assessed 
under the “present-day conditions” then a violation of Article 8 would have been 
more than a realistic outcome.63 
Drawing from, among others, Pretty, Evans and Dickson, the Grand Chamber of the 
Human Rights Court considered that the private life aspect within the meaning of 
Article 8 covered the desire of couples or life companions to have children as one of 
the essential forms of expression of their personality as human beings.64 Importantly, 
unlike the Chamber that considered the case under Article 1465 taken together with 
Article 8, the Grand Chamber limited its examination to Article 8 taken alone. Like 
in Dickson, we can see the Court’s continuing willingness to give Article 8 an 
enhanced role to regulate matters pertaining to procreation and reproduction.66  
                                                
61 S.H. and others v Austria, para 69-73. 
62 S.H. and others v Austria, para 115. 
63 S.H. and others v Austria, para 117-118: “[t]he Court observes that the Austrian parliament has not, 
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64 S.H. and others v Austria, para 80-82. 
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66 See also S.H. and others v Austria, Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Tulkens, Hirvelä, Lazarova 
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The great emphasis that the case gives to the importance of one’s individual 
autonomy, and to one of its expressions – the right for respect to choose to have a 
biological child – becomes more evident once the case is examined in further detail. 
As the first step, the Court decided that, rather than the State’s positive obligations, 
State’s negative obligations were at stake in this case. Although on several occasions 
the Court has noted that it is not always clear-cut and possible to define the question 
of whether the measure at issue should be deemed to be an interference by a public 
authority, or an alleged breach of a positive duty under Article 8,67 I think in this 
particular case the distinction between these two aspects of a right mattered. It 
mattered because framing the issue as one of “involving an interference with the 
applicants’ right to avail themselves of techniques of artificial procreation”68 made it 
possible to abstain from addressing directly the issue of the extent that the State must 
provide the cooperation of third parties.69 It made it easier to neglect the other poles 
of the relationship – the gamete donors. Structuring the case as one of interference to 
the applicants’ Article 8 rights meant that if only the laws were not prohibiting, the 
respective “services” would have been freely available. By structuring the case this 
way, the Court was able to overlook the presence of the “other” parties involved in 
artificial procreation matters in their case reasoning and judgment.   
The subsequent reasoning of the Court conforms to this structure. Addressing the 
Government’s concerns that medically advanced techniques of artificial procreation 
carried the risk that they would not be used only for therapeutic purposes, but for 
“selection” of children, or that the ovum donation posed a risk of exploitation or 
humiliation of women, the starting point for the Court was always an individual’s 
wish to have child. Since the legislation had already in place several specific 
safeguards and precautions to prevent the potential risks of eugenic selection or to 
prevent the exploitation of women in vulnerable situations as ovum donors, “the 
Austrian legislature could…devise and enact further measures and safeguards to 
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reduce the risk attached to ovum donation.”70 Further, considering the risk associated 
with creating the relationships in which the social circumstances deviated from the 
biological one, the Court, drawing a comparison with the institution of adoption, 
again noted that “a legal framework satisfactorily regulating the problems arising 
from ovum donation could also have been adopted.”71 It is notable that the Court did 
not attempt to weigh the interests of donor women or children born into ambiguous 
family forms, versus that of aspiring parents’ wishes; the arguments were solely 
based on how efficiently the State could adopt some legislation to protect women 
from the risks of artificial procreation. It seems that the Court elevated the “desire” 
for aspiring parents to have a child to be the ultimate goal, and therefore was critical 
of the State for not finding a way to satisfy that goal. And, until the State does so, 
“there is no prohibition under Austrian law on going abroad to seek treatment of 
infertility that uses artificial procreation techniques not allowed in Austria.”72  
In a way the applicants in S.H. and others are a good example of the image of the 
modern autonomous man that I maintain is being fostered by the Court’s 
interpretation of Article 8 in the light of the concept of individual autonomy. To 
make the point, it is worth quoting a paragraph from the judgment, which speaks for 
itself. Namely, in response to the Government’s concerns about allowing the use of 
either sperm or ova from the third parties, the applicants’ position was that 
[t]he adverse effects relied on by the Government in arguing the 
necessity of the interference could be reduced, if not prevented, by 
further measures that the Austrian legislature could enact and, in any 
event, were not sufficient to override the interests of the applicants in 
fulfilling their wish for a child.73  
I accept that it is impossible to predict all the possible social and psychological 
repercussions for future children born through heterologous fertilisation. The 
concerns might be truly unsubstantiated. But do these children want their parents’ 
main concern to be the “fulfilment of their wish for a child” regardless of the welfare 
of that very child? Or is the welfare of the child solely the State’s problem, which 
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can be “reduced by further measures of the legislature?” The point is that the rhetoric 
of individual autonomy, such as in this case, does not invoke any concern or 
responsibility towards others, making its value highly questionable in situations, 
where interpersonal relationships are at hand. 
2.2.3 Implications of an impoverished view of the individual 
Based on the analysis of three ECtHR cases pertaining to reproduction, the previous 
section argued that even when dealing with an intrinsically relational matter, the 
implicit image of the person behind these autonomy-based cases is an independent 
and self-sufficient individual. The judgments hardly note any relational dimensions 
of human life. But by making this vision of individual autonomy normative, it is 
inevitably implied, as Glendon has said, that dependency is something to be avoided 
in oneself and disdained in others.74 One important part of the human condition is 
lost. 
Whereas independence, flexibility, assertiveness are valuable features of an 
individual, in the context of intimate relationship matters, they cannot be the only 
ones, or the most important ones. Otherwise, the result is an autonomy right(s) that 
nurtures a culture of unencumbered individuals and lonely persons, disentangled 
from all relationships. 
2.3. Towards an adversarial model of personal 
relationships 
Although on several occasions the Human Rights Court speaks of autonomy as 
something we may have a right to, it is suggested that this is hardly a plausible 
claim.75 Rather, what the Court has in mind is that we have rights to things that serve 
or enhance autonomy. Autonomy being a good, but one that is defended by things 
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that strengthen it.76 The purpose of the law here is to support autonomous decision-
making by setting up a framework that aims to guarantee respect for this good.  
The framework that aims to guarantee respect for individual autonomy is my next 
examination point. My claim under this section is that through the framework that 
aims to guarantee respect for individual autonomy, the Human Rights Court’s 
reasoning structures interpersonal relationships in ways that turns them into 
adversarial, contract-based relationships. 
2.3.1 Tysiąc v Poland77  
Alicja Tysiąc had suffered from severe myopia since 1977. In 2000 she became 
pregnant with her third child. As she was worried about the possible impact of the 
delivery on her health she consulted her doctors. She was examined by three 
ophthalmologists, each of whom concluded that the pregnancy and delivery 
constituted a risk to her eyesight. However, despite the applicant’s requests, they 
refused to issue a certificate for the pregnancy to be terminated on therapeutic 
grounds. The doctors concluded that it was not certain that the retina might detach 
itself as a result of pregnancy. Seeking further medical advice, the applicant 
consulted her general practitioner, who issued a certificate stating that the pregnancy 
constituted two types of threats to her health: the pathological changes in her retina 
and a risk of rupture of her uterus because her two previous deliveries had been by 
caesarean section. The applicant understood that on the basis of this certificate she 
would be able to terminate her pregnancy lawfully. In the second month of her 
pregnancy the applicant’s eyesight deteriorated further. She contacted her local 
hospital with a view to obtaining the termination of pregnancy. A gynaecologist, who 
examined her, concluded that neither her short-sightedness nor her two previous 
deliveries by caesarean section constituted grounds for therapeutic termination of the 
pregnancy. The respective note was co-signed by an endocrinologist whom the 
gynaecologist consulted briefly during the applicant’s visit, but who never talked to 
the applicant. As a result, the pregnancy was not terminated. The applicant delivered 
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the baby by caesarean section in November 2000. After the delivery Ms Tysiąc’s 
eyesight declined significantly. In March 2001 an ophthalmologist issued a medical 
certificate stating that the deterioration of the applicant’s eyesight had been caused 
by recent haemorrhages in the retina. As a consequence the applicant was facing a 
risk of blindness. The disability panel declared her significantly disabled. She needed 
constant care and assistance in her everyday life. 
The applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the gynaecologist, alleging that he 
had prevented her from having a lawful abortion. She complained that, following the 
pregnancy and delivery, she had sustained severe bodily harm by way of almost 
complete loss of eyesight. During the investigations, the district prosecutor heard 
evidence from the ophthalmologists who had examined the applicant during her 
pregnancy, and from a panel of three medical experts. All of them concluded that the 
applicant’s pregnancies and deliveries had not affected the deterioration of her 
eyesight. According to the experts, the risk of retinal detachment had always been 
present and continued to exist. As a result, the prosecutor discontinued the 
investigations for the lack of a causal link between the gynaecologist’s actions and 
the deterioration of the applicant’s vision. Despite complaining that the investigation 
was procedurally flawed, the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor dismissed her appeal. The 
decision not to prosecute was then transmitted to the District Court for judicial 
review. The District Court upheld the decision to discontinue the case. The applicant 
also attempted to bring disciplinary proceedings against the doctors who refused to 
terminate her pregnancy. The Chamber of Physicians found that there had been no 
professional negligence. 
Ms Tysiąc filed an application with the Human Rights Court. The complaint had two 
limbs – substantive and procedural. As to the substantive part the applicant claimed 
that her right to physical and moral integrity had been violated since she had been 
seeking to have an abortion in the face of a risk to her health and the State’s refusal 
to provide her with a legal abortion had left her exposed to such risk. On the formal 
or procedural part, the applicant maintained that the State had been under a positive 
obligation to provide a comprehensive legal framework regulating disputes between 
pregnant women and doctors as to the need to terminate pregnancy in cases of a 
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threat to a woman’s health. She contended that it was inappropriate and unreasonable 
to leave the task of balancing fundamental rights to doctors exclusively. The Polish 
legal system did not provide any independent review system or any appropriate and 
effective procedural mechanisms to challenge a doctor’s decision not to make a 
referral for termination; consequently, according to the applicant, this led to a 
violation of her Article 8 rights.78 
After finding that the applicant’s case is related to her right for respect for private 
life, “encompassing…the right to autonomy, personal development and to establish 
and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world,”79 the 
Court concentrated on the second limb of the applicant’s complaint, concurred with 
her, and concluded that the authorities had indeed failed to comply with their positive 
obligations to provide appropriate protection for the physical integrity of individuals 
in such a vulnerable situation such as the applicant.80  
2.3.1.1 Protecting individual autonomy through effective 
decision-making processes 
Tysiąc was different compared to the earlier decisions of the Human Rights Court in 
the area of abortion, which were, by and large, determined by recourse to the margin 
of appreciation doctrine.81 This meant that the Court distanced itself from taking any 
substantive position in abortion matters and the States were left to draw the 
appropriate ethical and legal boundaries in the “interplay of the equal right to life of 
the mother and the “unborn””.82 Interestingly, the Court even seemed to attempt to 
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detach itself from the previous abortion-related case law. Apart from a brief 
reference to Brüggeman and Scheuten v Germany,83 the Tysiąc case does not aim to 
build any coherence or connection with already settled case law.84 Even then, the 
Court was in this case equally disinterested in framing the case in terms of the “right 
to abortion”.85 Instead of stepping into the feared and avoided territory of foetal 
interests and rights,86 the case was framed as a procedural matter. The Court 
observed that although Polish law prohibits abortion, it provides it for certain 
exceptions. In particular, under section 4(a) 1(1) of the 1993 Family Planning Act, 
abortion is lawful, where pregnancy poses a threat to the woman’s life or health, 
certified by two medical certificates, irrespective of the stage reached in pregnancy. 
Since the applicant’s claim was based on her alleged right to medical care that was 
already declared legal, the Court found it “more appropriate”87 to examine the case 
from the standpoint as to whether procedural safeguards for lawful therapeutic 
abortion in Poland were adequate to satisfy the requirements of Article 8:  
While Article 8 contains no explicit procedural requirements, it is 
important for the effective enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by this 
provision that the relevant decision-making process is fair and such as 
to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded by it. What has to be 
determined is whether, having regard to the particular circumstances of 
the case and notably the nature of the decisions to be taken, an 
individual has been involved in the decision-making process, seen as a 
whole, to a degree sufficient to provide her or him with the requisite 
protection of their interests.88 
                                                                                                                                     
Era”, (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 459-474; G. Letsas, “Two Concepts of 
the Margin of Appreciation”, (2006) 26(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 705-732. 
83 Brüggeman and Scheuten v Germany. 
84 While the Human Rights Court is not formally bound to follow its previous judgments, it has 
remarked that “in the interests of legal certainty and foreseeability it should not depart, without good 
reason, from its own precedents.” Case of Christine Goodwin v the United Kingdom (App.28957/95), 
Judgment of 11 July 2002, para 74; Case of I. v the United Kingdom (App.25680/94), Judgment of 11 
July 2002, para 54. 
85 Tysiąc v Poland, para 104 of the judgment. Judge Bonello found it necessary to stress 
independently that the Court was not concerned with any abstract right to abortion or with any 
fundamental right to abortion “lying low somewhere in the penumbral fringes of the Convention.” 
Tysiąc v Poland, Separate opinion of Judge Bonello, para 1. 
86 The Court has “successfully” managed that as well in earlier cases. See case of Vo v France 
(App.53924/00), Judgment of 8 July 2004. 
87 Tysiąc v Poland, para 108. 
88 Tysiąc v Poland, para 113. 
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By constructing the case in these terms, it arguably provided the Court a convenient 
basis to avoid addressing a couple of very difficult issues head on – the question 
about foetal rights and the question about the limits of women’s right to choose 
abortion.89 Because of this kind of formulation, the case had allegedly nothing to do 
with substantive questions of the existence and limits of women’s right to choose or 
to the availability of abortion in general.90 An individual’s right to autonomy played 
a seemingly modest part here. Following Priaulx, the significance of the case was in 
“affording a woman in the vulnerable position of Ms Tysiąc a greater certainty as to 
her situation:”91 
[r]ather than demanding that abortion be made available irrespective of 
merit, the Court’s concern was that there was a fair and unbiased process 
by which to determine ‘merit’ in the first place: ‘such a procedure should 
guarantee to a pregnant woman at least a possibility to be heard in person 
and to have her views considered.’92 
However, according to some commentators, this modest view on autonomy 
underestimated what the Court had actually said. Cornides was strongly convinced 
that the “formal requirements imposed on legislators wishing to foresee legal 
restrictions on abortion were so far-reaching that any regulation other than one 
granting unrestricted access to abortion became technically impossible.”93 What 
Cornides seemed to have in mind was that despite the opinion of eight medical 
specialists who could not agree on the link between the applicant’s pregnancy and 
delivery and the deterioration of her eyesight, the Court pronounced that the 
procedural safeguards for lawful therapeutic abortion in Poland did not meet 
sufficiently the applicant’s “fears” that “the pregnancy and delivery might further 
endanger her eyesight” and “[t]hat her fears cannot be said to have been irrational.”94 
                                                
89 See Brüggeman and Scheuten v Germany, para 60: “The Commission does not find it necessary to 
decide, in this context, whether un unborn child is to be considered as “life” in the sense of Article 2 
of the Convention, or whether it could be regarded as an entity which under Article 8(2) could justify 
an interference “for the protection of others.”” 
90 N. Priaulx, “Testing the Margin of Appreciation: Therapeutic Abortion, Reproductive “Rights” and 
the Intriguing Case of Tysiąc v Poland”, (2008) 15 European Journal of Health Law 361-379, at 376. 
91 N. Priaulx, note 90 above, at 372. 
92 Ibid. 
93 J. Cornides, “Human rights pitted against man”, (2008) 12(1) The International Journal of Human 
Rights 107-134, at 126. 
94 Tysiąc v Poland, para 119.  
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The Court’s reasoning seemed, hence, to favour the way the applicant defined her 
situation, causing the dissenting judge, Judge Borrego Borrego, even to suggest that 
the Court was favouring now “abortion on demand”95 and Cornides to claim that the 
Court was attempting “to promulgate a full-fledged “right to abortion though the 
backdoor.”96  
Following the reading of Judge Borrego Borrego and Cornides, the reach of 
autonomy, contrary to what Priaulx suggests, is a wide one. First and foremost it is 
about how somebody defines herself, her situation, her way of conducting her life. 
The procedural guarantees were there to meet the “subjective ‘fears’, ‘distress’ and 
‘anguish’ of a pregnant woman.”97 Since the “fears” of the applicant outweighed the 
opinion of eight specialists, these commentators are doubtful whether any regulation 
other than granting unrestricted access to abortion becomes possible or is favourable 
in terms of human rights protection. 
I agree with Cornides that the judgment does something different than it pretends 
to.98 However, claiming that the case promulgated a full-fledged right to abortion is 
perhaps stretching things too far. According to my reading, what the Court does, 
“through the backdoor”, is to accentuate the format of relationships based on 
adversarial contractual equality. And Cornides is right in stating that this form of 
relationship entails an independent and self-sufficient individual whose needs are 
paramount for the Court. Close personal relationships should not be, as will be 
argued below, adversarial. As Bluestein notes, the “parties to them should only rarely 
conceive of themselves as separate beings with conflicts and antagonistic interests,” 
since otherwise “those features of personal relationships that make them personal 
and worth having are [becoming] absent.”99  
                                                
95 Tysiąc v Poland, Dissenting opinion of Judge Borrego Borrego, para 13. 
96 J. Cornides, “Human rights pitted against man”, (2008) 12(1) The International Journal of Human 
Rights 107-134, at 126-127. According to Cornides, the formal requirements imposed on legislators 
wishing to foresee legal restrictions on abortion are so far-reaching that any regulation other than one 
granting unrestricted access to abortion becomes technically impossible. See N. Priaulx, note 90 
above, rebutting this idea. 
97 J. Cornides, note 96 above, at 127. See also Tysiąc v Poland, Dissenting opinion of Judge Borrego 
Borrego, para 9. 
98 J. Cornides, note 96 above, at 126. 
99 J. Blustein, “Care and Commitment: Taking the Personal Point of View”, OUP, 1991, at 229. 
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2.3.1.2 Autonomous individual in action 
The thrust of the protection of one’s autonomy lies, according to Tysiąc, in 
procedural guarantees. Decision-making procedures are needed in order to secure 
respect for “the right to personal autonomy, personal development and to establish 
and develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world.”100 
Autonomy is respected when the process of decision-making is appropriately 
regulated and the relevant procedure followed in each particular case.  
On this account, the procedural guarantees can be essentially seen as concerned with 
the constraint of power. As Montgomery notes, one of the threats to autonomy is 
external control.101 Requiring certain procedural safeguards to be put in place – to be 
heard in person, dispute settlement possibilities – is a mechanism to reduce the 
power exercised by health care professionals over their patients. If patients are 
informed of the facts and able to exercise choice, they are less vulnerable to being 
adversely affected by conduct of professionals. The aim is to promote the value of 
autonomy by creating the circumstances in which it can be exercised.102  
What are the particular safeguards the Court suggested that Poland adopt in order to 
protect the autonomy interests of the applicant? The Court emphasised a need for 
safeguards to apply “where a disagreement arises as to whether the preconditions for 
a legal abortion are satisfied in a given case, either between the pregnant woman and 
her doctors, or between the doctors themselves.”103 In the Court’s view, in such 
situations, the applicable legal provisions must, first and foremost, “ensure clarity of 
the pregnant woman’s legal position.”104 Such measures were also demanded in 
order to clarify the position of doctors who might otherwise fear criminal 
prosecution: “the provisions regulating the availability of lawful abortion should be 
formulated in such a way as to alleviate this [chilling] effect.”105 In this regard, the 
Court found that the State should ensure “some form of procedure before an 
                                                
100 Tysiąc v Poland, para 107. 
101 J. Montgomery, “Law and the Demoralisation of Medicine”, (2006) 26(2) Legal Studies 185-210, 
at 187. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Tysiąc v Poland, para 116. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
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independent body competent to review the reasons for the measures and the relevant 
evidence.”106 The independent competent body should “guarantee to a pregnant 
woman at least a possibility to be heard in person and to have her views considered, 
[and] issue written grounds for its decision.”107 Furthermore, the Court noted that 
since the time factor is of critical relevance for decisions to terminate pregnancy, the 
procedures should ensure that such decisions are timely, so as to limit or prevent 
damage to a woman’s health.108 
Additionally, while the Government contended that a variety of review mechanisms 
had been open to, or had in fact been applied to the applicant’s case, the Court was of 
the opinion that none of the review mechanisms were sufficient in providing 
appropriate protection for the applicant’s rights. Also, while the procedure for 
obtaining a lawful abortion provided for two concurring opinions of specialists, this, 
according to the Court, failed to distinguish between situations, where there was full 
agreement between women and their doctors, and those where there was none. The 
“safeguard” merely obliged a woman to obtain a certificate from a specialist without 
stipulating any steps that she could take in the context of disagreement. Furthermore, 
other “safeguards”, such as the acquisition of a second opinion in the context of 
therapeutic doubts, did not, in the Court’s view, provide any procedural guarantee for 
a patient in the context of conflicting views, since the provision merely addressed the 
medical profession. Nor indeed would either the civil law of tort or criminal 
proceedings as applied by the Polish courts afford the applicant a procedural 
instrument by which to vindicate her right to respect for her private life, given that 
these were retrospective measures. Retrospective measures would not be sufficient to 
provide appropriate protection for the physical integrity of individuals in such a 
vulnerable position as the applicant.109 
As one can see, the Court prescribes a plethora of procedural guidelines for the 
State(s) to implement in order to guarantee proper respect for one’s autonomy. In 
line with the idea of individual autonomy as independence and self-sufficiency one 
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107 Tysiąc v Poland, para 117. 
108 Ibid. 
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can understand what the Court is aiming for – to empower the pregnant woman and 
strengthen her capacity to exercise her autonomy by giving her the tools. I am 
doubtful, though, whether a person, “in such a vulnerable position as the 
applicant”,110 needs more opportunities to dispute a physician’s decision. It is hard to 
see how another instance of dispute settlement would have solved for the applicant 
the “situation of prolonged uncertainty.”111 Here the law presumes the existence of 
an autonomous competent individual, who can enforce his or her rights. The law 
presumes in this way that the partners are equal in power and that they are detached 
from each other. But this is hardly the case with relationships in the realms of 
medicine or family. The reality is that people are vulnerable and interdependent, 
especially when pregnant and concerned about his or her health. What is rather 
needed is that one feels ensured that the doctor takes good care of the patient. The 
expectation generally is that the doctor is competent, compassionate, caring and 
communicates with the patient about her or his needs.112 The patients need doctors to 
be focused on their care, and my doubt is that the procedural guarantees the Court 
found to be lacking in the Polish system do not prompt such commitments and 
responsibilities on the side of the physicians.  
2.3.2 Implications for relationships 
Protecting individual autonomy through procedural safeguards promises to keep the 
professional authority in control. Prescribing formulas for the decision-making 
process and requiring the formation of independent review boards for the decisions 
taken by physicians arguably reduces our vulnerability from paternalism. 
Simultaneously, people might feel empowered to be in control of their own lives and 
to shape it as they wish. One of the possible flipsides of these developments is that 
the guarantee mechanisms, required to protect individual autonomy, start to define 
the very relationships under issue. Relations between patients and physicians or that 
between family members, become formalised and regulated, and consequently 
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constrained in particular ways. One of the worries is that they crowd out beneficence, 
goodwill and caring attitudes in our relations with others.  
In a similar vein, O’Neill argues that relationships between professionals and patients 
are inevitably reshaped when regulation and control are added with the aim of 
protecting dependent and vulnerable patients and when professionals are disciplined 
by multiple systems of accountability backed by threats of litigation on grounds of 
professional negligence in case of failure to meet these requirements.113 In this 
situation, O’Neill maintains, doctors, like many other professionals, find themselves 
pressed to be accountable rather than to be communicative, to conform to regulations 
rather than to respond to the particular needs of the relationship.114 And no regulation 
can exhaustively predict or cover the needs of patients, or specify the terms of 
empathy or compassion in providing care. Additionally, it makes it hard to expect the 
doctor to be caring towards the patient if the patient under the model of individual 
autonomy assumes a defensive posture rather contributing to the maintenance of a 
healthy relationship. 
The application of contractual economic models to a new domain (family, medicine) 
should be taken, hence, with caution. The market model does not acknowledge 
mutual obligations, responsibility or care in intimate relationships if these are not 
literally contracted for. Nor does the principle of formal equality on which contracts 
are based redress the substantive inequalities in power that often exist in such 
relationships. Contract is a commitment device designed mainly for business 
transactions, negotiated normally between autonomous adult actors. In those, limited, 
contexts, it has positive impact for reducing parties’ economic risks and potentially 
contributing to the overall economic growth.115 The majority of the relationships the 
Court has dealt with in the autonomy-related case law, however, concern matters 
between parties that are unequal in power and authority. For lovers – as in Evans – 
for the ill – as in Pretty – for pregnant women – as in Tysiąc – for husbands, fathers, 
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the very young and the elderly, other relationships and their moral potential is 
arguably a better fit. 
Finally, I do not doubt that there might be systematic problems in Polish healthcare 
that hinder women from seeking legal abortions, but I do doubt whether these 
problems can be amended by structuring patient-doctor relationships into a more 
adversarial model. 
2.4. Conclusion 
The present chapter questioned whether individual autonomy provides a promising 
model in which to guide behaviour in interpersonal relationships. For that purpose I 
(a) teased out the image of the person as presented in the ECtHR autonomy-related 
case law and (b) analysed the way the Court conceptualises relationships between 
autonomous persons. 
The analysis showed that claims involving personal life choices, in the form of 
someone being able to live their life in the manner of their choosing, signify the 
emergence of a certain kind of autonomous action: a consciously assertive, self-
determining person exercising a high degree of creative autonomy by way of his or 
her claims to rights in personal relationships. In the opinion of the present writer, the 
inclination to interpret Article 8 rights in the light of a person’s wish to live the life 
of their own choosing should be treated with utmost care and critical attention.  
The appeal to individual autonomy is sometimes hard to resist. However, as I argued 
in this chapter, adopting individual autonomy for regulating certain relationships 
might not only paint a one-sided and impoverished picture of a human condition, it 
also may negatively backfire. By equating autonomy with the illusion of autonomous 
action free of dependency we also risk adopting a self-interested atomistic and 
adversarial outlook detached from others. Individual autonomy may reinforce the 
tendency to think of ourselves as separate and in conflict with others. Absent a sense 
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and recognition of care, individual autonomy appears to lend itself to a “cold 
unfeeling vision of moral judgment and behaviour.”116 
In other words, thinking in terms of independence and self-sufficiency may blind us 
to the extent of our reliance upon others. As we regard ourselves more and more as 
self-constituted individuals, we may fail to realise how we depend upon each other 
not only in early childhood, in old age or in cases of illness, but in multiple situations 
and formations. In order to further demystify the image of the self-sufficient and 
independent individual, I will turn now to sociological literature on individualisation. 
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AUTONOMY, INDIVIDUALISATION AND  
THE EMERGENCE OF TRUST  
 
3.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter I maintained that the perception of “individualistic” 
autonomy favoured by the European Court of Human Rights fosters an impoverished 
image of individuals and realigns interpersonal relationships in ways that are 
potentially problematic for the quality of relationships in our personal lives.  
However, these findings aside, I have to remind myself that most of the expanding 
ramifications of autonomy rights have been welcomed by policy makers, people in 
general and legal commentators. The notion of individual autonomy is still widely 
perceived as one of the positive aspects of modern society, based as it is on the 
notion of the emancipation of the individual.1 The commentators stress that advances 
in areas of science, technology and economics, coupled with increasing social and 
judicial emphases on individual autonomy, positively demand now that people have 
greater input into medical decision-making and control over life and death 
decisions.2 Reasons and reactions like these make me cautiously hesitant to make 
any early conclusions about individual autonomy, as conceived by the ECtHR, being 
morally deficient and socially dangerous. The inquiry about the purpose of the 
concept of autonomy under the ECtHR jurisprudence should proceed. 
As it is, this chapter is a continuation of the assessment of the normative implications 
of autonomy’s inclusion and its interpretation under the Article 8 of the ECHR in the 
context of human relationships. Whereas the previous chapter gave an account of 
                                                
1 B. de Vries, L. Francot, “Information, Decision and Self-Determination: Euthanasia as a 
Case Study, (2009) 6(3) SCRIPTed 558-574, at 559; T.M. Franck, The Empowered Self: Law and 
Society in the Age of Individualism, OUP, 1999. 
2 H. Biggs, “A Pretty Fine Line: Life, Death, Autonomy and Letting It B”, (2003) 11 Feminist Legal 
Studies 291-301, at 299; See also Chapter 1 Section 1.3.1. 
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autonomy in the light of the current practice of the European Court of Human Rights, 
it did not provide any explanations as to why the inclusion of the concept of 
autonomy was actually needed under Article 8 jurisprudence. What might explain 
autonomy’s manifestation in the Human Rights Court’s jurisprudence? How might 
we account for the increasing involvement of the ECtHR in a number of issues and 
problems, which had they arisen in the past, would have been discussed and resolved 
within the province of family circle or medical practice without ECtHR interference? 
Despite autonomy’s central position in moral and political philosophy ever since 
Emmanuel Kant “invented the conception of morality as autonomy,”3 and despite its 
extensive use in debates over various legal freedoms and rights and biomedical 
issues, the concept was “called into existence” under the ECtHR practice only as 
recently as at the very beginning of the twenty-first century. What purpose did the 
introduction of the concept and the particular interpretation given to it serve at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century in cases pertaining to family life, birth, health 
and dying? Why has autonomy become such a dominant feature in our lives? What 
might be the conditions responsible for the growth of autonomy-related case law? In 
order to provide answers to these questions, I propose to consider the jurisprudential 
developments discussed in the two previous chapters in the light of diverse and 
intertwined processes of social and cultural change. Answering these questions will 
arguably give a better understanding about the harms and detriments that autonomy 
rights are to protect under the human rights system and thereupon evaluate the 
concept’s suitability for the task.    
For these purposes I will take a step back and explore the possible reasons and 
underlying objectives for the involvement of autonomy in Article 8 case law and the 
particular reading given to this notion by the Strasbourg Court within a wider 
explanatory framework. What I propose is a reconsideration of autonomy under the 
European Convention on Human Rights system from the vantage point of the newest 
transformations and developments in the forms of social order and life in 
contemporary Western societies. Understanding the types of social and cultural 
transformations against which autonomy-related human rights law operates gives us 
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arguably a new perspective about the meaning of the concept, and its current 
meaning’s repercussions for individuals and the relationships they are engaged in. To 
that end, the concept of autonomy as developed under the ECHR system will be set 
into the context of “individualisation” – an influential characterisation of 
contemporary Western society, promulgated in particular by Zygmunt Bauman,4 
Ulrich Beck5 and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim.6 In other words, I now wish to consider 
the wider context of an “individualistic” conceptualisation of autonomy and what 
such an approach means, or might mean, by reference to literature and commentary 
on the notion of “individualism”.  
Drawing from the works of Beck, Beck-Gernsheim, Bauman and Anthony Giddens, 
among others, this chapter argues that autonomy-based case law originates from the 
growth of insecurities, lack of orientation and authority inflicted on individuals as a 
result of three interconnected dimensions of individualisation processes: (a) loss of 
traditional – “removal from historically prescribed social forms and commitments in 
the sense of traditional contexts of dominance and support (the liberating 
dimension);”7 (b) expansion of choice; and (c) institutional demands and expectation 
to lead a “life of one’s own.” As a result of these processes the individual is liberated 
from “natural” constraints, from norms set by tradition, custom, religion, yet at the 
same time new demands and controls are set by the labour market, legal regulations 
and social media that compel individuals to arrange their lives in accordance with the 
ideal and model of self-realisation. The erosion of the norms set by “tradition”, and 
the task of self-identification creates “sharply disruptive side-effects”8 of feelings of 
isolation, anguish and insecurity – consequences critically overlooked by the Human 
Rights Court, and indeed driven by the approach adopted by the Court. 
Looked at it in this way it will be argued that autonomy rights and their 
individualistic normative language is a double-edged sword – one that promotes the 
realisation of self-fulfilment as well as the cultivation of self-limitation. On the one 
                                                
4 Z. Bauman, Liquid Modernity, Polity Press, 2000. 
5 U. Beck, Risk Society, SAGE Publications, 1992; U. Beck, E. Beck-Gernsheim, Individualization, 
SAGE Publications Ltd, 2002. 
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7 U. Beck, note 5 above, at 128. 
8 Z. Bauman, note 4 above, at 90. 
Chapter 3 Autonomy, individualisation and the emergence of trust 
 
 107 
hand, the trend is towards personal freedom, independence, human empowerment, 
while on the other hand this happens at the cost of social alienation, growing 
insecurity and distrust towards others.  
The legal image of an independent human self assumes that individuals alone can 
master the whole of their lives. This approach, arguably adopted by the Court, 
however, ignores the fact that in modern individualised societies people are 
increasingly tied to each other. We are therefore also always dependent on others for 
the possibility of autonomy. This means that one has to be socially sensitive and to 
be able to relate to others and to obligate oneself, in order to manage and organise 
the complexities of everyday life. Our interdependence entails that trust becomes an 
increasingly significant factor to organise human interaction. This, in turn, means 
that there are attendant obligations between individuals to be sensitive towards, and 
care for, each other.   
By the end of this chapter the reader will understand that dealing with the growth of 
uncertainties that become increasingly prevalent under the conditions of modern 
social changes and finding the balance between individualism and our mutual 
dependencies requires an enlarged pool of trust. In other words, an effective exercise 
of one’s autonomy becomes necessarily dependent on the existence of caring and 
trusting relationships. In Chapter 4 I consider the importance of trust for human 
relations in highly individualised societies and analyse individual autonomy’s 
capacity to establish and foster trust-promoting practices. The inclusion of individual 
autonomy by the Human Rights Court as a substitute response to these concerns is 
considered inadequate. Chapter 5 proposes thereafter the adoption of caring 
autonomy as a more fruitful way to guide people’s lives. 
The chapter proceeds in the following way. I start by examining the concept of 
individualisation as put forward by contemporary leading sociologists. I differentiate 
between positive and negative sides of individualisation and claim that while the 
Court has embraced its liberating moment, it has failed to see the feelings of 
insecurity, fear and mistrust the “liberation” imposes on individuals. Based on the 
example of the historical development of the family life and the institution of 
marriage, I, thereafter, argue that people turn to the Human Rights Court to find new 
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securities against the backdrop of uncertainties they face in their private lives. 
Paradoxically, however, the Court’s solution to empower them with more individual 
autonomy arguably only complicates the problem. The final section of the chapter 
considers why trust becomes increasingly important in managing the complexities of 
everyday life. 
3.2. Individual autonomy as the normative response 
to the processes of individualisation  
3.2.1 Autonomy as the positive aspect of individualisation 
The characterisation of contemporary Western society is often associated with the 
term “individualisation.”9 At its core, individualisation signifies diverse and 
intertwined processes of social and cultural change that have taken place in Western 
societies during the past forty-fifty years, and which increasingly set individuals at 
the centre of social fabric and their own life-planning.10  
Detraditionalisation – or the undermining of traditions – is one of the key words most 
often related to this social phenomenon.11 It entails the understanding that modern 
Western societies are undergoing a decline of the belief in pre-given or the natural 
order of things, calling individual subjects to exercise authority and choice over 
matters that previously belonged to the terrain of tradition and fate.12 Whereas within 
the tradition, identities are inscribed rather than open for autonomous decision-
making, “detraditionalisation entails that people have acquired the opportunity to 
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stand back from, critically reflect upon, and lose their faith in what the traditional has 
to offer.”13 In other words, categories such as family, marriage, religion and morality 
used to give people’s identities pre-given meanings and left little room for individual 
autonomy. By contrast, in many contemporary Western societies, the construction of 
one’s identity becomes detached from traditional life models. With the disintegration 
of what Zygmunt Bauman calls “solids” – “bonds which interlock individual choices 
in collective projects and actions”14 – individuals become free to construct their own 
ends and goals, their own identities and life projects. As a consequence – life, death, 
gender, identity, religion, marriage, parenthood, social ties – all are becoming 
decidable. Choice becomes the means by which individuals define themselves and 
assert their autonomy. In a word, individualisation liberates people from traditional 
roles and constraints, and as a consequence, the range of personal choice and 
opportunity expands and the possibilities of greater freedom of action open up.15  
In Chapter 1, I briefly touched upon some of the considerations that have made this 
process of breaking from the traditional possible and how these developments have 
influenced the practice of the Human Rights Court. I claimed that, arguably, one of 
the reasons the Court adopted the concept of individual autonomy under its Article 8 
case law was precisely because of the concept’s heightened recognition under the 
conditions of social change. I pointed out that by adopting the individual autonomy 
perspective in cases pertaining to transsexuals, assisted suicide and assisted 
reproduction, the Court arguably took into consideration the way several 
advancements in medicine and technology have now undermined the credibility of 
what was previously homogeneous and therefore unquestioned. Out of these 
developments, reproduction or one’s sex cannot be perceived anymore so much as a 
matter of fate, but as a matter of choice.16 
According to Giddens’ terms, what we are witnessing is the “end of nature” – a 
world in which few aspects of physical nature remain untouched by human 
                                                
13 P. Heelas, “On Things Not Being Worse, and the Ethic of Humanity”, in P. Heelas et al (eds), 
Detraditionalization, Blackwell, 1996, 200-222, at 211; See also A. Elliott, C. Lemert, note 9 above, 
at 12-13. 
14 Z. Bauman, note 4 above, at 25. 
15 It is another question, of course, for how many this “freedom” is in reality attainable. 
16 See Chapter 1, Section 1.3.1.1. 
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intervention – and “end of tradition” – a world where life is no longer lived as fate.17 
As nature and tradition release their hold, there is a reorientation of values.18 The 
principle of sanctity of life, for example, becomes more widely recognised as a 
subjective preference, as it has lost its once unscrutinised position. In this light, it is 
worth to stating again what was said in the Pretty case:  
In an era of growing medical sophistication combined with longer life 
expectancies, many people are concerned that they should not be forced 
to linger on in old age or in states of advanced physical or mental 
decrepitude which conflict with strongly held ideas of self and personal 
identity.19  
There is a clear sign of recognition by the Human Rights Court of the subjectivity of 
experiences and values, of a move from pre-given to individual control. This is 
because autonomy becomes more cherished as more traditional identifications 
recede. 
The developments in medicine and technology are of course not the only reasons 
behind the demise of the traditional and the traditional ways of living and their 
consequent accommodation by the law. Sociological literature identifies several 
other material, social, cultural and intellectual processes of change that have been 
seen as contributing to the devaluation of the external authority to create a “new kind 
of individualism”20 that increasingly encourages the expansion of the ethic of 
individual self-fulfilment and achievement in Western modern societies.21 For 
example, Giddens stresses the role of globalisation and the expansion of 
communication systems that have put tradition under strain in a large part of the 
world and changed fundamentally the nature of people’s lives, including one’s day-
to-day family life. His argument goes that when components from different cultures 
become more and more available, the given social and cultural realm becomes more 
pluralistic. Societies come to contain diverse and fragmented range of beliefs and 
                                                
17 A. Giddens, note 12 above, at 3. 
18 Ibid., at 7. 
19 Pretty v the United Kingdom, para 65. 
20 A. Honneth, note 9 above, at 468. 
21 U. Beck, E. Beck-Gernheim, note 5 above, at 22. 
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values. Faced with diversity, he suggests, people lose faith in what has been 
traditionally sustained within a closed environment.22  
In a similar vein, Heelas, Bauman and Elliott and Lemert argue that the market 
technologies of capitalism, and the mass consumer culture it produces, trivialises the 
culture and tradition so that it loses much of its ethically and aesthetically demanding 
qualities.23 There is less to have faith in, less to challenge self-interest. Organised 
culture used to serve as moral and aesthetic authority to differentiate between values, 
to distinguish between what is important and what is not, and to facilitate coherent, 
purposeful identities or life-plans. The fact that culture has become increasingly 
disorganised and weakened, it can be argued, means that people have to turn to their 
own resources to decide what they value, to organise their priorities and to make 
sense of their lives. That is to say that 
The weakening of traditional bonds to cultural values, social positions, 
religion, marriage and so on, means that people find themselves in the 
position where they have to select from those packaged options or styles 
to which the cultural realm has been reduced in order to construct their 
own ways of life.24  
Honneth, additionally, points out the role of increased educational opportunities, the 
growth of income and leisure time, the expansion of the service sector, etc., that all, 
each in its own way, have diversified the ways open to individuals and expanded the 
options for individual self-discovery and self-reflection.25  
I will not be able nor is it my purpose to give here anything even close to a 
comprehensive overview of the multiple processes of social change that have taken 
place in Western societies over the past decades. The point to be made here is that as 
a result of reciprocal reinforcement of diverse dynamics of social development, many 
norms in people’s lives have been loosened, permitting individuals to have greater 
levels of choice of how to lead their lives, and consequently bringing the sense of 
autonomy strongly to people’s awareness and to their value system. It can be argued 
                                                
22 A. Giddens, note 11 above. 
23 A. Elliott, C. Lemert, note 9 above, at 38; Z. Bauman, Does Ethics Have a Chance in a World of 
Consumers?, Harvard University Press, 2008. 
24 P. Heelas, note 12 above, at 5. 
25 A. Honneth, note 9 above, at 468-470. 
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that this is a positive, enabling and emancipating side of the phenomenon of 
individualisation. This aspect of individualisation can be said to be power conferring: 
it enables individuals to live without the restraints of norms set by tradition or 
morality and provides the individual with an opportunity to determine the nature and 
the parameters of their own lives. 
Concurrently, and importantly, these tendencies fit well with the value given to 
autonomous agent within the ideology of liberal ethics. In these terms 
individualisation corresponds to the liberal view that values are, largely, a matter of 
individual choice rather than being pre-determined. To respect one’s autonomy is to 
respect each person’s interest in living her life in accordance with her own 
conception of the good. Going from there, it can be argued that the prising of the 
authority of the individual has been, consequently, translated into human rights law 
so that people can better cultivate their capacities for autonomous choice and 
decision-making. In other words, human rights law has moved to accommodate this 
new interest of persons who take charge of determining who they are.26 
Individualisation has positively opened up wide ranges of possibilities in the quality 
of people’s lives, and one can argue that this should be equally recognised (by the 
adoption of the value of individual autonomy under the ECHR) as well as be 
encouraged (by having autonomy as a justiciable right to choose how to lead one’s 
life) by the Human Rights Court.  
3.2.2 Autonomy as the negative aspect of individualisation 
Although there are clear benefits resulting from the processes of individualisation, 
which have influenced the ECtHR case law, there is a flipside to this social 
phenomenon. Beck et al. argue that the very same dynamic that liberates the 
individual to construct her or his own ends and goals, identities and life projects, 
                                                
26 The growing consciousness of individual worth and its manifestation in the claim to individual 
autonomy has been noted, for example, also in the context of citizenship laws. As a result of the new 
individualism, more and more states are moving in the direction of permitting individuals to exercise 
greater degree of personal autonomy in designing their identity. See T.M. Franck, note 1 above, ch 4. 
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generates for the individual the conditions of omnipresent and ever-changing risk.27 
Liberation from restraints, the expansion of choice and possibilities for self-
realisation might be valuable, but they also have its perils. Alongside the 
disintegration of historically prescribed social forms and commitments (the liberating 
aspect of individualisation), individualisation simultaneously entails the 
disintegration of old forms of certainties and support.  
When the rules governing custom, etiquette, or morality retreat, the individual 
himself becomes the rule finder. Moreover, as the sociologists argue, the liberated 
and emancipated individual becomes responsible for finding and inventing new 
certainties for himself.28 Under the conditions of individualisation, the individual is 
not only able to make choices in an ever expanding range of situations, but the 
individual is also compelled to do so.29 With the disintegration of support networks 
such as family, for example, the individual has to start to rely on his or her own 
ingenuity to develop personal support networks. Similarly, the economic security 
provided by the nuclear family is replaced by individual responsibility and is subject 
to the vagaries of employment prospects. The individual himself must become the 
agent of his or her own identity making and livelihood, and simultaneously become 
responsible for how well he or she performs this task. For example, it is not the fault 
of the authorities for an inability of an individual to secure employment, but  
[i]f they stay unemployed it is because they failed to learn the skills of 
gaining an interview, or because they did not try hard enough to find a 
job; if they are not sure about their career prospects and agonise about 
their future, it is because they are not good enough at winning friends and 
influencing people and failed to learn and master, as they should have 
done, the arts of self-expression and impressing others.30 
                                                
27 U. Beck, “The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization” in U. Beck 
et al (eds) Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order, 
Polity Press, 1994, 1-55, at 7. See also U. Beck, note 5 above; A. Giddens, note 11 above.  
28 U. Beck, note 27 above, at 14. 
29 U. Beck, E. Beck-Gernsheim, “Individualization and ‘Precarious Freedoms’: Perspectives and 
Controversies of a Subject-Oriented Sociology”, in P. Heelas et al (eds), Detraditionalization, 
Blackwell, 1996, 23-48, at 27; Z. Bauman, note 4 above, at 31-32. According to Bauman, 
individualisation consists of “transforming human ‘identity’ from a ‘given’ into a ‘task’ and charging 
the actors with the responsibility for performing that task and for the consequences of their 
performance.” 
30 Z. Bauman, note 4 above, at 34. 
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Alongside Bauman, a number of scholars, therefore, argue that the claim to 
autonomy and self-realisation has been increasingly made into something of an 
institutional demand – an expectation set by media, capitalist economy and legal 
regulations, demanding that individuals present themselves as being flexible, active, 
inventive, resourceful and willing to develop themselves if they wished to achieve 
success in their profession or in society.31 “What is demanded is a vigorous model of 
action in everyday life, which puts the ego at its centre.”32 “‘Responsibility’ means 
now, first and last, responsibility to oneself, while ‘responsible choices’ are, first and 
last, those moves which will serve the interests and satisfy the desire of the actor.”33 
“To individualism corresponds the liberal virtue of independence – the disposition to 
care for, and take responsibility for oneself and avoid becoming needlessly 
dependent on others.”34  
This goes to the core of my argument for this chapter. It is not only the benefits of 
individualisation that have influenced the inclusion of autonomy into ECtHR case 
law, but – let us call it – the negative side of individualisation is equally influential in 
forming the background against the new developing body of Article 8 case law. My 
argument is threefold:  
First, because of the liberation of rules and roles governing interpersonal 
relationships, the behaviour of the parties to these relationships has become less 
predictable and indeterminate. As autonomy grows, it becomes difficult to anticipate 
the behaviour of other people.  
Second, institutional demands call upon individuals to live “a life of one’s own”, to 
be the master of their own identity and livelihood. To take responsibility for that, 
arguably places the duty for oneself – to have one’s own interests first and foremost 
at heart – at the centre of one’s priorities. As a consequence, it makes it harder to 
count on others to act in our interest.  
                                                
31 A. Honneth, note 9 above, at 472; A. Elliott, C. Lemert, note 9 above, at 13 and 53; U. Beck, E. 
Beck-Gernsheim, note 5 above, at 23-24; Z. Bauman, The Art of Life, Polity Press, 2008, at 89-90. 
32 U. Beck, note 5 above, at 136. 
33 Z. Bauman, note 31 above, at 107. 
34 W. Galston, Liberal Purposes, OUP, 1991, at 222, cited from I.M. Young, “Mothers, Citizenship 
and Independence: A Critique of Pure Family Values”, (1995) 105(3) Ethics 535-556, at 543. 
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Third, as a result of these developments – when the securities provided by “tradition” 
disappear and the demands on self-sufficiency and autonomy grow – the individual is 
faced with a growing set of anxieties, risks and insecurities.  
Under these circumstances people turn to find new sources for “universal cravings 
for certainty, predictability, order and the like.”35 Thus, the increasing litigiousness 
to the ECtHR can be seen as a way to find this security. The right to respect for one’s 
autonomy acts in this context as a protective mechanism against others’ 
indeterminate and presumably malign behaviour.  
As the second half of this chapter argues, the concept of individual autonomy, rather 
than providing a solution to the problem, exacerbates the problem. As the range of 
social interaction and interdependence on one another grows, trust and cooperation 
become increasingly relevant.  
3.3. Shifting foundations of interpersonal 
relationships and their consequences for 
individuals 
In order to support my argument that the ECtHR Article 8 autonomy-related case law 
originates from the growth of insecurities, mistrust, lack of orientation and authority 
inflicted on individuals as a result of individualisation processes, I visit the historical 
developments of family life and marriage. The historical perspective arguably gives a 
better viewpoint about what is new about autonomy claims pertaining to family life 
and marriage, and what the Court arguably is missing in how it addresses them.  
3.3.1 Changes in family life and marriage 
Looking at the history of sexuality and family life it is possible to distinguish three 
different stages.36 First, the traditional family in pre-modern times was essentially an 
economic unit. It was a network of dependence, defined by the material needs of 
one’s family, farm and village. What counted was not the individual person, but 
                                                
35 P. Sztompka, Trust: A Sociological Theory, CUP, 1999, at 115. 
36 The narrative presented here is based on the Beck’s, Beck-Gernsheim’s and Giddens’ account on 
the social history of marriage. See U.Beck, E. Beck-Gernsheim, note 5 above; A. Giddens, note 11 
above. 
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common goals and purposes. The institution of marriage prescribed men and women 
what they were to do and not to do even in the details of daily life, work and 
sexuality. The tightly knit communities of family and community presented 
omnipresent possibilities of control. Anyone who infringed on the prevailing norms 
was possibly subject to rigorous sanctions. The basis of marriage was not sexual 
love, nor the place where such love could flourish, but instead was founded on the 
premise of religious obligation and transmission of property.  
The second stage in the history of family came with the age of industrialisation. The 
family lost its function as a working unit and the idea of romantic love as the basis of 
marriage replaced marriage as an economic contract. This did not mean, however, 
that the principle of individual freedom of the spouses dominated the institution. The 
dissolution of the material basis of the marriage was replaced by heightened moral 
and legal underpinnings stemming largely from the values of “Christian world 
order.” In addition to that, a new form of dependence asserted itself between husband 
and wife within the new framework of labour: the husband was financially 
responsible for the family livelihood, while the wife was defined as the “heart of the 
family” responsible for “relationship work” – not only for domestic tasks and child 
care, but also for the maintenance of a climate of security and contentment. Within 
this framework of relations the woman became dependent on the man’s earnings, 
while he needed her everyday labour and care to be capable of functioning in the 
workplace. Hence, the obligation of solidarity, that had characterised the pre-
industrial family, went on to exist in a modified form. 
Fundamental changes in the interpretation of marriage and family from something 
“beyond the individual to the exclusively individual interpretation”37 began roughly 
in the second half of the twentieth century. Improved educational opportunities for 
women and increased employment of women outside the home, among others, led to 
a third type of family life. In this case marriage is primarily a source of emotional 
support, a tie between two equal persons who each earns their own living and seeks 
in their partner mainly the fulfilment of inner needs. Marriage is increasingly seen as 
                                                
37 U. Beck, E. Beck-Gernsheim, note 5 above, at 11. 
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being free of objective goals and being geared to subjective expectations; it becomes 
flexible and open to the interpretation of those who are married. “Good” marriage 
means primarily personal happiness – the central focus is on the individual person, 
her or his own desires, needs, ideas and plans. As such, it may be modified in any 
way, including dissolution, which increases the satisfaction of one or both 
individuals. In other words, marriage and other domestic arrangements are now 
represented and regulated not as matters of obligation and conformity to a moral 
norm, but as lifestyle decisions made by autonomous individuals seeking to fulfil 
themselves and gain personal happiness.38  
Although, the “traditional” family has by no means disappeared, the crucial change is 
that even traditional conditions of life have to be chosen, defended and justified 
against other options.39 The individual has to decide on his or her course of action 
from a great variety of options, which are all within the realms what is socially 
acceptable. As a result, “no one now can say what goes on behind the oh-so-
unchanging label “marriage” – what is possible, permitted, required, taboo or 
indispensable”.40  
The erosion or weakening of certain norms of traditional family life has its 
advantages. Many of the weakened norms were not good norms. They often 
suppressed women, as well as children, leaving no room for autonomous action or 
the ability to choose one’s own ways in life. These developments opened up new 
scope for action and decision and new opportunities for individuals, and were 
welcomed by many, and rightly so. I put the value autonomy has for individuals 
under no doubt. 
My point here is, however, that traditional societies and family forms entailed rules 
that made people’s behaviour predictable. Two or three generations ago, when two 
people got married, by and large, they knew what it was they were doing and what to 
expect from each other. Marriage, largely fixed by tradition and custom was akin to a 
state of nature. When rules disappear or weaken, it becomes so much more difficult 
                                                
38 N. Rose, Powers of Freedom, CUP, 1999, at 86. See also J.B. Singer, “Privatization of Family 
Law”, (1992) Wisconsin Law Review 1443-1567. 
39 U. Beck, E. Beck-Gernsheim, note 5 above, at 27. 
40 Ibid., at 11. 
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to predict anyone’s behaviour.41 With the erosion of rules, reliable orientation points 
and trustworthy guides on other’s behaviour become much scarcer, and the “pre-
existing ways of doing things become less secure, less taken for granted.”42 
Similarly, the more options that are available to people, the less predictable are the 
decisions they will eventually take. In other words, the larger the feasible set of 
alternatives that is open to others, the more uncertain it becomes what actions the 
others will take.  
Hence, suddenly everything becomes uncertain, including the ways of living together 
– who does what, how and where – or the views of sexuality and love and their 
connection to marriage and the family.43 Marriage today, against the backdrop of 
soaring rates of divorce in Western countries, has transformed into a kind of 
temporary arrangement, something that can be easily discarded. The likelihood of 
divorce must now be “factored in” by anyone that contemplates getting married.44  
Furthermore, with self-development at the heart of personal projects, when 
individuals are encouraged to elaborate on their inner worlds and to follow their true 
nature, the more suspicious people are over whether others will remain loyal, 
dependable and trustworthy to them. The demand and pressure to have a “life of 
one’s own” potentially undercuts the sense of duty to other people and thus corrodes 
our conviction that we can depend on others to act in our interest even when it 
conflicts with theirs. It can be argued that “following one’s true nature” obliges us to 
constantly evolve and to keep our options open, and not to limit ourselves with a 
permanent relationship or activity. As Bauman put it: 
There is always a suspicion – even if it is put to sleep and dormant for a 
time – that one is living a lie or a mistake; that something crucially 
important has been overlooked, missed, neglected, left untried and 
unexplored; that a vital obligation to one’s own authentic self has not 
been met, or that some chances of unknown happiness completely 
different from any happiness experienced before have not been taken up 
                                                
41 C. Schneider, “Family Life in the Age of Distrust”, (1999) 33(3) Family Law Quarterly 447-460, at 
450. 
42 A. Elliott, C. Lemert, note 9 above, at 8. 
43 U. Beck, note 5 above, at 109. 
44 A. Elliott, C. Lemert, note 9 above, at 8. 
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in time and are bound to be lost forever if they continue to be 
neglected.45   
In summary, interpersonal relationships have, arguably, become today filled with 
fears, anxieties and insecurities about the behaviour of other parties of a relationship. 
Others’ actions become less predictable and risky. Also, because of growing 
institutional and cultural demands for self-realisation and self-development, there 
might be less reason for people to believe that others behave solicitously and with 
their best interests in mind. So how do these developments reflect in the practice of 
the Human Rights Court?  
3.3.2 Autonomy claims – dealing with uncertainty 
It is inevitable that in such situations people start thinking in terms of risk and in 
terms of finding new securities against these risks. In order to make one’s livelihood 
or to fulfil one’s goals in life, the increasing unpredictability and indeterminacy of 
personal matters needs to be filled with alternative arrangements providing similar 
functions and meeting universal needs for certainty, predictability, order and the 
like.46  
Against the background of growing uncertainty and mistrust towards others’ 
behaviour, we can consider why some of the cases discussed in the previous chapter 
landed on the work desks of the judges of the Strasbourg court, and can review how 
the Court has responded to these concerns.   
3.3.2.1 Reproduction and tensions in autonomy 
In the previous chapter, I dealt with several cases pertaining to assisted 
reproduction,47 and in light of the previous section on family life, I begin this section 
by asking: why has respect for a decision to become a parent emerged as a human 
right? 
                                                
45 Z. Bauman, note 4 above, at 55. 
46 P. Sztompka, note 35 above, at 115. 
47 See Case of Evans v the United Kingdom (App.6339/05), Judgment of 10 April 2007; Case of 
Dickson v the United Kingdom (App.44362/04), Judgment of 4 December 2007; Case of S. H. v 
Austria (App.57813/00), Judgment of 3 November 2011. 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, the generally understood underlying rationale behind 
these rights claims is “the shared conviction that our sense of being the author of 
own actions, especially when they pertain to something as personal as reproduction, 
is profoundly valuable to us.”48 Control over whether to reproduce or not to 
reproduce is considered important because it is central to personal identity and “to 
the meaning of one’s life.”49 In this sense, it can be argued, reproduction is part of 
the ethos of individual self-realisation and self-fulfilment, characteristic to our 
time.50 Reproduction is one of the elements, alongside career choices, the discovery 
of new talents or hobbies – to give some of the examples used by Priaulx – that make 
up the notion of “who one is.”51  
There may be, of course, different reasons for having a child, but in the light of the 
discussion presented earlier in this chapter, I want to propose a different reading of 
the cases underlying the claims for one’s right to respect to become a parent.  
Drawing from the discussion above, it could be argued that alongside with the 
fragmentation and disintegration of the traditional family, a child is becoming 
increasingly important in terms of one’s needs for companionship, affection and 
belonging. When traditional family structures become frail, e.g. because of divorces, 
break-ups, numerous changes of partners, and being single (all are common ways of 
life), “a child may be still ‘a bridge’ to something more durable.”52 As marital ties 
come apart, or fail to form in the first place, other ties become more important to 
secure oneself against the risks of loneliness, companionship or having somebody to 
take care of oneself in old age. As Beck elaborates:  
The child is the source of the last remaining, irrevocable, unexchangeable 
primary relationship. Partners come and go. The child stays. Everything 
that is desired, but not realisable in the relationship, is directed to the 
                                                
48 N. Priaulx, “Rethinking Progenitive Conflict: Why Reproductive Autonomy Matters”, (2008) 16 
Medical Law Review 169-200, at 175. 
49 J.A. Robertson, Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies, Princeton 
University Press, 1994, at 24.  
50 See Section 3.2.2. above. 
51 N. Priaulx, note 48 above, at 176. 
52 Z. Bauman, Liquid Love, Polity Press, 2003, at 41. 
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child. With the increasing fragility of the relationships between sexes the 
child acquires the monopoly on practical companionship.53  
New forms of family life include living alone, non-marital co-habitation, childless 
marriage or serial marriage or “living apart together” with partners in separate 
dwellings. These alternative ways of living may offer many advantages by releasing 
individuals from the confines of the old-style family and creating new options and 
free spaces. But it is not clear how these new forms will affect, for example, old age 
survival. For couples without children, the turning point may come when one of the 
partners dies and the other is left alone. What are the options beyond traditional 
family for care? In these ways people want to secure themselves against risks.54 
Naturally, it is not a risk-free “investment,” nothing guarantees that your child, after 
the age of 18 or so, will provide you the comfort you perhaps expected for. 
Nevertheless, the genetic links, at least, some way or another, connect you with this 
person.    
Based on an empirical research done in early 1990s in the United States of America, 
Susan Alexander argued that since children have become enormously valuable for 
their parents for the companionship they provide, the courts should recognise their 
importance and allow compensation for damage for the loss of the bond between the 
child and its parents.55 Drawing on different surveys and scholarly work, she claimed 
that although in late twentieth-century America people are having fewer children 
(one of the reasons being women choosing to remain in the workplace after marriage 
or after the birth of a child), at the same time, parents are putting increasing value on 
each child they produce or try to produce.56 She, further, maintains that although 
children take a lot of time and money, and many parents struggle with their 
upbringing, for most families each child who is born to the family is of great value. 
The main reason for this, Alexander argues, is that “most of the parents hope that 
once a child is born they enjoy the companionship of their child in a normal, happy 
relationship, and that the bond they create with this child remains strong throughout 
                                                
53 U. Beck, note 5 above, at 118. 
54 U. Beck, E. Beck-Gernsheim, note 5 above, at 130-131. 
55 S.J.G. Alexander, “A Fairer Hand: Why Courts Must Recognize the Value of a Child’s 
Companionship”, (1991) 8 T.M. Cooley Law Review 273-359. 
56 S.J.G. Alexander, note 55 above, at 274. 
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their lifetime.”57 She cites a perspective of one of the participants of a nationwide 
survey that inquired about women’s feelings on motherhood:  
After seeing many friends in my age group growing older without family 
and their partners dying, I think it must be a lonely life for them without 
children. Imagine being sixty-seven with no children – no thank you! 
Leaning on them in my old age gives me security.58 
Referring to the social changes the American society has undergone in recent 
decades, Alexander notes that the bonds of marriage or partnership are no longer 
viewed as necessarily lasting ones. As a result, other bonds have taken their place, 
and one of the most important ones among these bonds is that between a parent and a 
child.59 Even when the couple divorces or separates, the parents’ link to their child 
remains, “and this link may become the most important bond the divorced parent 
maintains.”60  
Although Alexander’s research was based on American data and studies, we have 
already observed that similar social developments have taken place also in many 
European countries. There seems to be no reason to think, then, that the Europeans 
who brought their cases to the ECtHR to fulfil their wish to have a child, might have 
been motivated by completely different reasons.    
Considering also the substantial emotional and physical investment women, and 
sometimes men, undergo in order to have a child in cases of infertility problems (as 
to Evans and S.H. and others) and the lengthy court proceedings they undertake to 
accomplish the aim of having a child (for the applicants in S.H. and others it took 13 
years since they lodged an application to the Austrian Constitutional Court for the 
review of the constitutionality of the Artificial Procreation Act to receive the final 
judgment from the European Court of Human Rights61), it all supports the conclusion 
that couples or individuals who choose to undergo all these difficulties must have a 
very strong motivation of doing so and must place a very high value on to the child 
who is the result of that process. 
                                                
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., at 276. 
59 Ibid., at 340. 
60 Ibid., at 342. 
61 S.H. and others v Austria, para 13. 
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A wish for companionship, a wish for a child, creates, however, certain tensions in 
autonomy claims. Paradoxically, a right for respect for a decision to become a parent 
simultaneously increases and reduces one’s independence. On the one hand, there is 
the wish for independence and the wish to be free from outside interferences in 
respect for one’s choices, including that of an (ex-)partner.62 On the other hand, the 
wish to have a child means that the autonomy of one’s own preferences is bound to 
be compromised:  
Having children may mean the need to lower one’s professional 
ambitions, to ‘sacrifice a career,’ as the people sitting in judgment over 
professional performance would look askance at any sign of divided 
loyalty. Most painfully, having children means accepting such loyalty-
dividing dependence for an indefinite time.63  
We claim the right for autonomy, yet what we aim for is a relationship of 
dependence. A relation of dependency, that calls for responsibility to care for the 
child.  
But there is, yet, another tension in play. We want to be autonomous in our choices, 
but inevitably we need someone to respond to our needs to have a child. As I 
maintained in the previous chapter, despite the advances in medical sciences and 
technologies, reproduction still needs the participation at least of two parties of 
opposite sex. This particular tension between one’s wish to have a child and the 
interdependence of that wish becomes clear when we think back to the Evans case 
about the dispute over frozen embryos after the breakdown of the relationship 
between Ms Evans and her former partner.  
At the time the Evans case was pending in the Human Rights Court, the use of 
medical technologies for assisted procreation was regulated in the United Kingdom 
by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. On the one hand, the 1990 
Act offered possibilities for those infertile couples or individuals who could not 
conceive by natural means to have a chance to fulfil their wish to have a child. In the 
light of the discussion provided above, the 1990 Act provided some relief against the 
insecurities that accompany modern intimate relationships. It provided infertile 
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couples and particular individuals some security in that whatever happens to their 
marriage or relationship, they will not be lonely or without companionship in the 
future.  
On the other hand, the Act was also addressing another kind of fear of the modern 
individual – that one can become “locked” into a situation which conflicts with their 
desire to “follow their true nature” or their need to constantly evolve. Following this 
principle, section 4(1) of Schedule 3 stated: “The terms of any consent under this 
Schedule may from time to time be varied, and the consent may be withdrawn, by 
notice given by the person who gave the consent to the person keeping the gametes 
or embryo to which the consent is relevant.” Meeting the fears of an “evolving” 
individual fits nicely also with Judge Wall’s interpretation of the 1990 Act in the 
High Court judgment: 
[a]s a matter of public policy, it had not been open to J to give an 
unequivocal consent to the use of embryos irrespective of any change of 
circumstance…in the field of personal relationships, endearments and 
reassurances of this kind were commonplace, but they did not – and 
could not – have any permanent, legal effect./…/It is a right which the 
Statute gives him within the clear scheme operated by Parliament. It was 
the basis upon which he gave his consent on 10 October 2001.64 
This particular regulation, ironically, made the other party’s personal situation even 
more perilous and insecure, since it was the law which gave unlimited “license” to 
change one’s mind and to withdraw consent for whatever reason at any time until the 
implantation of the embryos to the uterus. For Ms Evans, the threat written in the law 
unfortunately materialised. Since the Human Rights Court upheld the United 
Kingdom regulation, Ms Evans’ chances for the child she wished for were broken.  
So in the case of Ms Evans, we can differentiate two aspects of her claim: a wish for 
a child and to set some boundaries to the autonomy of the person one is dependent 
on. According to my reading, both of her claims were targeting the same underlying 
societal issue – how to deal with the autonomy of others and the unpredictability and 
insecurity it brings. By claiming for her right to respect for the decision to become a 
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parent in a genetic sense,65 she was, allegedly, aiming to ease the insecurities what 
she was going to have with any future partnership. Arguing that her former partner’s 
consent should have become irrevocable from the moment of the creation of the 
embryos,66 she was, again, aiming to reduce the insecurities of modern partnerships.  
On a more basic level, what these cases essentially reveal, according to my reading, 
is that we cannot and do not want to live as lone individuals. Even if we did, it soon 
becomes evident that for the capacity of autonomy, we need others’ involvement, 
care and consideration. We are always dependent on others for the possibility of 
autonomy. We are dependent on children because of the emotional – and later on, the 
financial and material – support they provide. Even if couples – especially women on 
men – are not so dependent on each other anymore materially, they are still 
dependent on each other to fulfil the needs of affection and companionship. To push 
it further, even if a woman decides to have and raise a child completely on her own, 
she is still, at a minimum, dependent on the will of an anonymous sperm donor not to 
withdraw his consent. In other words, “an independent life” or “a life of one’s own,” 
is always dependent on the goodwill of partners, colleagues, health care service 
providers, and others in the surrounding world.   
The question that naturally follows now is whether the concept of individual 
autonomy can deal and respond adequately to the uncertainties associated with 
modern-day relationships. Considering the outcome of Evans, and what was said in 
the previous chapter – individual autonomy fosters an image of an independent and 
self-sufficient individual who relates to others on the basis of contractual equality – it 
is possible to argue that the ECtHR tactic has been to respond to individualisation, 
and the uncertainty it brings, by trying to make people less dependent on each other. 
But this, it seems to me, is to confuse the problem with the solution.  
The Human Rights Court in Evans argued that one of the rationales behind 
upholding the 1990 Act provisions that allowed both gamete providers to withdraw 
their consent any time before the implantation of the embryos, was to promote clarity 
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and certainty in relations between partners.67 It seems to me that instead of providing 
any certainty, the mechanisms of the law to guarantee individual autonomy 
exacerbated the sense of uncertainty. Both parties were completely free from any 
attachments or responsibilities towards each other. Paradoxically, then, upholding the 
value of free will and independence happens at the cost of growing insecurity and 
distrust towards others. The realisation of self-fulfilment, ironically, converts to self-
limitation. Instead of being sure that you can rely on the promise given by your 
partner, you have to constantly suspect that he or she might withdraw the promise. 
Under these conditions, opting for an egg freezing or sperm donor might indeed 
seem like more “secure” option. However, the “risks” of interdependence never 
completely disappear. 
To conclude this section, my proposition is that, arguably, the ECtHR misunderstood 
what the autonomy claims meant under the conditions of individualisation; it is not 
the need for greater individual autonomy per se, but the need to be able to depend on 
others and to gain some more security in life. The right for respect for individual 
autonomy promises to provide a shield against disappointments when individual 
expectations in relationships are not being met, but in that way it only exacerbates 
the problem by making us believe that independence and control can bring one’s 
wishes and needs to fruition. In reality the fulfilment of most of our aspirations 
depends on a network of people whose behaviour we cannot control or predict. As I 
see it, the task before the ECtHR is to provide a framework that accommodates the 
ascendancy of autonomy to the acknowledgement of human mutuality. The key to 
this lies, I believe, by bringing the issue of trust in the centre of the discourse of 
autonomy rights. 
3.4. Emergence of the importance of trust  
A growing amount of literature pertaining to family law and medical law would say 
that what we are witnessing behind the quest for more autonomy and independence 
                                                
67 Evans v the United Kingdom, para 89. 
Chapter 3 Autonomy, individualisation and the emergence of trust 
 
 127 
is the lack or loss of trust in interpersonal relationships.68 A growing amount of 
sociological literature would also say that all these relationships require trust.69 Trust 
is seen as “essential for stable relationships, vital for the maintenance of cooperation, 
fundamental for any exchange and necessary for even the most routine of everyday 
interactions.”70 “Whatever matters to human beings,” says Bok, “trust is the 
atmosphere in which it thrives.”71 Essentially, the value of the existence of trust in 
these – or any – relationship is that it helps to reduce the anxiety caused by 
ambiguity and uncertainty of many social situations. Without trust, partnership and 
marriages, and the goods following from it, would not be possible. I will come back 
to these points in the next chapter, where I will also explain more thoroughly the 
relationship between trust and autonomy and the interdependence between these 
notions. For now, five aspects of the modern-day social conditions that necessitate 
the engagement of trust as a “regulator” of behaviours will be addressed. The claim 
is that the increased significance of trust in areas of family life or doctor-patient 
relationships is related to the changes underlying the family structure,72 the shifting 
foundations in doctor-patient relationships,73 and the ascendancy of autonomy in 
people’s lives.74 Trust becomes more important, because more traditional ways of 
defining interpersonal relationships are in transition. The Human Rights Court can 
have an important role for establishing new bases for trust. 
First, we have moved from societies based on tradition and fate to those based on 
human agency and autonomy. Traditional societies do not imply trust. Trust does not 
arise when tradition dictates each person’s place and how they shall conduct 
themselves in the hierarchy. The sanction of ancient and eternal routine reduces the 
                                                
68 A.I. Tauber, Patient Autonomy and the Ethics of Responsibility, The MIT Press, 2005, at 158; J.J. 
Chin, “Doctor-Patient Relationship: A Covenant of Trust”, (2001) 42(12) Singapore Medical Journal 
578-581, at 580; F.H. Miller, “Trusting Doctors: Tricky Business When It Comes to Clinical 
Research”, (2001) 81 Boston University Law Review 423-443, at 423; C.E. Schneider, note 41 above. 
69 R.C. Solomon, F. Flores, Building Trust in Business, Politics, Relationships and Life, OUP, at 11. 
70 B. Misztal, Trust in Modern Societies: The Search for the Bases of Social Order, Polity Press, 1996, 
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71 S. Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Privatr Life, Vintage Books, 1989, at 31. 
72 B. Misztal, note 70 above, at 157-158. 
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74 A.B. Seligman, “Role Complexity, Risk, and the Emergence of Trust”, (2001) 81 Boston University 
Law Review 619-634.  
Chapter 3 Autonomy, individualisation and the emergence of trust 
 
 128 
preconditions for the salience of trust – uncertainty and contingency – to minimum.75 
In modern societies more and more depends on individual actors’ choices and 
decisions. The pre-existing ways of doing things become less secure, less pre-
determined. With no given set of obligations and opportunities, trust becomes a 
crucial mechanism on which society depends. Following Luhmann and Seligman, 
trust is not an obsolete resource typical of traditional society, but just the reverse, it 
gains in importance with the development of modern social forms, becoming truly 
indispensable in the present phase of modernity.76  
Second, ours is a world of increasingly numerous options. In all domains of life the 
spectrum of potential choices is vast. The more available options people face, the 
less predictable are the decisions they will eventually take. To choose among 
alternative courses of actions – ranging from whether to buy this rather than that 
product to deciding on the ways of reproduction – we often have to resort to trust. 
The uncertainty about the actions the others will take, when faced with their own 
pool of multiple choices makes trust an indispensable ingredient of our actions. The 
larger the feasible set of alternatives that are open to others, the more significant does 
trust become in formulating our decisions and actions.77 
Third, the loss of traditional roles and communal ties means that relationships have 
become optional. Relationships have become, in fact, perhaps the most common and 
troublesome incarnations of ambivalence.78 The dismantling of traditional categories 
of family, class, social status and gender roles creates the conditions for unknown, 
elective categories of family, class and gender roles, the meaning of which has to be 
determined by individual decisions and choices. “We are getting into optional 
relationships inside families which are very difficult to identify in an objective, 
empirical way because they are a matter of subjective perspectives and decisions.”79  
                                                
75 P. Sztompka, note 35 above at 45; See also M. Kohn, Trust: Self-Interest and the Common Good, 
OUP, 2008, at 4-5. 
76 N. Luhmann, Trust and Power. Two Works by Niklas Luhmann, John Wiley & Sons, 1979; A. 
Seligman, The Problem of Trust, Princeton University Press, 1997. 
77 P. Sztompka, note 35 above, at 13. 
78 Z. Baumann, note 52 above, at viii. 
79 U. Beck, E. Beck-Gernsheim, note 5 above, at 204.  
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Besides the changes in family life, in the modern world the circles of acquaintances 
and friends are being continually updated. “We are nothing to one another but what 
we choose to become, and we can unbecome it whenever we want”, say Deresiewicz 
in his article “Faux Friendship”80. Deresiewicz shows how friendship has become the 
characteristically modern relationship:  
Modernity believes in equality, and friendships, unlike traditional 
relationships, are egalitarian. Modernity believes in individualism. 
Friendships serve public purpose and exist independent of all other 
bonds. Modernity believes in choice. Friendships, unlike blood ties, are 
elective. Modernity believes in self-expression. Friends, because we 
choose them, give us back an image of ourselves. Modernity believes in 
freedom, and friendship involves no fixed commitments. The modern 
temper runs toward unrestricted fluidity and flexibility, the endless play 
of possibility, and so is perfectly suited to the informal, improvisational 
nature of friendship. We can be friends with whomever we want, 
however we want, for as long we want.81 
Coping with all of this raised subjectivity requires an enlarged pool of trust.  
Fourth, the expansion of technological achievements, especially in the field of 
medicine and molecular biology, creates an ever-larger number of unpredictable 
consequences.82 Starting with the invention of the mechanical ventilator to the 
development of gene technology and engineering, the traditional perceptions of 
human life, death and illness have had, and continue to have, considerable 
transformations. The more technology is applied to nature and society, the more life 
becomes unpredictable. “Increasing social and technological complexity elevates the 
probability that some key portions of the system cannot be safely counted on.”83 
Coping with that raised power and consequent vulnerability calls, again, for the 
engagement of trust. 
Finally, contemporary society is an extremely interdependent society. Under the 
powers of autonomy and the individualised worldview its current language 
encourages, our interdependence and interconnectedness on each other becomes 
increasingly more apparent, and in the end more relevant. Individuals are more and 
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81 Ibid. 
82 See U. Beck, note 5 above; See also P. Sztompka, note 35 above, at 29-40. 
83 P. Sztompka, note 35 above, at 13. 
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more interdependent upon one another to accomplish their goals. As our dependence 
on the cooperation of others grows, so does the importance of trust in their reliability. 
Since human mutuality and community rest no longer on solidly established 
traditions, but rather, on a paradoxical collectivity of reciprocal individualization,84 
we need the engagement of trust. The importance of trust derives directly from the 
nature of human beings as social animals who can only satisfy most of their needs by 
means of coordinated and cooperative activities.85 And any form of cooperating 
activity requires the co-operators to trust one another to do their bit.86  
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter presents a, perhaps paradoxical, conclusion that the more “autonomous” 
we become, the more uncertain our lives are. Liberation entails that the certainties 
provided by the structures of traditional social forms are becoming disintegrated. The 
disappearance of guaranteed jobs for life, the increased visibility of diverse 
sexualities and identities, the elective and ambiguous character of interpersonal 
relationships and institutionalised pressures on self-sufficiency, have all led many 
sociologists to argue that modern life is becoming more anxiety-ridden that it has 
ever been before. An individual of the contemporary Western world is facing 
uncertainty and growing anxiety and is consequently faced with compulsion to find 
and invent new certainties for oneself without them.  
This chapter maintains that autonomy claims originated from uncertainty caused by 
the decline of traditional ways of living, dealing with the abundance of choices, 
presented to us by the modern world, and the institutionalised pressure to live an 
autonomous, individualised life. It was the search for security, confidence and 
control, I argued, that lies at the origins of autonomy claims. In a sense the fading of 
traditional authority has created a vacuum in social relations that is being filled by 
regulation. The Human Rights Court’s response to these concerns is, however, 
inadequate. 
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Individual autonomy casts human beings in the contexts of family life and medicine 
as self-sufficient individuals and guardians of their own interests. In this way it 
upholds and enforces individualisation, rather than responds to any of the problems 
the processes of individualisation creates and causes for personal lives and human 
well-being. However, the way the Human Rights Court responds to these new 
disputes is crucial in defining the new type of social commitments that inevitably 
come about when previous bonds and rules break down. 
The indeterminacy of social action coupled with an ever-widening range of social 
interaction and interdependence, makes trust increasingly relevant for social 
interaction. Living in a highly individualised culture means that you have to be 
socially sensible and be able to relate to others and to obligate yourself, in order to 
manage and to organise your everyday life. This, consequently, raises the question of 
the recognition of our mutuality – the interdependence of our choices – and the 
recognition of the binding forces of this mutuality. In an era of uncertainty in 
interpersonal relations, trust becomes increasingly important as a “regulator” of 
behaviours. 
Having laid down the social basis for the need for trust and the social conditions that 
necessitate the engagement of trust, it becomes necessary to look more closely into 
whether and in what way the ECtHR has approached the issue.  
 





AUTONOMY, LAW AND TRUST 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Trust is a crucial factor in managing the modern world’s complexities and 
uncertainties, yet concerns have grown over whether trust in interpersonal 
relationships is, in fact, in decline.1 The problem, then, becomes how to reverse the 
deterioration of trust in our everyday lives. The previous chapter showed that by 
looking for authority that could guarantee higher levels of security and confidence in 
matters pertaining to one’s health, procreation and death, people more often now 
have recourse to human rights litigation, appealing to their right to autonomy. The 
increasing dependence on institutions in personal matters shows that the resulting 
vacuum left from traditional forms of trust is filled with alternative arrangements 
providing similar functions and meeting universal need for certainty, predictability, 
order and the like.2  
Seeing it in this way, the introduction of individual autonomy into the human rights 
law and the subsequent increase in legalisation of personal matters can be perceived 
both as a symptom of decrease in trust and as the functional equivalent of trust. The 
question central to this chapter is whether the concept of individual autonomy as 
developed under the European Human Rights Convention can successfully 
complement trust – e.g., does it have the effect of enhancing trust and trustworthy 
action? In order to evaluate that, I will proceed in the following manner.  
                                                
1 In 2009 the Joseph Rowntree Foundation initiated a consultation among leading thinkers, activists 
and commentators, as well as the wider public, on identifying the problems that pose the greatest 
threat to the British society in the 21st century. The results were published in the book called 
Contemporary Social Evils, Policy Press, 2009. The book argued that the erosion of trust in 
interpersonal relationships was one of the most clearly felt “evils” of contemporary British society. 
See also O. O’Neill, A Question of Trust: The BBC Reith Lectures, CUP, 2002; A.I. Tauber, Patient 
Autonomy and the Ethics of Responsibility, The MIT Press, 2005, Ch 5. 
2 P. Sztompka, Trust. A Sociological Theory, CUP, 1999, at 115. 
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The previous chapter argued that the relevance of trust arises from the changes in 
social conditions that make lives increasingly complex and uncertain. It follows that 
it becomes more crucial to understand that trust is essential for our freedom and it is 
essential for dealing with the freedom of others. The working definition this thesis 
adopts is that trust is a way of managing uncertainty with our dealings with others by 
willingly making oneself vulnerable based on the belief that the trusted person will 
reciprocate and choose to behave in a trustworthy manner. 
Since trust is always risky and potentially harmful, it is normally based on some kind 
of evidence, or various clues, which make people grant or withdraw trust, and 
equally, which make trusted parties accept trust and behave in a trustworthy manner. 
One of those “commitment devices” people turn to is law. Given the somewhat 
sceptical view towards law’s capacity to enhance trust, the chapter further explores 
the relationship between trust and law. Although it is rather common to perceive trust 
and law as opposites, it is more appropriate to treat them as complements. Law can 
positively support trust and encourage good behaviour through its expressive 
functions.   
The chapter, hereafter, proceeds to explore the ways individual autonomy, as 
constructed by the Human Rights Court, ensures or promotes that people generally 
act in a trustworthy manner. In other words, the final part of the chapter explores the 
capacity of individual autonomy to deal with the uncertainties identified in Chapter 3 
and the proposition that autonomy can complement trust. Based on a critical analysis 
of the ECtHR autonomy-related case law, I will reach the conclusion that individual 
autonomy as conceived at the moment under Article 8 case law undermines, rather 
than supports, trust in interpersonal relationships. 
I argue that the problem with the construction of individual autonomy starts with the 
premise that distrust rather than trust is the factual basis or reality of contemporary 
relationships. I believe that, rather than accommodating distrust, human rights law 
should recognise and appreciate the centrality of trust to these relationships and 
guide medical, family and interpersonal practice towards building trust. Also, the law 
in this context should concentrate on influencing people to earn each other’s trust 
rather than focusing on accommodating other’s lack of trustworthiness. Trust, not 
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distrust, should dictate the model for human rights law in regulating human 
behaviour in the realms of interpersonal relationships. 
Second, the unscrutinised adoption of measures that aim to increase one’s autonomy 
– additional controls, complaints systems and appeal mechanisms – increasingly 
suggest that various professionals are mistrusted and that they are not expected to act 
on the basis of trustworthy motivations. If people receive signals that they are not 
trustworthy, they are likely to become less trustworthy. This, correspondingly, may 
trigger a wider culture of distrust, low morale, and may lead to professional 
stagnation. 
Third, I examine the Human Rights Court’s attitude towards one of the most 
blameworthy breaches of trust, that of lying and deception in interpersonal 
relationships. The dissatisfaction with the Court’s present approach to uphold the 
primacy of informed consent – set to serve to protect individuals’ autonomy and 
independence – is that under certain conditions the respective regulation acts as a 
social incentive to deceit.  
The chapter concludes, accordingly, that the particular legal regulation – established 
by autonomy-related case law – does not increase trust, but is, in fact, 
counterproductive to trust and trustworthy action. In other words, the individualistic 
concept of autonomy is an inadequate component for dealing with lack of trust and 
needs to be reconsidered. Therefore an account of autonomy is needed that helps to 
enhance trusting and trustworthiness, and thus helps to support or induce trust. In 
response to this need, in the next, final, chapter I develop an account of caring 
autonomy for the moral basis of the practice of trust. 
4.2. An overview of trust 
An emerging recognition among scholars writing on trust is that “without trust, the 
everyday social life which we take for granted is simply not possible.”3 Although 
                                                
3 D. Good “Individuals, Interpersonal Relations and Trust”, in D. Gambetta (ed) Trust: Making and 
Breaking Cooperative Relations, Basil Blackwell, 1988, at 32. See also A. Seligman, The Problem of 
Trust, Princeton University Press, 1997, at 13: “The existence of trust is an essential component of all 
enduring social relationships.” 
Chapter 4 Autonomy, law and trust 
 
135 
some form of trust is necessary for the continued operation of any social order,4 the 
issue of trust has become more urgent and central under the conditions of uncertainty 
and risk.5 As the previous chapter argued, the augmented requirement of trust in 
interpersonal relationships is closely connected with the loosening of restrictions set 
by “tradition” and the growth of “autonomy” in people’s lives. This section further 
explains the intimate relation between that of autonomy and trust and the importance 
of placing trust intelligently. This sets the stage for assessing the capacity of law and 
the capacity of the particular concept of autonomy to complement trust. 
4.2.1 Nature and significance of trust 
According to Niklas Luhmann a complete absence of trust would prevent someone 
even from getting up in the morning:  
He would be prey to a vague sense of dread, to paralysing 
fears…Anything and everything would be possible. Such abrupt 
confrontation with the complexity of the world at its most extreme is 
beyond human endurance.6  
Indeed, human life would turn into a pathological paranoia if we had to suspect 
constantly that others around us might attack us. In order to survive and keep one’s 
sanity, trust must supersede distrust.7 Following Luhmann, I consider trust important 
in two crucial and interconnected ways: it is crucial for our own freedom and it is 
crucial for dealing with the freedom of others.8 Or put it in another way, we need 
trust because we have to be able to rely on others acting as they say that they will, 
and because we need others to accept that we will act as we say we will.9 This dual 
function gives trust necessarily a relational character. To be sure, trust is the basis for 
autonomous action. Trust liberates human agency and “releases creative, uninhibited, 
                                                
4 A. Seligman, note 3 above, at 7-8. 
5 B.A. Misztal, Trust in Modern Societies: The Search for the Bases of Social Order, Polity Press, 
1996, at 9.  
6 N. Luhmann, Trust and Power: Two Works by Niklas Luhmann, John Wiley & Sons, 1979, at 4. 
7 Ibid. 
8 “The world is being dissipitated into an uncontrollable complexity; so much so that any given time 
people are able to choose freely between very different actions.” See N. Luhmann, note 6 above, at 
24; See also J. Dunn, “Trust and Political Agency”, in D. Gambetta (ed) Trust: Making and Breaking 
Cooperative Relations, Basil Blackwell, 1988, 73-at 80. 
9 O. O’Neill, note 1 above, at 4. 
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innovative activism towards other people.”10 The uncertainty and risk towards 
others’ actions is lowered and “possibilities of action increase proportionally to the 
increase in trust.”11 Autonomy is a capacity that is made possible by relationships 
based on trust. Trusting relationships are necessary for autonomy to flourish 
throughout one’s life. Let me expand this thought a bit further. 
People most often act in the presence, and in connection with, the actions of many 
others. The action of those others is in many degrees uncertain and uncontrollable. It 
is what Annette Baier calls the “discretionary powers of others”12 and Adam 
Seligman as the “freedom, agency, and hence fundamental inscrutability of the 
other.”13 It is the human agency and autonomy that we rightly so value, yet which 
makes other people’s motives, intentions and reasons unpredictable and potentially 
harmful. A crucial element of trust is, therefore, that of uncertainty – trust is needed 
when and because we lack certainty about others’ future actions.14 It is a matter of 
relying on what others say and what they undertake to do, without the certainty of the 
outcomes. Trust is never without risks. No trust is involved where our behaviour is 
dictated by complete control or coercion. In situations where actions or outcomes are 
guaranteed and expectations are certain and strong, trust is redundant.15  
However, we cannot do without trust, since trust provides us the freedom to engage 
in projects that we otherwise could not or would not undertake on our own. It opens 
the door to positive outcomes that would be impossible without it. Our life, health, 
our offspring and their well-being are some of the things we cannot either create or 
sustain single-handedly. Due to the nature of human beings as social animals and due 
to our limited epistemic and practical capacities, we can satisfy most of our needs 
only by means of coordinated and cooperative activity. For example, I would need 
trust for undergoing a medical procedure, for agreeing to marry someone or for going 
on a boat trip. Each of us has a wide range of needs, interests, goals, desires, wants, 
                                                
10 P. Sztompka, note 2 above, at 103. 
11 N. Luhmann, note 6 above, at 40. 
12 A. Baier, “Trust and Antitrust”, (1986) 96(2) Ethics 231-260, at 237. 
13 A. Seligman, note 3 above, at 69. 
14 N.C. Manson, O. O’Neill, Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics, CUP, 2007, at 162; P. 
Sztompka, note 2 above, at 20. 
15 V. Held, “On the Meaning of Trust”, (1968) 78(2) Ethics 156-159, at 157; O. O’Neill, Autonomy 
and Trust in Bioethics, CUP, 2007, at 13; P. Sztompka, note 2 above, at 21-23. 
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and none of us is self-sufficient. We are all profoundly linked in countless ways we 
can hardly perceive. We depend on other people’s knowledge, expertise and 
goodwill to lead a viable and minimally secure life, “let alone anything like a life 
worth living.”16 Our decisions, choices, actions are inspired and motivated by others 
to no small extent. We are not the sole authors of our destiny, each of us; our 
destinies are entangled – messily, unpredictably. Trust is, therefore, of much 
importance because its presence or absence can have a strong bearing on what we 
choose to do and in many cases what we can do.17 In other words it has a strong 
impact on exercising one’s autonomy if we conceive it as making choices on one’s 
health, death, identity or on matters of reproduction. The effective exercise of 
autonomy can only rely on willingness to trust and to be trusted. 
On the other hand, if distrust is prevailing in our relationships with others, our 
freedoms are substantially limited. Either we would, in extreme cases, stay in bed, 
paralysed with fear, as suggested by Luhmann, or we would have to invest a 
considerable amount of time and resources to ease those fears and insecurities. Take 
for example a married couple where a woman does not trust her husband in 
managing money. It becomes necessary for her to spend an enormous amount of time 
overseeing, questioning, challenging and arguing with his dubious decisions about 
investments and purchases. The restrictions this behaviour imposes on one’s life are 
clear. Conversely, consider a case where a husband does not trust his wife and 
decides to go through her emails. How is he supposed to know whether James is 21 
or 65 years old, whether David signs everything with an “x”, or if “thanks for your 
insights” is a code for unfaithful activity? He cannot know. He then has to find out, 
and considering the amount of email activity his wife has, it can become a full-time 
job.  
In the same vein, if people lack in trust towards doctors, they will not seek care, 
submit themselves to treatment, disclose necessary information or follow treatment 
recommendations.18 They may end up sitting alone with their illness and watch how 
                                                
16 N.C. Manson, O. O’Neill, note 14 above, at 159. 
17 P. Dasgupta, “Trust as a Commodity”, in D. Gambetta (ed) Trust. Making and Breaking 
Cooperative Relations, Basil Blackwell, 1988, at 51. 
18 M.A. Hall, “Law, Medicine and Trust”, (2002) 55 Stanford Law Review 463-527, at 478. 
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it robs them of their freedom of movement, freedom of pursuing the preferred career 
– potentially affecting a whole range of activities necessary for enjoyment of a full 
and autonomous life. Of course, even if distrust prevails, they may still decide to go 
to see a doctor, however with a degree of pessimism and scepticism towards the 
physician. In these conditions, people might find it necessary to conduct complete 
background checks on their doctors and to do research of their own about illnesses 
affecting them and their treatments. Again, the overwhelming fears and anxieties that 
accompany the lack of trust rob the energy and time needed for getting well and 
returning to a state of good health. Not to mention the loss of therapeutic benefits 
associated with good trusting relationships, which are said to activate the self-healing 
mechanisms and to enhance the effects of therapies.19  
In addition, it would give strong signals to the medical personnel that despite their 
trustworthy and competent action, you actually mistrust them. As Manson and 
O’Neill note, “other’s trust, like their respect is of fundamental value to most of us. 
When others treat us as if we were untrustworthy, the results can be both 
psychologically and socially devastating.”20 If it is true that the moral psychology of 
being regularly trusted helps to create trustworthiness in people,21 the unwillingness 
to trust has the contrary effect of spreading fear, divisiveness and irresponsibility.22 
All of this, again, would have a potentially detrimental effect on making the doctor-
patient relationship dysfunctional, and eventually curb the freedom of both parties. 
I can see already that there will be those who think that I am suggesting that 
everybody should place trust without questions asked. This is not the case. I do not 
suggest that we should place trust blindly – denying the evidence for distrust – or 
that we should practice simple trust – to trust unthinkingly or naively without any 
deliberation and ethical and/or evidential consideration – just in order to simplify our 
                                                
19 Ibid. See also F.H. Miller, “Trusting Doctors: Tricky Business When It Comes to Clinical 
Research”, (2001) 81 Boston University Law Review 423-443, at 427. 
20 N.C. Manson, O. O’Neill, note 14 above, at 161. 
21 L.E. Mitchell, “The Importance of Being Trusted”, (2001) 81 Boston University Law Review 591-
617, at 599. 
22 N.C. Manson, O. O’Neill, note 14 above, at 161; L.E. Mitchell, note 21 above, at 600. 
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lives.23 Trust regardless of partners, situations and circumstances would be nothing 
short of stupid or pathological. Only trust that is placed intelligently and in a justified 
manner has the effect of building more trust, enhances cooperation and reduces 
complexity in our lives. But what makes trust justified? 
4.2.2 Placing and responding to trust 
Trust, as argued above, is crucial for human interaction, but it is also always risky 
and potentially harmful. Consider again medical practice. In order to get the 
necessary medical treatment, patients have to share with doctors information about 
their personal and family history and details about their symptoms that might be 
embarrassing and uncomfortable. Sometimes they have to appear disrobed, they have 
to allow their bodies to be touched and probed, they have to submit to tests that they 
never would have otherwise sought, and sometimes they even allow themselves to be 
made unconscious so that their bodies can be invaded with knives and body parts can 
be removed. Because in these and similar situations the stakes are high, we do not 
place trust randomly. In order to avoid loss and betrayal, a person’s belief or 
expectation on the other person’s trustworthiness is normally based on some kind of 
evidence, on various clues, which make people grant or withdraw trust, and equally, 
which make trusted parties accept trust and behave in a trustworthy manner. You do 
not trust a person to do something merely because he says he will do it. You trust 
him only because, knowing what you do of his disposition, his information, his 
ability, his available options and their consequences, his ability and so forth, you 
expect that he will choose to do it.24 Trust is a way of managing uncertainty with our 
dealings with others by willingly making oneself vulnerable based on the belief that 
the trusted person will choose to behave trustworthily. His promise must be 
credible.25  
                                                
23 For a thorough account on blind and simple trust, and the difference between them, see R.C. 
Solomon, F. Flores, Building Trust in Business, Politics, Relationships and Life, OUP, 2001, at 59-68. 
24 On the different grounds of trust see P. Sztompka, note 2 above, chapter 4. 
25 P. Dasgupta, note 17 above, at 51. 
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One has to keep in mind though that such grounds for trust are never conclusive or 
foolproof; they never give complete certainty about the correctness of the decision. 
Trust always remains a risk with a chance of losing. As observed by Luhmann:  
The clues employed to form trust do not eliminate the risk, they simply 
make it less. They do not supply complete information about the likely 
behaviour of the person to be trusted. They simply serve as a springboard 
for the leap into uncertainty, although bounded and structured….Trust is 
more likely to be conferred when certain preconditions are met.26 
Among the widely considered clues are legal and professional regulations.27 
However, the issue whether law has the ability to induce people to be trustworthy 
and self-limiting is hardly a settled matter. Therefore, before examining whether the 
concept of individual autonomy has the capacity to promote trust and trustworthy 
action – whether law can provide incentives to the trusted to fulfil the trust and 
provide necessary knowledge to allow the truster to trust?28 – I will explore the 
somewhat controversial relationship between law and trust.   
4.3. Law and trust 
While there is an agreement in scholarly writings that law and trust interact with each 
other,29 there is disagreement about the effects of this interaction – is the law’s 
influence on trust primarily positive or negative? Some claim that law itself is a 
source of the worrisome loss of trust we have supposedly suffered: the diminution of 
trust in society is associated with and attributed to the growth of the law and 
legalisation of relationships.30 The critics argue that law by its inherently adversarial 
                                                
26 N. Luhmann, note 6 above, at 33. 
27 P. Sztompka, note 2 above, at 89; M.B. Blair, L.A. Stout, “Trust, Trustworthiness, and the 
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law”, (2001) 149 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
1735-1810, at 1747; See also M.A. Hall, note 18 above; D.M. Kahan, “Trust, Collective Action, and 
Law”, (2001) 81 Boston University Law Review 333-347; C.A. Hill, E.A. O’Hara, “A Cognitive 
Theory of Trust”, (2006) 84 Washington University Law Review 1717-1796; 
28 R. Hardin, “Street-Level Epistemology of Trust”, (1993) 21(4) Politics and Society 505-529, at 505. 
29 F.B. Cross, “Law and Trust”, (2004-2005) 93 Georgetown Law Journal 1457-1545; M.A. Hall, note 
18 above; F. Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, New York: Free 
Press, 1995; M.B. Blair, L.A. Stout, note 27 above; R. Hardin, “Trustworthiness”, (1996) 107(1) 
Ethics 26-42; D.M. Kahan, note 27 above; C.A. Hill, E.A. O’Hara, note 27 above; T. Frankel, 
“Trusting and Non-Trusting on the Internet”, (2001) 81 Boston University Law Review 457-478; I. 
Goldberg et al., “Trust, Ethics and Privacy”, (2001) 81 Boston University Law Review 407-422. 
30 F. Fukuyama, note 29 above. 
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and calculating nature is intrinsically contrary to trust.31 They maintain that the 
increase in law has displaced trust as a foundation of relationships and caused 
thereby a loss of essential, intrinsic trust.32 Others claim, again, that actually the 
contrary is true – law has a crucial place to enhance trust and trustworthy action and 
it is indeed possible to foster trust through law.33 By giving legal assurances of 
remedies through breaches of trust, the law makes parties more likely to be both 
trusting and trustworthy.34 
It appears that we are at the crossroads here – if the former allegation holds true then 
less law and litigation would be preferable. If too much regulation is more likely to 
harm than foster trust, then curbing rather than urging regulation seems best. Hence, 
we are likely to come to a conclusion that the introduction of the concept of 
autonomy into human rights law, and the regulation accompanying it, is superfluous 
and troublesome, if not harmful. However, if the proponents of the position that 
law’s impact on trust is inherently positive are right, then autonomy regulation 
should be essentially a welcome addition to human rights protection.  
I maintain that law can have a positive effect on trust. Alongside with the authors 
who distinguish between law’s regulatory and expressive functions,35 I believe that, 
in addition to restraining misbehaviour, law has also the ability to encourage good 
behaviour. By law’s ability to enhance trusting and trustworthiness, it can build 
effectively greater overall levels of trust in interpersonal relationships. Given the 
undeniable societal value of trust, human rights law should be developed in a way to 
advance those objectives. This is not to say though that any legal mechanism is 
always suitable for enhancing trust and trustworthiness. Sometimes, even when the 
intentions are good, the regulation may backfire. It is, therefore, essential to evaluate 
the content of particular laws related to trust and their compatibility with the nature 
of the particular social relationships under question.  
                                                
31 S. Veitch, Law and Responsibility. On the Legitimation of Human Suffering, Routledge-Cavendish, 
2007, at 84. 
32 M.B. Blair, L.A. Stout, note 27 above. 
33 C.A. Hill, E.A. O’Hara, note 27 above, at 1752; R. Hardin, note 29 above. 
34 F.B. Cross, note 29 above, at 1483. 
35 See e.g. M.A. Hall, note 18 above. 
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4.3.1 Law as the source of decrease in trust 
According to Francis Fukuyama, law has developed as a substitute for trust, 
necessitated by the breakdown of trusting relationships: “People who do not trust one 
another will end up cooperating only under a system of formal rules and regulations, 
which have to be negotiated, agreed to, litigated, and enforced, sometimes by 
coercive means.”36 Whereas in many instances it can be observed that “law appears 
when trust fails,”37 this is not to say yet that law is the one to blame for the decrease 
of trust in interpersonal relationships. Rather, the increase in law and litigation is 
arguably a symptom of the decline of trust in society caused by a more general 
realignment of relationships over the last fifty to sixty years,38 and by a “decreased 
willingness to accept the authority of existing social structures and to work things out 
under the environment they provide.”39 If anything, law’s intentions have been noble. 
Where trust is undermined, it has to be restored. And the expectation goes that the 
increasing attention paid to the protection of rights is to re-establish trust.40 
Arguably, the promotion of patient rights originates precisely from the breakdown in 
older patterns of doctor-patient trust,41 where informed consent, as “the modern 
clinical ritual of trust,”42 has become increasingly necessary where informal bonds of 
trust have eroded. Rights discourse is the primary mechanism through which the law 
is meant to redress the imbalance of power perceived to exist within the doctor-
patient relationship.43 In order to re-establish trust, informed consent and the 
advocacy of patient autonomy was introduced to ensure that patients have access to 
information to participate in decision-making and that they can themselves gauge 
                                                
36 F. Fukuyama, note 29 above, at 27. 
37 A.I. Tauber, note 1 above, at 185. 
38 A.I. Tauber, note 1 above, at 6. 
39 F. Fukuyama, note 29 above, at 311. 
40 O. O’Neill, note 1 above, at 27; O. O’Neill, note 15 above, at 3. 
41 A.I. Tauber, note 1 above, at 158-159. 
42 P.R. Wolpe, “The Triumph of Autonomy in American Bioethics: A Sociological View” in R. 
DeVries, J. Subedi (eds) Bioethics and Society: Constructing the Ethical Enterprise, Pearson, 1998, 
38-59, at 50. 
43 K. Veitch, The Jurisdiction of Medical Law, Ashgate, 2007, at 103; J.D. Moreno, “The Triumph of 
Autonomy in Bioethics and Commercialism in American Healthcare”, (2007) 16 Cambridge 
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 415-419, at 415. 
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whether procedures should be performed. “In this more sophisticated approach to 
trust,” as O’Neill observes, “autonomy is seen as a precondition of genuine trust.”44  
Similarly, law has been arguably accommodated to the growth of distrust in the areas 
of family law. The courts now increasingly recognise the organisation of spousal 
relationships through legally binding contracts, e.g. prenuptial agreements or 
distribution of property on divorce, suggesting that the parties do not trust each other 
enough to rely on informal exchange.45 People enter into legally binding contracts 
when they do not believe that those whom they plan to deal with will reliably act in 
their interests.46 As marriage is seen as being increasingly perilous, alternatives to it, 
e.g. legal recognition of co-habitation, look more attractive.47 On the other hand, as 
Schneider observes, co-habitation is itself risky. It is in some ways riskier than 
marriage, since people usually enter it less deliberately than marriage, with less 
commitment to each other and with less sense of what to expect from each other.48 
To reduce these risks, many jurisdictions have adopted regulations to resolve the 
separating couple’s disputes over their economic interests.  
Whereas the starting point in analysing the relationship between trust and law might 
be non-partisan and even supportive towards law’s role to re-establish trust, 
commentators increasingly suggest now that the complex systems of legal regulation, 
accountability and control seem actually rather to diminish than foster trust.49 As 
explained by one health care commentator: 
The language of rights and the language of trust move in opposite 
directions from one another. The scrupulous insistence on observance of 
one’s rights is an admission that one does not trust those at hand to care 
properly for one’s welfare. This point can be seen in the fact that “rights” 
are a peculiarly modern language, developed for and appropriate to the 
                                                
44 O. O’Neill, note 15 above, at 19. 
45 A.A. Marston, “Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements”, (1997) 49 Stanford Law 
Review 887-916. 
46 C.E. Schneider, “Family Law in the Age of Distrust”, (1999) 33(3) Family Law Quarterly 447-460, 
at 458-459.  
47 C.E. Schneider, note 46 above, at 459. 
48 Ibid. 
49 See O. O’Neill, note 1 above; O. O’Neill, note 15 above; M. Kohn, Trust, Self-Interest and the 
Common Good, OUP, 2008. 
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highly impersonal social relationships that characterize our times, times 
in which the breakdown of trust is endemic.50  
On such a view, not only has law, according to these critics, failed to re-establish 
trust, but it simultaneously undermines the “organic” forms of trust and it introduces 
new grounds for distrust.51  
4.3.1.1 Loss of “organic” trust 
This strand of criticism contends that increased legal regulation of society has 
squeezed out traditional, “organic”, relationships of trust. Law interferes where it 
should not. According to these authors “optimal levels of trust and distrust emerge 
through private ordering, without the assistance of law.”52 They argue that the more 
areas of social interaction are left under legal regulation, the more people lose their 
ability to negotiate, and in the end, the development of trust is halted.53 As the law 
expands, it does not simply fill the void left from the decline of trust, but it also 
“replaces extra-legal systems of trust in arranging human relationships.”54 The more 
people depend on rules to regulate their interactions, the less they trust each other, 
and vice versa.55 
The main concern here is that we are losing something valuable if we replace 
“organic” trust with legal regulation that only manages, if even this, to mimic trust. 
Following Blair and Stout, external incentives such as law can “reduce levels of trust 
and trustworthiness within interpersonal relationships by eroding the participants’ 
internal motivations to trust.”56 
The weaknesses of this sort of criticism include the fact that it seems to overlook that 
some of the traditional forms of trust were based on the lack of alternatives, i.e. – 
relationships were driven by and founded on paternalism rather than on any true and 
                                                
50 R. Sherlock, “Reasonable Men and Sick Human Beings”, (1986) 80 The American Journal of 
Medicine 2-4, at 3. 
51 See e.g. M.B. Blair, L.A. Stout, note 27 above, at 1745. 
52 M.A. Hall, note 18 above, at 484. 
53 A. Seligman, note 3 above, at 173. 
54 F. Cross, note 29 above, at 1485. 
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authentic relationship of trust.57 This sort of criticism seems to rest, at least to a 
certain extent, on a nostalgic vision of past-times, when doctors knew best58 and 
marriages were agreeable lifelong commitments. In the doctor-patient relationship, 
what was considered to be a paradigm manifestation of trust was rather a form of 
paternalism that institutionalised opportunities for abuse of trust59 or called for 
placing trust gullibly or blindly. This relationship was characterised by a high degree 
of confidence in the person trusted, the trusting person being either devoid of distrust 
or in denial of distrust. Similarly, much of the history of marriage demonstrates that 
mutual trust and mutual trustworthiness in a good cause – upholding traditional 
family values and providing children with proper parental care – can co-exist even 
with the oppression and exploitation of half the trusting and trusted partners. As 
Annette Baier reminds us, “…trust can co-exist and has long co-existed with 
contrived and perpetuated inequality.”60 Therefore it is hard to perceive the 
weakening of these forms of trust in family and medical settings as negative. What 
becomes crucial, however, is to see what kind of devices can provide conditions for 
trust that is better placed and responded to.   
Another aspect of the critical argument that law “crowds out” inherent forms of trust 
relates to the conceptual disagreement about the meaning of trust – whether true trust 
is essentially affective61 or is it largely calculative.62 Those who believe that trust is 
essentially affective or emotion-based consider it to be more of a feeling than a 
                                                
57 O. O’Neill, note 15 above, at 17-18; J. Montgomery, “Law and Demoralisation of Medicine”, 
(2006) 26(2) Legal Studies 185-210, at 187. 
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University Press, 1995, 130-151, at 131. 
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Attitude”, (1996) 107(1) Ethics 4-25.  
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thought or assumption.63 According to one of the proponents of this view, to trust a 
person is to have an attitude of optimism about that person’s goodwill and to have 
the confident expectation that, when the need arises, the person will be directly and 
favourably moved by the thought that he or she is being counted upon and trusted.64  
The question raised here is whether law can also support trust based on an emotional 
approach. How is law to overcome its negative message of mistrust? One of the 
answers may lie in distinguishing between law’s regulatory and expressive functions, 
and determining whether these effects are likely to be complementary or competing. 
In the latter event, we must decide which is likely to dominate and how to minimise 
the suppression of trust. Often, this path of reasoning may advise us to adopt broad 
standards rather than detailed rules, and it may counsel us to have rather weak or 
nondirective enforcement mechanisms.65  
Trust is something that must be learned.66 Norms, such as trusting behaviour, are not 
genetically created, but are produced by the course of human interaction, which law 
is a part of. The laws that society chooses are an expressive statement of what society 
values. Such statements, in turn, can cause behavioural norms to shift.67 A strong 
legal devotion to trust can therefore strengthen the extra-legal norms of trusting and 
trustworthiness. As Blair and Stout demonstrate, experiments show that when the 
social conditions are right, people’s cooperative, other-regarding personalities 
emerge. Social “framing” plays a critical role in determining whether or not 
individuals choose to trust and be trustworthy.68 Experiments indicate that 
individuals trying to decide whether a particular social context calls for cooperation 
or competition are remarkably sensitive to the signals they receive from the 
experimenter who defines and has the authority over the game. That is the reason 
Blair and Stout see courts as powerful and effective vehicles for performing the 
framing function.69  
                                                
63 F.B. Cross, note 29 above, at 1464. 
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These findings support the idea that the conceptualisation of autonomy and what it 
means to be an autonomous person in human rights law jurisprudence can provide 
guidance on proper motives and conduct that filter down on those acting in 
interpersonal relationships. By fleshing out the social context of the relationship 
under issue, and emphasising the moral commitments a particular contextual 
relationship calls, the Human Rights Court can play through its expressive functions 
an important part in trust-inducing practices. In that way we can appreciate that 
human rights law can influence behaviour not just by imposing sanctions but also by 
shaping perceptions of what sort of behaviour is expected and appropriate.  
4.3.1.2 New grounds for distrust 
Critical views concerning law’s impact on trust go further. Similarly sceptical as the 
above-mentioned scholars is Scott Veitch about the increased influence and 
invocation of legal norms as a way of “responsibilising” activities that were 
previously left under the control of extra-legal forces.70 According to Veitch, the 
increase in litigation fails to make people trustworthier, and more “attuned to the 
suffering of others.”71 Furthermore, he claims that such “legal solidarity” represents 
solidarity of a very distinctive type, that is, “a highly emaciated solidarity 
corresponding in its modern form to the “society of strangers”; a solidarity, in other 
words, that is based on a calculative or calculating measure, the form of which is 
essentially that of competing rights claims and their adjudication.” 72 Arguably what 
Veitch then says is that not only does law fail to support trust and trustworthy 
behaviour, but law’s respective efforts are altogether counterproductive to trust. 
This resonates well with the scholars writing in the field of human rights who have 
made similar contentions regarding the increase in individual rights and its 
expression in litigation as undermining interpersonal cooperation and the existence 
of trusting relationships. The complaint is that when we talk and think in terms of 
rights, we set ourselves apart from others. Rights belong to individuals, so the appeal 
to rights encourages us to think of ourselves as apart from and threatened by a 
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society, state or government that is constantly seeking to intrude or invade our 
rights.73 As was noted already at the very beginning of the thesis, Joseph Weiler has 
recently been critical towards the prevailing human rights culture. He says that it is 
not conducive to the virtues and sensibilities necessary for real community and 
solidarity.74 Similarly, Fukuyama has argued that the decline of trust is to be 
attributed to the growth of legalistic “rights-based individualism.”75 
In the field of medical law, Jonathan Montgomery worries that law’s increasing 
involvement in medical care takes morality out of medicine and moves “the 
discipline in which the moral values of medical ethics are a central concern to one in 
which they are being supplanted by an amoral commitment to choice and 
consumerism.”76 The development of law without the special trust in doctors has 
resulted, according to Montgomery, in amorality – not more morality. 
As I see it, the claims and criticisms presented above do not attack law as much as 
they attack the particular construction of it. What they question is whether certain 
legal mechanisms may cause such effects on human behaviour that the formation of 
trusting relationships becomes under these conditions highly problematic. For 
example, when the concept of individual autonomy demands one to be independent 
and self-sufficient, then one feels less compelled to accommodate his or her 
behaviour to other people’s wants and will. As a consequence it makes people doubt 
that other people will behave in a trustworthy manner. 
This construction of autonomy may have its appropriate and relevant place in the 
consumer market, for instance. In other, perhaps more personal contexts, the same 
construction of it proves to be inadequate or even detrimental to other values at 
stake.  
Effectively what becomes clear is that rather than all law, it is the particular 
construction of the law that is arguably counterproductive to certain interpersonal 
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relationships. Nevertheless, the critical attitudes towards law’s role in enhancing trust 
provide useful indications of where regulation may backfire.  
4.3.2 Law as the source of increase in trust 
As discussed above, we place trust in others usually with respect to a specific range 
of action. We place trust in people who have explicit responsibility over specific 
actions, have special knowledge, or are in some other way an authority over a topic 
of issue.77 In that way we make ourselves vulnerable to the others who hold “the 
authority of superior knowledge”78 at our occasions of need. Any profession 
possesses a set of knowledge, skills and powers that allows its practitioners to 
assume an authoritative position in their encounters with persons who need that 
expertise – e.g. persons who have become vulnerable because of illnesses, 
pregnancy, and or due to some other conditions. Therefore, a set of features has 
become criteria that distinguish a trustworthy professional from an untrustworthy 
one. 
For instance, regulation imposes rigorous educational, training and performance 
standards on medical professionals and health care institutions; on airplanes and 
flight personnel; on primary school teachers and academic staff. In this case, law acts 
to strengthen people’s trust in professionals by certifying the professional’s expertise 
and authority. This helps people to follow through with actions such as going to see a 
doctor, taking a flight, sending one’s child to school, or indeed employing someone 
for an airline company. Law targets here patients, customers and employers and 
conveys to them that they can and should trust the corresponding institutions and 
personnel.  
Considering, for example, the differentiation and specialisation of roles in medicine, 
it is more likely than not that we do not know the doctors who treat us. How can we 
allow a stranger, a doctor we have never met or heard of before, to perform an open-
heart surgery on our self if we have no knowledge of the doctor’s personal 
characteristics? In this context the mechanisms of licensure and peer review can be 
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seen as fostering trust towards the whole body of medicine, so that individual 
professionals do not have to earn trust to do their job for each instance.79   
Regulations can foster trust also in more subtle ways. They give professionals – 
doctors, pilots, or academics – what Frankel and Gordon term as “high regard” – “a 
description of special people in special elevated position expected to behave in a 
special way.”80 High regard is accompanied by a measure of pressure – it involves 
not merely standing higher, but also falling harder. In contrast to a breach of 
contract, for example a breach of trust carries a stigma that cannot be expiated by 
payment alone.81 The implications of this analysis are that if, for example, a doctor-
patient relationship becomes purely contract-based between two autonomous adults, 
not only will the doctors lose their elevated status, “but the deterrence resulting from 
the threat of this loss will be eliminated as well.”82  
To give another example, how law can arguably support trust in more indirect ways, 
consider the laws prohibiting doctors from assisting patients to commit suicide. 
Despite arguments that physician-assisted suicide is no different than physicians 
complying with patients’ decisions to reject life-sustaining treatment,83 the law in the 
majority of European countries treats assisted suicide still as a form of homicide. 
Arguably, one of the reasons the law stays “inconsistent”84 in end of life matters, is 
that it serves a function related to trust. These laws allow the doctors to maintain the 
image that they always promote life and never act as agents of death, out of concern 
that otherwise patients would not trust them. In cases pertaining to refusal of 
treatment, the doctor’s image remains intact since the patient dies from underlying 
causes and the doctor is not seen to be actively bringing about the patient’s death. 
To conclude, rather than opposites, forms of law and trust can be seen as 
complements, with legal constraints enabling trust that otherwise would be perhaps 
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either blind or simple. If trusting is a matter of placing trust with good judgment, we 
need social and political institutions that allow us to judge where to place our trust.85  
Nevertheless, some caution is warranted in devising supportive measures. Not only 
may these efforts entail other costs and have no effect, they can also, paradoxically, 
weaken trust. This is so because law’s regulatory functions can sometimes compete 
with its expressive functions, which can be unpredictable and complex.86 For 
example, recently the UK Government has decided that doctors will be given annual 
assessments and full five-yearly checks to ensure that they are competent and fit to 
practice.87 According to the plan, each doctor will be assessed on the basis of a 
dossier of evidence of the doctor’s competence compiled over five years. This will 
include annual assessments and patient questionnaires.88 Revalidation of doctors can 
be seen as one of the mechanisms in an effort to improve or support patients’ trust 
towards the medical profession. Most likely it is expected that the regular assessment 
procedures will give patients assurance that doctors have up-to-date skills and 
knowledge to be able to offer the best possible care. However, scrupulous 
performance checks may, paradoxically, convey to the public that doctors are 
actually not trustworthy. Why else should they be checked all the time?  
Furthermore, it is not just the public that may be affected, but overregulation may 
negatively impact the performance of physicians as well. Such measures may suggest 
to doctors that they are not trusted and that they are not expected to act on the basis 
of trustworthy motivations. As was discussed before: trust often works in reciprocal 
ways. If you see that you are trusted, you act in a trustworthy way, and vice versa. Or 
as Davies argued: “If the government demonstrates that it does not trust doctors to 
maintain high standards of performance or to have considerable degree of autonomy 
in their practice, doctors may become disillusioned and cease to take personal pride 
in their work.”89 
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The core point is that sometimes less regulation or broad professional norms are 
better mechanisms to support trust than narrow and specific performance rules. There 
are still more trustworthy doctors out there than untrustworthy ones, and until there is 
evidence that trust towards physicians is destroyed, laws that express trust are 
preferable to sanctions and regulations. 
4.4. Individual autonomy and trust in the practice of 
the European Court of Human Rights   
If it were true that more regulation would involve some increase in trust, one would 
have to agree that the Human Rights Court has indeed contributed to trust promoting 
practices. More and more new areas of daily life are being subsumed under legal 
regulation with a view to empowering patients, family members and living partners 
with a stronger sense of autonomy and capacity to lead a life of one’s own. Growth 
in legal regulation that aims to protect one’s autonomy can be viewed with an 
expectation that it will increase trust in the ways we operate our lives, and create a 
stronger sense of security and control over matters of life and death, illness and 
health. The expectation can be that since greater rights and autonomy give 
individuals greater control over the ways they live and increase their capacity to 
resist others’ demands and institutional pressures, it consequently has an effect of 
increasing trust in interpersonal relationships.90   
However, as I will demonstrate in the following pages, this proposition is 
questionable. It will be argued that the particular legal regulation – as established by 
autonomy-related case law through the reasoning of the Human Rights Court – is 
more likely to result in reduction of trust rather than increase in trust in interpersonal 
relationships.  
First, it is argued that the problem with the particular construction of autonomy starts 
with the premise that distrust rather than trust is the factual basis or reality of 
contemporary relationships. An unlooked-for consequence of this approach is that 
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the ECtHR does not engage in building trust, but it encourages distrust. And distrust 
only feeds more distrust.  
Next, the section evaluates the potential effect of the mechanisms that aim to foster 
autonomous action – the requirements of informed consent and accountability – on 
inducing trust and trustworthy behaviour. It is argued that the accountability 
measures have detrimental impact on trust since they reduce the doctor’s internal 
motivations for trustworthy action. If people receive signals that they are not 
trustworthy, they are likely to become less trustworthy. 
Finally, this section turns from assessing whether the Court has openly and directly 
tried to achieve trust or any particular benefit from it, to looking into the attitude the 
Court has taken towards breaking trust. This means, above all, exploring the 
approaches the Court has taken towards cases involving deception, dishonesty and 
broken promises as instances of “ultimate breaches of trust.”91 It is concluded that 
the law and how it stands at the moment under the regulation of individual autonomy 
acts as a social incentive to deceive, and, therefore, is considered insufficient in 
terms of fostering trusting relationships. 
4.4.1 The centrality of (dis)trust in the practice of the 
European Court of Human Rights 
While the Human Rights Court – or human rights law in general for that matter – 
never discusses trust head on, it is hardly the case that the issue of trust has no 
relevance for its case law and for the individuals involved in it. In fact, several 
autonomy-based cases can be conceived as instances of breaches of trust.92 But this 
is, of course, hardly anything unusual. Many, perhaps even a great majority, of legal 
cases arise from some sort of violation of trust. This, in itself is unavoidable and not 
a matter of concern here. What I would like to do is draw attention to the proposition 
that the ECtHR Article 8 autonomy-related case law is based on the premise of 
distrust, where individual autonomy serves as the functional equivalent of trust. In 
other words, the Court takes the existence of distrust as factual premise for 
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introducing autonomy and its particular interpretation of it. Both trust and distrust 
have a self-generating and spiralling dynamic in which the starting attitude colours 
how people interpret subsequent particular events and actions. This spiral 
relationship applies also between lawmakers or law enforcers and the persons subject 
to the legal system. Just as the law reacts to the changes in people’s behaviour, 
people change their behaviour in reaction to the law.93 Accommodating distrust into 
the interpretation of the concept of individual autonomy then potentially increases 
rather than diminishes distrust in interpersonal relationships. 
Rather than accommodating distrust, human rights law should recognise and 
appreciate the centrality of trust to these relationships and guide medical, family and 
interpersonal practice towards building trust. Attention should be concentrated on 
earning encouraging trustworthiness and trusting actions rather than focusing on 
accommodating people’s lack of trustworthiness. The possible implications of this 
approach will be expounded in the subsequent sections.  
In the following pages I will use the cases of Reklos and Davourlis v Greece94 and 
Ternovszky v Hungary95 to provide an explanation of the alleged atmosphere of 
distrust characteristic of interpersonal relationships that forms the basis of the 
Court’s reasoning. In the light of these cases I will, thereafter, consider the effect of 
placing distrust in the centre of human rights analysis. 
4.4.1.1 Reklos and Davourlis v Greece 
In Reklos and Davourlis v Greece96, the applicants were the parents of their newly 
born baby son. Immediately after birth the baby was placed in a sterile unit, under 
the constant supervision of the staff of the private clinic where he was born. On the 
second day after his birth, while the baby was still in the sterile unit, a professional 
photographer, located on the first floor of the clinic, photographed him. The 
photographer thereafter offered to sell the photos to the parents, who were disturbed 
by this. They demanded the clinic to take action and to hand over to them the 
                                                
93 T. Frankel, W.J. Gordon, note 80 above, at 326.  
94 Case of Reklos and Davourlis v Greece (App.1234/05), Judgment of 15 January 2009. 
95 Case of Ternovszky v Hungary (App.67545/09), Judgment of 14 December 2010. 
96 Reklos and Davourlis v Greece. 
Chapter 4 Autonomy, law and trust 
 
155 
negatives of the photographs. As the clinic did not react, the parents sued. The 
national courts dismissed their action as unfounded – the photos were not made 
public and there was no harm done to the baby. 
The parents appealed to the ECtHR claiming that their child’s personality rights had 
been infringed. The Human Rights Court concurred, and found the violation of 
Article 8 based on the individual’s right to control the use of her or his image. In 
response to the Greek Government’s suggestion that Article 8 was not engaged if 
there was no use or distribution of the photographs of the applicants’ son, the Court 
ruled that the taking of the photographs and the retention of the negatives themselves 
were enough to bring Article 8 into play. As the Court further articulated, a person’s 
image is an essential attribute of his or her personality and belongs to the sphere of 
autonomy, where the individual has the right to choose whether it be recorded, 
conserved or reproduced.97 The effective protection of this interest, according to the 
Court, presupposes obtaining the consent of the person concerned at the time the 
picture is taken or a proxy decision-maker in the case of someone who cannot 
consent on their own behalf, such as a child. 
Throughout this chapter I have emphasised the importance of trust for interpersonal 
relationships. Trust is repeatedly said to be essential to the success of medical 
practice and the core of the doctor-patient relationship.98 The vulnerability of patients 
and their need for care makes it essential to trust physicians. It is, therefore, often 
suggested that what we want more than anything else in our encounters with doctors 
is to be able to trust them.99 Confidentiality is one of the key attributes for retaining 
that trust. Patients need to be able to trust their doctors to keep the intimate personal 
details about their behaviour and history as private secrets. In a medical setting, trust 
provides, therefore, a direct justification of the importance of confidentiality as one 
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of the most essential moral commitments of the profession.100 The expectation that 
we can trust that our private matters will be respected extends to the environment of 
the medical setting and those who enter it, i.e. – it is not simply about medical 
relationships with medical personnel; it is also about the setting where we conduct 
intimate aspects of our lives, such as hospitals, etc. Indeed, violations in this setting 
by those who enter it from outside are a particular affront and breach of trust. The 
same level of requirements of confidentiality does not, and I believe should not, 
apply to interactions in every other private social setting. Taking photographs at a 
friend’s or family member’s birthday party, for example, is entertaining and perhaps 
even useful for the coming generations, but we would not reasonably have the same 
expectations of respect for private life as in a medical setting. In other words, trust in 
this setting demands the employment of a different set of morality and obligations. 
Following strictly the Reklos and Davourlis judgment, based on autonomy and 
consent, there is, however, no observance of the particular relationships involved; the 
individual’s interest and need to control one’s image are always to be considered 
paramount. 
Following this, I suggest that rather than enunciating a right to control one’s image, 
the Court could have founded its decision on the fact that the baby was photographed 
in what was essentially an intimate location, and in circumstances where there had to 
be a reasonable expectation of confidentiality. Instead, by concentrating on 
protecting the applicant’s autonomy, the core value of preserving trust in this 
particular setting regrettably gets lost. It is replaced with a heightened attention to the 
clinic’s or photographer’s lack of trustworthiness. It was not,  
[t]he nature, harmless or otherwise, of the applicants’ son’s 
representation on the offending photographs, but the fact that the 
photographer kept them without the applicants’ consent. The baby’s 
image was thus retained in the hands of the photographer in an 
identifiable form with the possibility of subsequent use against the 
wishes of the person concerned and/or his parents.101  
                                                
100 R. Rhodes, “Understanding the Trusted Doctor and Constructing a Theory for Bioethics”, (2001) 
22 Theoretical Medicine 493-504, at 498. 
101 Reklos and Davourlis v Greece, para 42. 
Chapter 4 Autonomy, law and trust 
 
157 
Before delving into the question of the impact of having distrust rather than trust as 
the starting point for autonomy regulation, I would like to consider another recent 
case from the ECtHR practice. 
4.4.1.2 Ternovszky v Hungary 
The second case I would like to present here is Ternovszky v Hungary.102 The 
applicant in this case was a pregnant woman who wished to give birth at her home 
rather than in a hospital or a birth home. Under Hungarian laws home births were not 
prohibited, but they were not encouraged or supported either, because of the inherent 
risks to the mother and the baby. Any health professional encouraging and assisting a 
home birth ran therefore the risk of conviction for a regulatory offence.103 According 
to the applicant, this created for her a condition of uncertainty about what is allowed 
and what is not allowed, and consequently deprived her from making an informed 
choice about the alternatives of giving birth – a matter that “belonged to the hard 
core of self-determination”104 and was protected under Article 8 of the 
Convention.105 Hence, the purpose of her application was “to obtain an unhampered 
right to home birth without the assisting professionals facing sanctions but with 
access to an institution in case of complications.”106 Ultimately what the applicant 
was looking for was a sense of security for the occasion if she chooses to give birth 
at home. She wanted the involvement of health care professionals and also for the 
conduct of their involvement to be regulated. 
The Human Rights Court agreed with the applicant. It noted that “the notion of 
freedom implies some measure of choice as to its exercise” and that “the notion of 
personal autonomy is a fundamental principle underlying the interpretation of Article 
8 guarantees.”107 “Therefore,” the Court concluded, “the right concerning the 
decision to become a parent includes the right of choosing the circumstances of 
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becoming a parent.”108 The Court further considered that, where choices related to 
the exercise of a right to respect for a private life occur in a legally regulated area, 
the State should provide adequate legal protection to the right in the regulatory 
scheme.109 In the context of home birth, this implies, according to the Court, that the 
mother is entitled to a legal and institutional environment that enables her choice.110 
Following from this, the Court found that the legal uncertainty – absence of specific, 
comprehensive legislation on the matter – limited the choices of the applicant 
considering home delivery.111 As a result Hungary was in breach of the Convention. 
Compared to the Reklos and Davourlis judgment discussed above, Ternovszky was 
not initiated by a specific case of breach of trust. Nevertheless, it was sustained by a 
strong attitude of distrust. First, the case indicated the applicant’s distrust towards the 
“traditional” way of giving birth in a hospital despite “the professional consensus in 
Hungary to the effect that home birth was less safe than birth in a health care 
institution.”112 Some clues explaining the possible sources and causes of this distrust 
can be found in the Recommendation of the World Health Organization report 
attached to the judgment as an expert opinion.113 According to the report, women opt 
out from giving birth in professional health care facilities, inter alia, because of 
unfamiliar practices, inappropriate staff attitudes and restrictions with regard to the 
attendance of family members at birth.114  
Second, it seemed that the applicant did not also trust the medical opinion in 
Hungary. As the Government submitted, there was a professional consensus in 
Hungary to the effect that home birth was less safe than birth in a health care 
institution. Although, with regard to one’s right to self-determination, since 1997 
home birth was no longer prohibited, it was not encouraged or supported by the 
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physicians. The risks to the health and life of the mother and the child were still 
considered high.115   
Third, since home birth was unregulated in Hungary, it did not provide enough 
security towards birth care professionals. The applicant did not trust to contact and 
rely on a birth care professional without the existence of regulatory guarantees. The 
concurring Judges Sajó and Tulkens put it this way: “regulation in the medical 
environment of welfare system is the default and only what is regulated is considered 
safe and acceptable…[what] was a matter of uncontested private choice becomes 
unusual and uncertain.”116  
I do not agree with Judges Sajó and Tulkens that the environment of the welfare 
system requires that everything should be regulated. Rather, as the previous chapter 
argued, the increase in regulation that is based on claims for respect for one’s 
autonomy is evidence that trust is missing in interpersonal relationships and that void 
in the end is filled with a functional equivalent to trust – that is with distrust. This 
might sound contradictory, but as Luhmann observes: “Anyone who does not trust 
must turn to functionally equivalent strategies for the reduction of complexity in 
order to be able to define practically meaningful situation at all. He must turn his 
expectations into negative ones, and so must, in certain respects, become 
distrustful.”117 
As Luhmann further stresses, despite trust and distrust being functional equivalents, 
they are functionally very different in their implications for a person’s actions or for 
social organisation more generally. In a group or society in which people are 
trustworthy, trust enables mutually beneficial cooperative endeavours. Distrust 
blocks it.118 
Distrust connotes an attitude of wariness or pessimism. To have a pessimistic attitude 
is to expect that the other is likely to harm my interests, and thus to treat him or her 
warily or with suspicion. It means taking your role-partner as an enemy who is likely 
                                                
115 Ternovszky v Hungary, para 17. 
116 Ternovszky v Hungary, Joint concurring opinion of Judges Sajó and Tulkens. 
117 N. Luhmann, note 6 above, at 71. 
118 R. Hardin, “Distrust”, (2001) 81 Boston University Law Review 495-522, at 503. 
Chapter 4 Autonomy, law and trust 
 
160 
to act against your interest or, at least, for whom your interests are a matter of 
complete indifference. In order for you to be able to respond, certain characteristics 
become more important than others: one needs to be independent, self-sufficient, 
assertive, and above all, defensive. 
Distrustful parties put more effort into securing themselves against its breakdown by 
use of devices outside the relationship – and this reduces dependency on the partner. 
Hence, distrust is circularly reinforced by the actions it provokes.119 Distrust creates 
a distance and the expression of that distrust generates a further distance, an 
alienation of affection.120 
It is understandable that cases such as Reklos and Davourlis and Ternovszky arise 
because of mistrust or lack of trust. However, the job for the Court should be to make 
an effort to build trust or support it, where it is lacking. This is especially important 
in the contexts of medical care or family setting. Instead, the ECtHR currently starts 
with the premise that distrust against the medical profession is justified and that they 
should be treated as untrustworthy. This approach only creates more distrust, and in 
the end may produce dysfunctional consequences for the wider society.121   
4.4.2 Increasing trust by increasing control and 
accountability 
Chapter 2 argued that effective and accessible procedural guarantees set by law are 
an important part of safeguarding one’s autonomy. In the light of the present chapter 
we can perceive the growth in regulation and control, on the one hand, as a symptom 
of distrust, and on the other hand, as its remedy. But have these instruments of 
control, regulation and monitoring worked? The following analysis suggests that 
they have not, albeit that this is not intended as a comprehensive review or factual 
account of actual behaviours involving trust. 
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4.4.2.1 R.R. v Poland 
Consider the case of R.R. v Poland,122 similar to Tysiaç v Poland,123 discussed in 
Chapter 2. The applicant – a 29-year old woman, married with two children – was 
pregnant with her third child. In the 18th week of her pregnancy an ultrasound scan 
showed that the foetus might be affected by some malformation. The applicant then 
told her doctor that, if the suspicion proved true she wished to have an abortion.124 
The results of the subsequent ultrasound scans confirmed the likelihood of foetus 
malformation and the applicant’s fears that the foetus was affected with a genetic 
disorder. In order to confirm or dispel the suspicion and to identify the nature and 
seriousness of any foetal defect, genetic examination was recommended as the only 
possible method to objectively establish the correct diagnosis. However, for reasons 
related to the doctors’ moral reluctance to carry out abortions and matters pertaining 
to the reimbursement of the costs of the test, none of the doctors the applicant came 
into contact with during her treatment gave her the necessary referral to have genetic 
tests carried out. Hence, despite the applicant’s persistent efforts, through numerous 
visits to doctors and through written requests and complaints, she did not succeed in 
obtaining the required genetic test until the 23rd week of her pregnancy. The test 
confirmed the presence of Turner syndrome.125 By that time it was too late for an 
abortion to be carried out and, on the 11th of July 2002, the applicant gave birth to a 
baby girl affected with the syndrome.  
Unhappy with the manner in which the doctors had handled her case – their failure to 
perform timely prenatal examinations and to provide her with reliable and timely 
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information about the foetus’ condition – the applicant appealed in the last instance 
to the Human Rights Court. The applicant submitted that the public powers’ failure 
to implement laws and regulations governing access to prenatal examinations, the 
lack of procedures to ensure whether the conditions for a lawful abortion had been 
met, and the failure to implement and oversee the laws governing the practice of 
conscientious objection, resulted in a violation of her Article 8 rights.126  
The Court concurred with the applicant and found that Poland had been in breach of 
Article 8 of the Convention. Drawing from Tysiaç v Poland127 and in tune with the 
autonomy-based practice now developing under Article 8, the Court highlighted the 
importance of the existence of an effective procedural framework to guarantee that 
“relevant, full and reliable information on the foetus’ health is available to pregnant 
women.”128 As to the content of these procedural provisions, the Human Rights 
Court gave the responding State the following guidelines: a proper procedural 
framework should be in place to address and resolve controversies arising in 
connection with the availability of lawful abortion. A pregnant woman should be 
able to invoke a review of a medical decision – at a minimum she should be heard in 
person and her views should be taken into account;129 the procedures should 
guarantee an individual effective access to information about the condition of his or 
her health; and the procedures in place should also ensure that decisions to give 
pregnant women referral to genetic testing are taken in good time.130 Neither the 
administrative nor civil law remedies, relied on by the Government, were considered 
sufficient to provide appropriate protection of the autonomy rights of a pregnant 
woman.131 As to the question about conscientious objection, raised by the applicant, 
the Court stressed that the States should organise the health service system in such a 
way that the health care professionals’ exercise of freedom of conscience does not 
prevent patients from obtaining access to services to which they are entitled.132  
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There is little doubt that in this particular case the applicant’s trust towards medical 
personnel was not adequately met. From the moment that there was indication that 
the child the applicant was carrying might be suffering from some form of 
malformation, she was subjected to disrespectful and incompetent treatment, “marred 
by procrastination, confusion and lack of proper counselling.”133 She was “shabbily 
treated” and “humiliated”, as the Human Rights Court’s judgment says.134  
Looking at these instances of untrustworthy action on the part of the medical 
professionals it may seem prudent to take a stance of distrust rather than trust 
towards the clinicians. In order to enhance “trustworthy” action and reduce 
uncertainty as to the patient’s situation, according to the Human Rights Court, more 
robust legislative procedures needed to be introduced. This, despite the fact that there 
were several legal regulations in Poland in force already that set the standards for 
good medical practice and that provided obligations for medical professionals to give 
patients comprehensible information about their conditions, the diagnosis, the 
proposed and possible diagnostic and therapeutic methods, the foreseeable 
consequences of a decision to have a recourse to them or not, the possible results of 
the therapy and about the prognosis.135 The doctors’ behaviour was found in 
violation with these standards by the Polish Supreme Court as well as by the Human 
Rights Court. Was more regulation really needed? Some regulations, as I argue, may 
backfire, and instead of reducing distrust, they may contribute to its intensification. 
Efforts to improve the performance of medical professionals can backfire by 
conveying to the public an attitude of distrust and by reducing medical actors’ 
motivations to behave in a trustworthy fashion.  
4.4.2.2 Doctors do not deserve trust 
My worry here is that the unreflective adoption of measures that aim to increase 
one’s individual autonomy – additional control and complaints systems and appeal 
mechanisms – increasingly suggest to doctors, or any other professionals for that 
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matter, that they are not trusted and that they are not expected to act on the basis of 
trustworthy motivations. This may trigger a wider culture of distrust, low morale, 
and may lead to professional stagnation. Simultaneously, and I would assume 
contrary to general expectations, they rather limit the trusting person’s autonomy, 
who is now “empowered” to take charge in his or her medical situation and the 
conduct of it. This empowerment might, however, be more illusory than real if the 
relationships, which are crucial to self-development and flourishing of autonomy are, 
in fact, undermined. This is especially questionable in the light of the Court’s 
emphasis on the vulnerability of the pregnant woman’s position.136 
The argument presented here rests on the widely endorsed premise that the trust of 
others is of fundamental value to most of us. As MacCormick and Mitchell both 
point out, it was Adam Smith who observed that a very common human 
characteristic is a wish both to be trusted and to be worthy of trust.137 Picking up on 
that, several authors writing on trust argue that trust develops in reciprocal fashion: 
trusted parties respond to cues they receive about how they are expected to 
behave.138 Correspondingly, conferring trust has an effect in that it improves the 
motivation and behaviour of the parties who perceive that they are trusted.139 If 
people receive signals that they are trusted, they are more likely to live up to the 
expectation and become more trustworthy overall. As Mitchell argues, it is the moral 
psychology of being trusted itself that helps to create trustworthiness in people.140 In 
this way, trusting may make the trusted trustworthy. 
Contrariwise, if people receive signals that they are not trustworthy, they are likely to 
become less trustworthy. Those who (correctly) view themselves as trustworthy and 
competent may feel undermined by social practices that query their trustworthiness, 
or that demonstrate mistrust by imposing excessive forms of assessment, review and 
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137 N. MacCormick, note 77 above, at 77; L.E. Mitchell, note 21 above, at 613. 
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monitoring.141 If more regulation sets very specific guidelines on one’s profession, it 
has the risk of reducing the profession into mere targets prescribed by procedures 
and requirements. It runs the risk of producing compliance only with the precise 
scope of the law and only to the extent of actual enforcement, rather than a more 
global or inner ethic that reciprocates trust with trustworthy behaviour.142 As O’Neill 
argues: “Each profession has its proper aim, and this aim is not reducible to meeting 
set targets following prescribed procedures and requirements.”143 She further 
contends that “the new accountability is widely experienced not just as changing but 
as distorting the proper aims of professional practice and indeed as damaging 
professional pride and integrity.”144  I believe she is right. Distrust has the potential 
to provoke resentment, alienation and suspicion on the part of the person mistrusted. 
Doctors who are loaded with record-keeping and busy with avoiding complaints – a 
threat, even if not put in practice, created by the added appeal and complaints 
mechanisms – are prone to taking a defiant and hostile approach towards their 
patients. Cynical views even claim that by incorporating informed consent into 
medical practice the responsibility shifts to the patient and this provides the 
physicians a potent tactic to combat malpractice suits.145 
An apparent increase in informed consent can then be seen as rather serving to 
reduce the obligations of health care providers than to protect the interests of 
patients. From this perspective, law has substituted a formal requirement of openness 
for a substantive one of protection. The legal doctrine of informed consent, 
understood in this way, undermines autonomy because it reduces the moral 
obligation of health care providers to protect the ability of patients to shape their own 
lives.146 To put it another way, it may give neat justification for physicians to “off-
load” hard decisions to their patients.147 As Montgomery argues, consent in the hands 
of certain legal advisors is not about promoting the moral value of autonomy, but 
about removing the need for health care professionals to take responsibility for 
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145 P.R. Wolpe, note 42 above, at 52. 
146 J. Montgomery, note 57 above, at 188. 
147 J.D. Moreno, note 43 above, at 415.  
Chapter 4 Autonomy, law and trust 
 
166 
treatment being in the interests of their patients by transferring that responsibility to 
the patients. The moral value of autonomy is not, in fact, promoted, and the moral 
purpose of healthcare is obscured.148 
Furthermore, since the added legislative measures in R.R. did not impose any 
additional professional requirements for the doctors, but they were rather encouraged 
to empower the patients, this may provide incentives for a different sort of 
unprofessional conduct. In order to avoid lengthy legal battles or to deal with 
distrustful patients, the doctors may willingly transfer the responsibility for treatment 
into the hands of patients. The tired and overworked doctor is likely to welcome the 
patient who autonomously refuses treatment.149 For instance, as commentators have 
noted, it may “lead some doctors to consider mistakenly that unthinking 
acquiescence to a requested intervention against their clinical judgment is honouring 
“patient autonomy” when it is, in fact, abrogation of their duties as doctors.”150 In 
other words, certain devices that aim to protect the interests of patients and their 
individual autonomy may inadvertently reduce the moral obligations of health care 
providers.   
Finally, even if the Court’s intentions were to provide patients with a strong sense of 
security towards the actions of the doctors, this is not to eliminate the risks involved 
in trust. These regulations just shift the target of trust from being towards doctors and 
instead towards the functioning of the systems that control and secure their reliable 
performance.151 From the point of view of both patients and doctors, this would 
hardly be a helpful or a desirable outcome. 
4.4.3 Betrayal of trust  
Since trust always entails some level of uncertainty and risk, there is always a 
possibility of betrayal. Not all betrayals are equal, however. There are instances of 
breaking trust, which are considered mere disappointments, which do not involve 
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blame. But there are also blameworthy acts that are considered real breaches of trust. 
One of widely considered blameworthy breaches of trust is lying. Indeed, by some 
standards it is the ultimate breach of trust.152 
Addressing trust under the ECtHR jurisprudence involves, therefore, not seeing 
whether the Court has openly and directly tried to achieve trust or any particular 
benefit from it, but rather in looking into the attitude the Court has taken towards 
breaking trust. This means, above all, exploring the approaches the Court has taken 
towards deceiving, lying and breaking promises. For this purposes I will use again 
the already familiar case from previous chapters, Evans v the United Kingdom,153 to 
showcase and argue that as the law stands at the moment it does not condemn the 
acts that break trust, but rather acts as a social incentive to deceive  
4.4.3.1 Broken promises and untruthfulness 
After the delivery of the judgment in Evans there was an intuitive public empathy 
with Ms Evans.154 Commentators qualified the case as a “human tragedy”,155 and as 
a “desperately sad outcome for Ms Evans”.156 They felt sympathy for Ms Evans and 
they felt that she had been given assurances and promises that should have been kept. 
Even if everything seemed correct formally and legally, there was still something 
unsatisfactory about the whole outcome of the case.157  
What then did Mr Johnston do exactly that seemed for many so wrong? He was 
clearly concerned to support his partner, who had just found out that she had cancer 
in both of her ovaries and that her chances of having the genetic child she so 
desperately desired was suddenly drastically reduced. He had told Ms Evans that he 
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was not going to leave her and that he was going to be the father of her children.158 
He also knew that the relationship would have ended if he had told her that he was 
not going to give her the child she so desperately wanted.159 More than that, he also 
knew that he could withdraw his consent any time before the implantation.160 Was 
there any pressure then for him to give all these assurances and promises?161 Or, 
more significantly, would he have given the assurances and promises so easily if 
there were not the legal regulations in operation that allowed him to withdraw his 
consent to storage or use of the embryos? 
Drawing from the statements Mr Johnston made to the trial judge, it seems indeed 
reasonable to assume that his decision to undertake the IVF with Ms Evans was 
influenced by his foreknowledge of the possibility to withdraw his consent any time 
before the implantation: 
It was obviously made clear to us that the consent of both myself and Ms 
Evans would be required before anything could be done…It was 
clear…that we would still maintain freedom to choose either whether we 
wanted to start a family together or when we would start a family 
together. I suppose I was reassured by the fact that I would still maintain 
the same control regarding this decision as I would had [if] these 
unfortunate events [break-up of the relationship] [had] not occurred.162  
Was Mr Johnston effectively lying to Ms Evans? Is that the reason for the 
dissatisfaction expressed by several commentators to the case? Or was it that the law 
did not foresee the possibility or do anything to obviate the mischief? 
According to MacCormick, to tell a lie is to address a false statement to another 
person knowing that it is false or not believing that it is true, or being reckless as to 
its truth or falsity.163 The circumstances must be such that the other person regards 
the statement as being seriously made. The speaker must intend the statement 
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seriously, or at least realise that the addressee will reasonably assume that it is being 
made seriously.164   
To evaluate whether Mr Johnston’s actions165 indeed qualified as lying according to 
this definition is not just problematic merely because of the many subjective 
elements involved, but also, as was shown in the citation from Mr Johnston above, 
because the law itself sets the conditions for “being reckless,” thus, leaving the 
truthfulness of your statement in limbo. The ability to withdraw one’s consent at any 
time not only perpetuates states of uncertainty, but also potentially supports a lack of 
veracity and even outright dishonesty, since it allows people to claim that they have 
changed their minds regarding consent with little or no legal consequence. 
Hence, the dissatisfaction there is with the law and how it stands at the moment, is 
that the structure of the legislature, underpinned by the primacy of informed consent 
and its flipside, the absolute right to refuse – which, in turn, is set to serve the 
protection of the individual’s autonomy and independence – acts as a social incentive 
to deceive. Of course lying is an everyday matter, and unfortunately couples lie and 
give unsubstantiated promises to each other not so infrequently. I do not think that 
law should impose regulations or sanctions on every lie that happens in interpersonal 
relationships. Yet it is another matter to accept and propagate through (human rights) 
law, even if indirectly and inadvertently, readiness to deceive. A party with a certain 
level of motivation to betray for opportunistic reasons is more likely to act on that 
motivation when he or she perceives a low likelihood of suffering any penalties.166 
On my reading of the case, the Court acknowledged that promises, assurances and 
trust, in effect, given in private settings do not count, since “legal” possibilities for 
deceit in the form of a formal consent form was written into the law.167 This kind of 
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legal endorsement of individualistic autonomy in the end does not only say that we 
need not sacrifice ourselves for other people, but it makes it also more acceptable to 
say that we need not concern ourselves when we make other people unhappy. It 
certainly influences the functioning of trust. It reveals yet another aspect of 
individual autonomy’s incapacity to support trust through existing mechanisms.  
4.4.3.2 Trust and deception 
The premise that deceit and/or the breaking of promises destroy trust seems rather 
uncontroversial. Many of our choices depend on our estimates of what will be the 
outcome of the decision.168 These expectations must in turn often rely on information 
from others. Each person has authority concerning his or her future conduct, to the 
extent that our conduct is a matter of our own free discretion. Somebody who has 
authority over his or her own future conduct is in a position to undertake various 
sorts of commitment, both unilateral and bilateral, towards others. Those others may 
place trust in assurances about the commitment undertaken.169 (In that sense Mr 
Johnston enjoyed informational authority over Ms Evans concerning his feelings, his 
hesitations and his willingness to become the father of her child. The exercise of 
such authority engaged trust, which turned out to be misplaced.) The receiver of the 
information has to proceed on the basis of trust, at least for the moment, since she 
has no information base of her own on the basis of which to check the honesty of the 
information. Depending on the circumstances and relationships under question, there 
is sometimes time and possibilities to confirm the information received. But in the 
first instance, the most reasonable course of action is to trust the person on the basis 
of presumed authority and on the footing that people are more often than not truthful. 
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Deceit in this setting thus involves betrayal of trust by way of abuse of informational 
authority.170 
Legislation or its underlying principle that allows a person to renege on 
commitments whenever one chooses provides no basis for trust.171 This would make 
it difficult to see how anyone could come to be considered a trustworthy source of 
information, since trust could never be confidently placed by anyone in any other 
person. Commitments of any serious kind would wither, or never come into 
existence, in such a society. Co-operative activity and collaboration among 
individuals would be at best fragile.172 
Similar to the accord among the academics that trust is a valuable social good, there 
is an agreement that trust belongs with relationships and it can thrive only on a 
foundation of respect for veracity.173 Based on Evans, and on what has been said on 
previous pages, the concept of autonomy may well act in a counterproductive way on 
both accounts. 
Also, Ms Evans’ relevant alternatives of choice and action were eliminated by Mr 
Johnston’s lying. Relying on his assurances that he loved her and wanted to be the 
father of her children, she “put all her trust in him, and did not look for alternative 
treatment – e.g. egg freezing or the use of donor sperm.”174  
Since autonomy as conceived under the ECHR largely ignores relationships, denies 
mutual dependency and praises purely self-regarding independence (e.g. Ms Evans 
was driven to have her own baby and Mr Johnston wanted to be in control over 
whether to, when and with whom to have children), the findings by the trial judge, 
Wall J, concerning the insignificance of Mr Johnston’s assurances, seem to be in 
accord with the main idea of individual autonomy.  
According to Wall J, Ms Evans was not so much relying on Mr Johnston’s 
assurances as taking the only realistic course of action open to her.175 Egg freezing 
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and donor sperm were not very realistic courses of action for Ms Evans; hence in the 
opinion of Wall J, she would have gone ahead with the IVF treatment with Mr 
Johnston in any event – thus precluding a successful action of negligence.  
In the end, analyses of the case imply that trust did not play a factor in either of the 
parties’ decisions. Yet, if we are to take the importance of trust seriously, decisions 
made on the basis of trust need to be better protected. 
The laws and rules in our society must be examined from the point of view of 
whether they encourage deception needlessly. Some regulations put great pressure on 
individuals to deceive, e.g. in order to continue to receive welfare payments, or to be 
allowed to have a divorce in societies with very strict rules against divorce.176 Bok 
draws an insightful correlation between individualism and deception. She argues that 
the very stress on individualism, on competition, on achieving material success, 
which so marks our society, also generates intense pressure to cut corners. Motives 
such as to win an election, to increase one’s income, to outsell competitors, impel 
many to participate in forms of duplicity they might otherwise resist. According to 
Bok, the more widespread people judge these practices to be, the stronger will be the 
pressure to join, and even compete, in deviousness.177 But the more important it 
should be for a public institution as powerful as the ECtHR to attempt to alter the 
existing pressures and incentives to deceit, by curbing high praise for independence 
and individualistic cultures in order to curtail the prevailing mistrust by people 
towards one another. As Bok says:  
The social incentives to deceit are at present very powerful; the control 
often weak. Many individuals feel caught up in practices they cannot 
change. It would be wishful thinking, therefore, to expect individuals to 
bring about major changes in the collective practices of deceit by 
themselves. Public and private institutions, with their enormous power to 
affect personal choice, must help alter the existing pressures and 
incentives.178 
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We are all unique individuals living in a world of others. Whatever is done for one 
person inevitably has implications for others. There are no such completely self-
determining individuals who are not influenced by or dependent on others in their 
personal and social world. Interaction and dependence requires some measure of 
trust, and law is one mechanism that can support trust in society. Understanding what 
triggers and maintains trust in order to appropriately design such law mechanisms is 
therefore of utmost importance.  
While trust cannot be directly willed, we can pay attention to the kind of things that 
are likely to support, create, or extend our trust, and we can will ourselves to refrain 
from focusing on the kinds of things that are likely to undermine or limit our trust.179 
Once the trust culture emerges and becomes strongly rooted in the normative system 
of a society, it becomes a powerful factor influencing decisions to trust, as well as 
decisions to meet or to reciprocate trust taken by many agents, in various social roles, 
and in many institutions.180  
The problem with individual autonomy and the particular approach taken by the 
European Court of Human Rights is that it imports the mechanisms of enhancing 
trustworthiness, and hence, the value of trust, in a manner suitable in economic 
impersonal relationships rather than in noneconomic and personal ones. As a 
consequence, the particular construction of autonomy starts with the premise that 
distrust rather than trust is the factual basis or reality of contemporary relationships. 
An unforeseen and unexpected consequence of this approach is that the ECtHR does 
not engage in building trust, but it encourages distrust. And distrust only feeds more 
distrust.  
Further, introducing more accountability measures to guarantee individual autonomy 
potentially causes the reduction of trust since these measures reduce the internal 
motivations of professionals, such as doctors, for trustworthy action. If people 
receive signals that they are not trustworthy, they are likely to become less 
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trustworthy. Finally, the approach the Court has taken towards breaches of trust – 
deception, lying and the breaking of promises – is wanting. The way law stands at 
the moment under the regulations of individual autonomy acts as a social incentive to 
deceive, and is therefore not conducive to trust.  
Trust is socially valuable and thus institutions should encourage it. Therefore an 
account of autonomy is needed that helps to enhance trusting and trustworthiness, 
and thus helps to support or induce trust. In response to this need, the final chapter 
develops an account of caring autonomy for the moral basis of the practice of trust. 








Under the conditions of individualisation, the role of trust in modern Western society 
is significant and increasing (Chapter 3). Moreover, if the new individualism of the 
21st century is to thrive, and nothing indicates otherwise, “trust cannot be seen any 
more as an automatic by-product of macro-social or macro-economic processes, but 
rather it needs to be perceived as an active political accomplishment.”1 Bolstering 
trust has to become an effort within the human rights project that values autonomy 
and regards the strengthening of interrelationships as crucial for human well-being. 
As was argued in the previous chapter, it is the existence of trusting relationships that 
enable individuals to flourish and develop capacities that make life valuable. 
The previous chapter found that individual autonomy, as interpreted by the Human 
Rights Court in its Article 8 jurisprudence, is inadequate for supporting trust in 
personal relationships – e.g. doctor-patient relationships or intimate relationships 
within a family setting. It was argued that individual autonomy rather has the 
potential effect of undermining trust in these contexts and relationships. An 
individualistic concept of autonomy takes a protective stance towards others and 
starts with the premise of distrust and goes on to reinforce it. Individual autonomy 
that emphasises the values of being independent and self-sufficient gives less reason 
to believe that people will behave solicitously, attentively and caringly towards 
others. In other words, while respect for individual autonomy does not require 
hurting others, it does not prompt a positive move towards others: it falls short of 
encouraging care and concern about others. 
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Yet for trust to outweigh distrust, our beliefs, attitudes or expectations concerning the 
likelihood that the actions of others will be acceptable or will serve our interests, 
need to be mostly optimistic.2 Following Hall, trust is the “optimistic acceptance of a 
vulnerable situation in which the truster believes the trustee will care for the truster’s 
interests [Emphasis added]”.3 Trust, therefore, is based on positive expectations that 
another person behaves in a responsible and caring way, and will continue to do so.4 
Behaving in a caring way helps to build trust and mutual concern and connectedness 
between persons. In order to cultivate trust, we need to cultivate caring.5 
The present chapter proposes that in order to cultivate practices of trust, to enhance 
social cohesion and to strengthen trustworthiness in interpersonal relationships, the 
European Court of Human Rights should take the approach of advocating the 
language of caring autonomy – a concept of autonomy informed by the insights of 
the ethics of care.  
The chapter proceeds in the following way. I start by giving a brief explanation of 
the essential features of the ethics of care and address, thereafter, some of the main 
criticisms that have questioned its desirability and usefulness in solving ethically 
sensitive dilemmas and providing a basis for legal analysis. In this way I hope to 
anticipate some of the potential concerns that the applicability of caring autonomy 
might have in the setting of the European human rights adjudication. 
Next, I propose a definition of caring autonomy fit for the purpose of strengthening 
trust in interpersonal relationships. Building on the works of care ethicists, my 
concept of caring autonomy is based on the idea that we are both unique, 
autonomous individuals and at the same time embedded in nested dependencies. It 
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sees free choice and moral obligations and responsibility as complementary to each 
other and thus mutually interdependent.6 Characteristics of independence, 
assertiveness and flexibility are all necessary elements of autonomous decision-
making, but they cannot be the only ones, nor the dominant ones. Caring autonomy 
regards equally and highly, the qualities of attentiveness, responsiveness and 
empathy in autonomous decision-making.  
Finally, I will address the question of the implementation of caring autonomy by the 
European Court of Human Rights. I will go back to the very beginning of this thesis 
and revisit the case of Pretty v United Kingdom – the case that arguably introduced 
individual autonomy into the Human Rights case law. My aim is to reconstruct the 
reasoning of this case in terms of caring autonomy to demonstrate how a different 
and more justifiable outcome would be possible on my reconceptualisation of the 
core values and interests at stake. 
In the end I hope to have demonstrated that adopting the care perspective under the 
Article 8 jurisprudence allows us to move towards a more trusting and caring 
humane society. 
5.2. The ethics of care and some concerns about its 
use and usefulness in the human rights 
discourse 
The concept of autonomy I propose in this chapter – caring autonomy – that is 
designed to substitute individual autonomy as an underlying value for interpretation 
of Article 8 jurisprudence, has its roots in the ethics of care: a moral and political 
theory based upon caring.7 Although the literature on the ethics of care has grown 
considerably over the past twenty years or so,8 with numerous scholars expanding 
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the ideas of what it means to care for others and how care might be integrated into 
areas as diverse as international law and terrorism9 and healthcare law,10 the ethics of 
care has, nevertheless, remained outside much of the mainstream attention. Its use in 
human rights discourse has been almost non-existent and has been invisible to 
many.11 Therefore, before proposing my understanding of the concept of caring 
autonomy and how the Human Rights Court could implement it, I think it would be 
helpful to start by summarising the key aspects of the care perspective, and 
thereafter, review some of the possible objections to its use and usefulness in the 
human rights framework. There might be good reasons why the care perspective has 
not been considered relevant for human rights adjudication. I will address these 
before going on to make my case for the role and relevance of ethics of care in this 
context.  
5.2.1 What is the ethics of care?  
The ethics of care originates from Carol Gilligan’s seminal book In a Different 
Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development12 where she claimed, very 
broadly, that women tend to think of moral issues in terms of emotionally involved 
caring for others and connection to others, whereas most men see things in terms of 
autonomy from others and the just and rational application of rules or principles to 
                                                
9 V. Held, “Military Intervention and the Ethics of Care”, (2008) 46 The Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 1-20; V. Held, “Can the Ethics of Care Handle Violence?”, (2010) 4(2) Ethics and Social 
Welfare 115-129. 
10 J. Herring, “Where are the Carers in Healthcare Law and Ethics?”, (2007) 27(1) Legal Studies 51-
73; R. Gillon, “Caring, Men and Women, Nurses and Doctors, and Health Care Ethics, (1992) 18 
Journal of Medical Ethics 171-172; C. Gastmans et al., “Nursing Considered as Moral Practice: A 
Philosophical-Ethical Interpretation of Nursing”, (1998) 8(1) Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 43-
69; For an argument rejecting the usefulness of the ethics of care in healthcare settings see P. Allmark, 
“Can There Be an Ethics of Care?”, (1995) 21 Journal of Medical Ethics 19-24. 
11 For an exception see J. Spring, “On the Rescuing of Rights in Feminist Ethics: A Critical 
Assessment of Virginia Held’s Transformative Strategy”, (2011) 3(1) Praxis 66-83, arguing for the 
importance of developing an approach that integrates rights and care rather than seeing rights as 
juxtaposed with the commitments of care. For a discussion between the relationships of rights and 
care ethics more broadly see J. Kroeger-Mappes, “The Ethics of Care Vis-à-vis the Ethics of Rights: 
A Problem for Contemporary Moral Theory”, (1994) 9(3) Hypatia 108-131; D. Engster, “Care Ethics 
and Natural Law Theory: Toward an Institutional Political Theory of Caring”, (2004) 66(1) The 
Journal of Politics 113-135. 
12 C. Gilligan, note 7 above. 
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problem situations.13 Since then, many, mostly feminist, philosophers have 
developed Gilligan’s ideas further to advance towards a general body of thought 
based on the notion of caring and how caring can offer new insights for rethinking in 
more fruitful ways how we ought to guide our lives.14 Whereas originally, the ethics 
of care was starkly contrasted with justice theories, such that each ethic focused on 
one dimension of human relationships,15 the more recent works have disregarded this 
opposition.16 Instead, the aim has been to work towards integrating the ethics of 
justice and the ethics of care into a uniform account of moral reasoning, without 
neglecting one or the other.17 As I see it, the importance of the ethics of care is that it 
emphasises aspects of moral reasoning that are not generally emphasised by 
dominant moral thought, but which are, nevertheless, essential dimensions of human 
life and ethics. For the present purposes, the ethics of care, then, provides useful and 
important insights for how to enrich the concept of autonomy, rather than neglecting 
it altogether. 
What are the essential features of the ethics of care? At the core of the ethics of care 
is the understanding that care constitutes an important and essential component of 
moral thinking, attitude and behaviour. The ethics of care recognises that human 
beings are dependent on each other in many ways and for most of the time of their 
lives. It sees persons essentially as relational and interdependent rather than self-
sufficient and independent.18 All persons need care for at least their early years, 
during times of sickness, disability and frail old age. But even during times of 
relative health and vigour, most of us rely on others to help us and meet our needs. 
The prospects for human flourishing hinge fundamentally on the idea that those 
needing care thereby receive it. The care ethicists argue that because of this universal 
dependence upon one another for care, we all have moral obligations to care for 
                                                
13 One the reasons why Gilligan’s work had far-reaching impact on feminist thought, but also why it 
led to impasse see M. Drakolpoulou, “The Ethics of Care, Female Subjectivity, and Feminist Legal 
Scholarship”, (2000) 8 Feminist Legal Studies 199-228.  
14 See footnote 8 above. 
15 C. Gilligan, note 7 above; N. Noddings, note 7 above. 
16 D. Engster, note 8 above; G. Clement, note 8 above. 
17 G. Clement, note 8 above. 
18 V. Held, note 8 above, at 46; C. Clement, note 8 above, at 13; S. Sevenhuijsen, “Caring in the Third 
Way: The Relation Between Obligation, Responsibility and Care in Third Way Discourse”, (2000) 
20(1) Critical Social Policy 5-37, at 9. 
Chapter 5 Caring autonomy 
 
 180 
others in need.19 The care perspective involves seeing oneself as connected to others 
within a web of various relationships and attending to and meeting the needs of the 
particular others for whom we take responsibility.20  
The priority of the ethics of care can be said then to lie in two interrelated aspects: in 
taking relationships as fundamental and valuing their maintenance, and in developing 
moral injunctions to protect these relationships and meeting the needs of those to 
whom one is connected.21 As Orend notes:  
Care for others means sympathising with them and supporting them, 
helping them develop their skills, being committed to a personal 
connection with them based on trust and mutual respect, taking on 
responsibility to do what one can to ensure their well-being.22 
To put it another way, the ethics of care takes the idea of self-in-relationship as a 
point of entry for thinking about responsibility and obligation. While the moral 
subject in the discourse of individual rights looks at situations of moral dilemma 
from the stance of the “highest principles” and takes rights and obligations as a 
means of establishing relationships, the moral subject in the discourse of care always 
already lives in a network of relationships, in which she or he has to find balances 
between different forms of responsibility – for the self, for others and for the 
relationships between them.23 Grace Clement illustrates this point by referring to the 
case of a couple, who decides to have a child. As she points out, this voluntary 
decision would seem to ground the couple’s obligations toward the child they create. 
However, the child is born with severe mental and physical disabilities. Assuming 
that the parents have some obligations toward their disabled child, Clement argues 
that these obligations should not be understood in terms of consent, as the parents 
never consented to the situation in which they have found themselves. Rather the 
parents recognise an obligation that they have not explicitly chosen.24 
                                                
19 V. Held, note 8 above; D. Engster, note 8 above. 
20 V. Held, note 8 above, at 10. 
21 G. Clement, note 8 above, at 13-14. 
22 B. Orend, Human Rights: Concept and Context, Broadview Press, 2002, at 173. 
23 S. Sevenhuijsen, note 18 above, at 10. 
24 G. Clement, note 8 above, at 13. 
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Another core element of the ethics of care is its emphasis on the concrete and 
particular. Rather than approaching moral questions solely in terms of abstract 
principles, utility or other universal ideals, care ethics aims to meet the concrete 
needs of individuals in context-specific and responsive ways. What the ethics of care 
advocates is the pattern of thinking in terms of “contextual and narrative” rather than 
formal and abstract.”25 Whereas in the latter case the moral problem is abstracted 
from the interpersonal situation, the former case “invokes a narrative of relationships 
that extends over time.”26 As Benhabib further explains “the standpoint of the 
concrete other…requires us to view each and every rational being as an individual 
with a concrete history, identity and affective-emotional constitution.”27 Moral 
deliberation in terms of ethics of care thus involves paying attention to the concrete 
individual, and appreciating the context of the relationships in which she or he exists. 
For example, rather than abstracting from a person’s individuating features, using the 
ethics of care we make moral decisions on the basis of these features.28 Considering 
who has the right over frozen embryos in case of a conflict between the parties 
involved, the ethics of care would guide us to pay attention to the particular 
circumstances of the relationship – what is at stake for each of the parties, what was 
promised from one party to the other before the relationship ended etc. From the 
justice perspective, it can be argued, that these sorts of details are unnecessary: the 
question is what was consented on the formal contract for medical treatment.   
A number of criticisms have been launched against the ethics of care that can be 
perceived as questioning its suitability and usefulness in the human rights discourse. 
Because of the features of the ethics of care, outlined above, some of the critics 
would argue that it is impossible, immoral or unhelpful to use the insights of the 
ethics of care in human rights law. In a word, it would be a bad argument to advocate 
for the adoption of the care perspective in human rights law, despite its potentially 
positive effect on inducing trust in interpersonal relationships. These criticisms 
                                                
25 M.U. Walker, “Moral Understandings: Alternative ‘Epistemology’ for a Feminist Ethics”, (1989) 
4(2) Hypatia 15-28, at 17-18. 
26 M.U. Walker, note 25 above, at 18. 
27 S. Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics, 
Polity Press, 1992, at 159. 
28 G. Clement, note 8 above, at 12. 
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include: a) because of its attention to contextuality, the ethics of care is suited only to 
the private realm;29 b) stemming from women’s “voice”, the ethics of care enforces 
women’s self-sacrifice and enforces “slave morality”;30 c) through its dedication to 
maintaining relationships, caring devalues the individual at the cost of the 
relationship;31 d) caring is too vague a concept to provide proper guidance for 
decision-making in ethically sensitive judicial matters.32 As I argue, while pertinent 
to the early writings on the ethics of care, these criticisms have largely lost their 
relevance in the light of the more recent care theories. These criticisms are, 
nevertheless, instructive in deciphering those features of care that are helpful for 
constructing a concept of autonomy for the purposes of human rights protection. 
5.2.2 The incompatibility of human rights adjudication and 
the ethics of care  
Nel Noddings, whose work was one of the first to articulate an ethics of caring, 
provided a definition of care that necessarily entailed only a particular and situational 
morality.33 Following directly from her definition of care, Noddings argues that 
caring cannot be taken as a model for general moral relations or as an institutional 
political theory.34 For Noddings, caring occurs only in a circle of intimates and 
friends who are engrossed in one another.35 Caring, according to Noddings, requires 
personal contact and varies according to individuals and situations. Indeed, because 
of this particularity, Noddings is wary of passing judgment on the caring activities of 
others. What is good for one individual in one situation may not be good for another 
individual in another situation. Care ethics does not, then, stipulate any substantive 
norms, but rather consists of an attitude of attending to others’ wants and needs.36  
Following this concept of care, it might be thought that, although, the ethics of care 
can provide important insights into the moral values involved in the caring practices 
                                                
29 N. Noddings, note 7 above. 
30 S.L. Hoagland, “Some Concerns About Nel Noddings’ Caring”, (1990) 5(1) Hypatia 109-114. 
31 V. Davion, “Autonomy, Integrity, and Care”, (1993) 19(2) Social Theory and Practice 161-182. 
32 E. Jackson, Medical Law: Text, Cases and Materials, OUP, 2006, at 22. 
33 N. Noddings, note 7 above. 
34 Ibid., at 46-48. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., at 13-14. 
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of family, friendship and personal care-giving, it has little to offer for the public 
sphere, including that of human rights adjudication. It could be argued that the 
contextuality of care limits it to situations about which we can know extensive 
details, and the evaluation of the latter is only possible in the context of personal 
relationships. In the present case a critic may ask, what has the ethics of care, the 
emphasis of which is on meeting the needs of the concrete individual in a particular 
relational context, to provide for the human rights adjudication, where the judges of 
the Human Rights Court can hardly know all the details and history of the claimants? 
Even the parties to the relationships whose cases are being considered under the 
Article 8 rubric are not always and necessarily intimate ones. More often, for 
example, the patients and doctors hardly know each other for longer than a 15-
minute consultation time.  
On the other hand, if care is perceived to vary according to individuals and situations 
so that it cannot provide any substantive norms for caring behaviour, my suggestion 
that adopting caring autonomy under the ECtHR Article 8 jurisprudence would 
induce people to behave in a more caring hence more trustworthy manner, would 
collapse.  
More recent writings on care have argued, however, that care does not and should 
not limit itself to only intimate relations.37 Otherwise, as Card argues, caring would 
render “as ethically insignificant our relationships with most people in the world, 
because we do not know them and never will.”38 Tronto notes that given Noddings’ 
definition, care ethics “could quickly become a way to argue that everyone should 
cultivate one’s own garden and let other’s take care of themselves.”39 According to 
Held, “the care that is valued by the ethics of care can – and to be justifiable must – 
include caring for distant others in an interdependent world, and caring that the rights 
of all are respected and their needs met.”40  
                                                
37 J.C. Tronto, note 8 above; S. Schwarzenbach, “On Civic Friendship”, (1996) 107 Ethics 97-128; M. 
Slote, note 8 above, D. Engster, note 8 above. 
38 C. Card, “Caring and Evil”, (1990) 5(1) Hypatia 101-108, at 102. 
39 J.C. Tronto, note 8 above, at 103 and 171. 
40 V. Held, note 8 above, at 66. 
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This suggests that although the emphasis of the care perspective is on the contextual 
and concrete, it need not always be personal. In order to adequately care for 
someone, one must take that other person’s concrete attributes and situation into 
account, but one need not therefore have a personal – however that is defined – 
relationship with him or her.41 Hence, the judges of the Human Rights Court need 
not know the parties personally in order to evaluate whether they are entitled to the 
caring treatment they argue for, or whether the applicants themselves have behaved 
in a caring way.  
It can be argued that the possible incompatibility between care ethics and human 
rights adjudication rather rests on the different levels of emphasis they accord to 
concreteness and abstractness.42 The ethics of care focuses on the particularities of a 
situation because it recognises the dangers of applying general rules without regard 
for individuals and their specific needs. The justice perspective, on the other hand, 
concentrates on the general principles, which underlie our apparently dissimilar 
moral judgments, because it recognises the dangers of being so immersed in the 
context that one loses sight of one’s principles and becomes inconsistent or 
relativistic.43 However, it is hardly the case that either of the ethics is so 
straightforward in its operation. The European human rights adjudication has always 
paid attention to the contextual details of each case, and not just followed the 
reasoning in terms of abstract principles. In order to understand which general 
principles apply in a particular case, the Court must first pay attention to its 
contextual details. In this sense, general principles and contextual details are 
dependent upon one another. Deciding which principles are relevant and what 
priority to give them requires full attention to context.44 
Moreover, the Human Rights Court can have an important place in fostering caring 
relations and providing an institutional framework for perspectives and ways to see 
how people ought to live their lives to sustain and foster human flourishing. Rights 
can be fruitfully conceived as rules specifying what people should do in relation to 
                                                
41 See also S.A. Schwarzenbach, note 37 above, at 121. 
42 See also G. Clement, note 8 above, at 76. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., at 77. 
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one another, and as such, may be used to institutionalise the commitments of care. 
Positive rights, in particular, which are not limited to refraining from action, can 
bring the priorities of care to the public sphere by encouraging care and concern 
about others. With their power to alter, even if indirectly, the national legislations the 
Court can provide guidance on how the practices of care can be included in the 
legislation. 
5.2.3 The ethics of care as an exclusively female morality 
As noted above, the ethics of care rose to prominence with Carol Gilligan’s In a 
Different Voice45 that portrayed care ethics as a moral perspective closely associated 
with women’s morality. Gilligan argued that women tend to approach morality from 
a different perspective from that of men – a perspective which accords moral 
primacy to caring within personal relationships. She noted the following: 
The psychology of women that has consistently been described as 
distinctive in its greater orientation toward relationships and 
interdependence implies a more contextual mode of judgment and a 
different moral understanding. Given the differences in women’s 
conceptions of self and morality, women bring to the life circle a 
different point of view and order human experience in terms of different 
priorities.46 
Drawing on her work, feminist theorists have since distinguished between a “male” 
approach to ethical issues, which focuses on abstract moral reasoning and on 
concepts of autonomy and justice, and a “female” approach to ethical issues, which 
focuses on particular needs, on relationships and concepts of care.47 Although 
subsequent psychological research has found this correlation between care ethics and 
the mode of moral thinking most often used by women fairly weak,48 the ethics of 
                                                
45 C. Gilligan, note 7 above. 
46 C. Gilligan, note 7 above, at 22. 
47 N. Noddings, note 7 above. 
48 A. Vikan et al., “Note on a Cross-Cultural Test of Gilligan’s Ethic of Care”, (2005) 34(1) Journal of 
Moral Education 107-111; S. Jaffee, J.S. Hyde, “Gender Differences in Moral Orientation: A Meta-
Analysis”, (2000) 126(6) Psychological Bulletin 703-726. 
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care still carries a kind of historical stigma as representing a distinctively feminine or 
gendered morality.49  
This association of the ethics of care to women’s morality has provoked some of the 
critics to argue that the ethics of care amounts to a resuscitation of traditional 
stereotypes of women – stereotypes, which are used to rationalise the subordination 
of women. In this way, the critics argue, to pursue the feminine – the essence of 
which is dedication to relationships and meeting others’ needs – is to pursue 
oppression.50 Emily Jackson, for example, claims that the ethics of care is unsuitable 
for bioethical discourse since there is a “danger of reinforcing the stereotype that 
self-sacrifice and care come naturally to women, and by implication, that values such 
as justice do not.”51 Similarly O’Neill writes that “a stress on caring and 
relationships…may endorse relegation to the nursery and the kitchen, to purdah and 
to poverty. In rejecting ‘abstract liberalism’, such feminists converge with traditions 
that have excluded women from economic and public life.”52 As the critics point out, 
if the model of caring relations is based on work that women have been traditionally 
expected to do, work that has been part of their subjugation, then an ethics based on 
caring is a “slave morality.”53 According to Puka, there is a danger with projecting 
women’s care-taking strengths as valuable, since it “runs the risk of transforming 
victimisation into virtue”,54 and “of legitimising subjugation to gender in a 
misguided attempt at self-affirmation.”55  
My, presumably feminist, critic may say that bringing the insights of the ethics of 
care to the human rights reasoning might not be, therefore, in the best interests of 
women, who have struggled hard to gain the recognition and rights to choose and 
control their own ways in life. Arguably, the adoption of the care perspective can 
                                                
49 For an analysis how this dichotomy between “male” and “female” morality is nothing “biological”, 
but socially and historically constructed, see J.C. Tronto, note 8 above, ch 2. 
50 S.L. Hoagland, note 30 above, at 112. 
51 E. Jackson, note 32 above, at 22. 
52 O. O’Neill, “Justice, Gender and International Boundaries”, in R. Attfield, B. Wilkins (eds) 
International Justice and the Third World, Routledge, 1992, 50-76, at 55. 
53 E.F. Kittay, “The Ethics of Care, Dependence, and Disability”, (2011) 24(1) Ratio Juris 49-58, at 
53. 
54 B. Puka, “The Liberation of Caring; A Different Voice for Gilligan’s ‘Different Voice’”, (1990) 
5(1) Hypatia 58-82, at 58. 
55 B. Puka, note 54 above; See also C. Card, note 38 above, at 102. 
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potentially compromise the autonomy of the caregiver – e.g. women. Instead of 
continuing their “liberation”, women would take a step back towards their oppressive 
history.56  
I think the critics have undervalued the contribution the ethics of care can potentially 
make to the discourse of human rights, and eventually to the better conceptualisation 
and organisation of human relationships. What Gilligan said was that there is a 
different “voice” to that of the mainstream one. What she did not say is that these 
two “voices” or the two sorts of ethics are incompatible with each other.57 I think the 
voice of the ethics of care needs to be heard because it can reveal values where there 
none was previously acknowledged. Part of the appeal to incorporate the insights of 
the ethics of care to the human rights reasoning is the expectation that all people, not 
just women, should act according to the values of caring.  
Moreover, as Kittay argues, appreciating the values of care may prevent the newly 
empowered people from colluding with the very values that previously were used in 
their own subjection.58 For example, as I argued in Chapter 2, the interpretation of 
autonomy by the Human Rights Court in cases pertaining to interpersonal 
relationships fosters a vision of a detached, independent and self-sufficient 
individual. Inadvertently, this “empowerment” of patients and women, for example, 
may cultivate the very same habits that previously belonged to that of the 
“privileged” group. Emphasis on respect for patient’s autonomy in medical setting, 
for example, is sometimes extended to an argument that patients must be given 
whatever they demand.59   
 
                                                
56 C. Card, note 38 above; H. Kuhse, “Clinical Ethics and Nursing: ‘Yes’ to Caring, but ‘No’ to a 
Female Ethics of Care”, (1995) 9(3/4) Bioethics 207-219; J. Kroeger-Mappes, note 11 above, at 116.  
57 Similar point is made by R. Gillon, note 10 above. 
58 E.F. Kittay, note 53 above, at 54. 
59 See also M. Brazier, “Do No Harm – Do Patients Have Responsibilities Too?”, (2006) 65(2) 
Cambridge Law Journal 397-422. Brazier points out how patients’ lack of manners become evident 
when you walk around a clinic or a surgery in England and you will see notices of the kind 
unimagined 50 years ago. They state that patients who are violent or abusive to stuff may be refused 
treatment. Telephone conversations may be recorded and abusive language used to receptionists may 
result in expulsion from the general practitioner’s list. (at 403) 
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5.2.4 Relationships subsume the individual 
The ethics of care has been criticised for its failure to recognise absolute value in 
anything but caring.60 The ethical ideal is about giving care and to maintain caring 
relations.61 Even if the importance of taking care of ourselves is noted, the moral 
basis for this is, arguably, to become better carers.62 Caring, according to these 
critics, is first and foremost an other-regarding activity that devalues the individual 
and his or her place in the relationship. Also, there is something deficient in a wholly 
other-regarding caring morality. By according little importance to caring for oneself, 
except perhaps as a means to provide further care for others, the model care-giver by 
that definition would seem to be rather a servant or slave.63 If to consider that at the 
centre of the human rights project is the protection and well-being of the individual – 
which I do – then following the insights of the ethics of care might be considered 
counterintuitive for human rights discourse.  
To get to the roots of this criticism we have to turn again to the work of Nel 
Noddings. One of the Noddings’s central claims was that relations between human 
beings are ontologically basic. Therefore, she argued, caring relations are ethically 
basic. In order to be moral, according to Noddings, one must maintain oneself as 
caring: “We want to be moral in order to remain in the caring relationship and to 
enhance the ideal of ourselves as one-caring [that is as givers of care]. It is this 
ethical ideal…that guides us as we strive to meet the other morally.”64 So even in 
situations when I find it difficult to engage in caring action, I am under the obligation 
to do so if I want to be moral, that is to maintain myself as one-caring.65 Genuine 
caring involves what Noddings calls “engrossment and motivational displacement.” 
Engrossment means that the one-caring attends to the cared-for without judgment 
and evaluation, and she allows herself to be transformed by the other. In motivational 
                                                
60 V. Davion, note 31 above. 
61 V. Davion, note 31 above, at 175. 
62 S.L. Hoagland, note 30, at 110. 
63 S.L. Hoagland, note 30 above. 
64 N. Noddings, note 7 above, at 5. 
65 N. Noddings, note 7 above, at 82. 
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displacement the one-caring adopts the goals of the cared-for and helps the latter to 
promote them.66  
Caring involves stepping out of one’s own personal frame of reference 
into the other’s. When we care, we consider the other’s point of view, his 
objective needs and what he expects of us. Our attention, our mental-
engrossment is on the cared-for, not on ourselves. Our reasons for acting, 
then, have to do both with the other’s wants and desires and with the 
objective elements of his problematic situation.67 
Drawing from this account of caring one might question, then, whether autonomy is 
desirable or even possible within the framework of care. From Noddings’ perspective 
of care, autonomy can be perceived even as dangerous, because it is maximised 
through isolation from others, as others represent potential threats to our ability to 
define ourselves freely. But the more isolated we are, the less we are able to do what 
the ethics of care values, i.e. – to create and maintain relationships with particular 
others.68 Whereas an autonomous individual defines herself, arguably, an adherent of 
the ethics of care allows herself to be defined by others.69 
I agree with the critics that there are at least two problems with this account of caring 
and its suitability for the human rights discourse. First, Noddings’ account does not 
seem to include the idea of valuing the individuals themselves. Her account of care 
ethics misses an account of the individuals within caring relations as being important 
themselves.  
Secondly, Noddings’ approach fails to see that even if maintaining caring 
relationships is necessary for survival, it does not follow that all caring relations are 
good. As Davion points out, sometimes it is wrong to be one-caring if this involves 
motivational displacement and engrossment in someone whose projects are wrong: 
“If someone is evil and one allows herself to be transformed by that person, one risks 
becoming evil oneself. If the other’s goals are immoral, and one makes those goals 
one’s own, one becomes responsible for supporting immoral goals.”70  
                                                
66 N. Noddings, note 7 above, at 15-20 and 33-34. 
67 N. Noddings, note 7 above, at 24. 
68 G. Clement, note 8 above, at 16. 
69 G. Clement, note 8 above, at 21. 
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A third point that can be made about Noddings’ account of care as essentially “other-
regarding” care, is that it may result in a “smothering paternalism.”71 Engster argues 
that Noddings’ account assumes that needs are transparent to the caregiver in such a 
way that the caregiver’s perceptions are privileged in the process of interpreting 
needs. Whatever the caregiver perceives as the needs of the other is taken as the 
other’s true needs based upon their true relationship.72 An obvious example here can 
be a doctor who imposes his or her preferred treatment on the patient and claiming 
that he or she is doing it out of care. 
What all these three instances of criticisms indicate is that according to Noddings’ 
account, either autonomy does not have a place at all in the caring relationship, or it 
is one person’s autonomy that is subsumed by the other.  
However, while being material and accurate concerning the early writings and 
theories on the ethics of care, more recent works on care have emphasised that a 
mature care perspective involves concern as well for oneself and for one’s own well-
being within relations of care,73 thereby stressing that care is not just other-oriented 
activity.74 As Schwarzenbach puts it: “nothing in ‘care’ requires that the activity of 
care be pure altruism or self-sacrifice.”75 Engster argues, further, that caring for 
ourselves is also valuable in itself, since “we too are dependent creatures with 
biological and developmental needs that must be satisfied if we are to continue to 
live and function at a decent level.”76  
Nor is care considered “non-rational”, but true care must be intelligent and 
reasoned.77 We need autonomy to evaluate potential and ongoing relationships. 
Otherwise we risk becoming simply tools or extensions of others.78 As Davion 
proposes, one can consistently hold that caring is necessary for human survival and 
                                                
71 D. Engster, note 11 above, at 116. 
72 Ibid. 
73 D. Engster, note 8 above. 
74 D. Engster, “Rethinking Care Theory: The Practice of Caring and the Obligation to Care”, (2005) 
20(3) Hypatia 50-74, at 54. J.C. Tronto, note 8 above, at 103. 
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distinguish between morally desirable and morally undesirable instances of caring.79 
Grace Clement builds on this point to argue that “genuine care” requires autonomy 
and concern for oneself, since an individual must first recognise her own distinct 
needs before she can recognise and empathise with those of others.80  
Sarah Hoagland points out that one cannot have a relation without there being at least 
two beings to relate.81 Even if one is the product of one’s relations, in making 
decisions about continuing caring relationships and about forming new ones, one acts 
out of a sense of oneself as a separate being from others. According to Hoagland: 
Relation is central to ethics. However, there must be two beings, at least, 
to relate. Moving away from oneself is one aspect of caring, but it cannot 
be the only defining element. Otherwise, relationship is not ontologically 
basic, the other is ontologically basic, and the self ceases to exist in its 
own ethical right.82  
Therefore: “One who cares must perceive herself not just as both separate and 
related, but as ethically both separate and related.”83 And if one cannot acknowledge 
the difference, one cannot evaluate the relationships one is in, and the projects of the 
others. 
Caring and autonomy, hence, do not have to be in conflict with each other, but a 
more constructive way is to see them as mutually supportive and compatible. As 
more recent writings on care show, the ethics of care must allow for the autonomy of 
the caregiver as well as the care recipient. As Clement has put it: “One of the criteria 
for healthy caring relationships is that they allow for the autonomy of their 
members.”84 Being a caring person or being engaged in a caring practice does not 
deny autonomy. In fact autonomy is a necessary condition for cultivating and 
learning the relevant abilities to care. Concurrently, being a care recipient does not 
entail that care can be imposed on her or him. Responding to one’s needs means 
paying attention to what these needs are from the perspective of the recipient. 
                                                
79 V. Davion, note 31 above, at 174. 
80 G. Clement, note 8 above, at 166. 
81 S.L. Hoagland, note 30 above, at 110. 
82 Ibid., at 110-111. 
83 Ibid., at 111. 
84 G. Clement, note 8 above, at 42. 
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5.2.5 Vagueness of care 
The final criticism directed against the ethics of care I want to address is the alleged 
problem with the vagueness of the concept of care. The ethics of care is sometimes 
considered inadequate because of its inability to provide definite answers in cases of 
conflicting moral demands. One of the main problems is that it is not clear at all what 
caring amounts to. As Kuhse helpfully outlines, caring has  
[c]onnotations of concern, compassion, worry, anxiety, and of burden; 
there are also connotations of inclination, fondness and affection; 
connotations of carefulness, that is, of attention to detail, of responding 
sensitively to the situation of the other; and there are connotations of 
looking after, or providing for, the other.85  
This sort of ambiguity has arguably made Emily Jackson reproach the ethics of care 
as “an inherently vague concept, which could be used to justify almost any plausible 
moral argument.”86 She points out that in relation to euthanasia, for example, the 
ethics of care could be equally used to support or oppose legalised euthanasia. On 
one side, the ethics of care can be argued to be concerned about relieving distressed 
patients from enduring frightening or painful deaths. On the other, it is concerned 
about the possibility of vulnerable patients feeling pressurised into requesting 
euthanasia. To demonstrate the deficiency of care perspective to solve moral 
dilemmas, Jackson asks: “If an unconscious patient in urgent need of a blood 
transfusion is carrying a card stating that she is a Jehovah’s Witness who wishes to 
refuse the use of blood products, does an ethic of care demand that doctors respect 
her wishes and allow her to die, or should they treat her without consent and save her 
life?”87 
I agree with Jackson that “care” is a highly ambiguous notion. The fact that care and 
caring are ambiguous concepts counts, however, for little as an objection. 
Conceptions of freedom, autonomy, dignity, justice are also topics of endless, 
political, legal and moral debate.88 The concept of dignity, for example, can be, and 
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it has been, used as well as in support of legalising euthanasia as well as in opposing 
it.89 Often principles of justice conflict, and there is no meta-principle to help to 
make a choice between them.90 The insights of the ethics of care and its essential 
features are helpful as a normative and aspirational guide for describing our 
behaviour, and as providing tools with which to analyse a case or a legal dilemma. 
But it cannot provide ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers to hypothetical questions about complex 
and sensitive moral issues. Furthermore, considering my aim to propose a concept of 
autonomy that aims to foster trust in interpersonal relationships, a large part of that 
aim is, then, targeted at preventing conflict. For example, in the case of Evans, I do 
not think that the Court could have reached another outcome for the parties involved. 
In the situation, where the parties found themselves, I do not see that the Court could 
have imposed fatherhood on Ms Evans’ ex-partner. However, that does not mean that 
the Ms Evans’ rights were not violated. The respective legislation in force was 
designed in a manner that allowed withdrawing one’s consent without paying any 
respect to the other party or upholding one’s promises.91 The ECtHR could have 
guided the Responding State to find a legal solution that would have directed the 
parties to infertility treatment to be more attentive and considerate to each other’s 
needs. As I see it, a better solution would be to limit the time until the donor has a 
right to withdraw one’s consent up until the moment of the creation of the embryo. In 
that way, a decision of becoming a parent would be, arguably, taken with more 
consideration and respect towards one’s partner. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
the freedom of the will. It is equated with dignity, integrity, individuality, independence, 
responsibility, and self-knowledge. It is identified with qualities of self-assertion, with critical 
reflection, with freedom from obligation, with absence of external causation, with knowledge of one’s 
own interests…It is related to actions, to beliefs, to reasons for acting, to rules, to the will of other 
persons, to thoughts and to principles.” G. Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, CUP, 
1988, at 10.  
89 See on this D. Beyleveld, R. Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw, OUP, 2001, 
chapter 11. 
90 See L. Zucca, Constitutional Dilemmas: Conflicts of Fundamental Legal Rights in Europe and the 
USA, OUP, 2007. 
91 See also Chapter 4, Section 4.4.5. 
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5.2.6 Interim conclusions 
The chapter argues that the care perspective can provide a basis for a version of 
autonomy that, arguably, provides a more appropriate model for regulating human 
relationships in the area falling within the scope of Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. By including the insights of care ethics – the social 
conception of the self, meeting the needs of particular others, the importance of 
relationships – into the concept of autonomy is, arguably, more inducive to trust and 
fostering trustworthiness than the present concept of individual autonomy. However, 
as the discussion above showed, several counterarguments can be provided for the 
usefulness of the ethics of care in human rights law. As I hope to have demonstrated, 
all of the criticisms are rebuttable.  
In a way, the early writings on caring seemed to suffer from the same problem that is 
attributed to the ethics of justice and the “rights talk”, and that I attribute to 
individual autonomy as interpreted under the ECtHR case law – they are both too 
one-dimensional. The more recent writings on care have responded to the 
shortcomings that initially left caring and care ethics to be applied and practised only 
in the periphery of limited personal relationships. Paying attention to the context of a 
particular situation does not necessarily mean that caring can take place only in a 
private setting. Following from this, caring cannot be also associated solely with the 
female perspective and “women’s work” done at home. Care should be understood 
as an ethic for everyone, not just for women. The care ethicists have also responded 
to the limited view of early writings, which place the value of maintaining 
relationships above any individual desires or needs. Care ethics can be, instead, 
understood as the appreciation of healthy relationships, where autonomy of both the 
caregiver and the care receiver deserve respect. 
5.3. Defining caring autonomy 
The concept of caring autonomy proposed in this thesis is in certain ways a 
paradoxical term – it aims to capture free choice and moral obligations and 
responsibility not in conflict, but as complementary to each other and thus mutually 
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interdependent.92 Caring autonomy is a notion that aims to express both the values of 
autonomy and care simultaneously. It acknowledges the value of autonomy – the 
developed and exercised capacity to think and decide for oneself. Once more, I re-
emphasise my position that there is nothing wrong with the assumption that 
autonomy is an important human good. We can and should value autonomy, but it 
should be equally made clear and acknowledged that we can develop and sustain 
autonomy only within a framework of relations of trust. In other words, in the 
essence of caring autonomy is the acknowledgement that self-realisation or self-
fulfilment cannot happen in a vacuum. In one moment or another we all are 
vulnerable and depend on each other. Self-realisation is concurrently self-sustenance. 
Two alternative paths of action are possible here – at the expense of others or 
alongside with others. The former refers to co-habitation as a struggle for existence. 
In the latter case self-realisation takes place through giving and receiving care.  
In order to suggest how the concept of caring autonomy should take shape in the 
practice of the Human Rights Court, I follow the same pattern used in Chapter 2 
when analysing individual autonomy. Just as we asked about the person in the 
concept of individual autonomy, we ask about the person in the concept of caring 
autonomy. What kind of a human being is implied by caring autonomy? What kind 
of humanity does it disclose? Two ideas behind caring autonomy are crucial here.  
First, the subject of caring autonomy is conceived as relational – a relational self, 
one that is constituted in part by relationships important to a person’s autonomy and 
who equally needs relationships to exercise his or her autonomy.   
Second, the exercise of one’s autonomy requires not just an independent mind in 
decision-making, but the adoption of certain moral requirements for behaviour e.g. 
responsiveness, attendance to other’s needs, respect for other’s autonomy and 
competence in meeting other’s needs. 
As the previous chapter argued, the autonomous person as envisaged by the Human 
Rights Court – an independent, self-sufficient individual, one who is control of his or 
her life rather than being controlled by outside forces – is deficient if not detrimental 
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to trust in interpersonal relationships. The person behind caring autonomy provides a 
more promising basis for cultivating trusting relationships because it: a) assumes 
what MacIntyre has called “acknowledged dependency”93 – that we all are, in one 
way or another, dependent on each other for acquiring and exercising our autonomy, 
and b) it aims to foster personal dispositions towards meeting others’ needs and 
responding to vulnerabilities that have been entrusted into one’s care – e.g. the 
“virtues of acknowledged dependency.”  
5.3.1 Not independence, but interdependence 
No man’s activity is completely so private as never to obstruct the lives of others in 
any way. Viewing persons as relational and as interdependent is central to caring 
autonomy. Inspired by the works of feminist philosophers, especially that of Virginia 
Held and Eva Kittay, Alasdair MacIntyre takes up the care ethicists’ challenge to 
emphasise the basic fact of human interdependence. I think his viewpoint makes a 
good starting point to regard people as relational. I, therefore, cite it at length: 
We human beings are vulnerable to many kinds of affliction and most of 
us are at some time afflicted by serious ills. How we cope is only in small 
part up to us. It is most often to others that we owe our survival, let alone 
our flourishing, as we encounter bodily illness and injury, inadequate 
nutrition, mental defect and disturbance, and human aggression and 
neglect. This dependence on particular others for protection and 
sustenance is most obvious in early childhood and in old age. But 
between these first and last stages of our lives are characteristically 
marked by longer or shorter periods of injury, illness or other 
disablement and some among us are disabled for their entire lives. 
These two related sets of facts, those concerning our vulnerabilities and 
afflictions and those concerning the extent of our dependence on 
particular others are so evidently of singular importance that it might 
seem that no account of the human condition whose authors hoped to 
achieve credibility could avoid giving them a central place. Yet the 
history of Western moral philosophy suggests otherwise. From Plato to 
Moore and since then there are usually, with some rare exceptions, only 
passing references to human vulnerability and affliction and to the 
connections between them and our dependence on others. Some of the 
facts of human limitation and of our consequent need of cooperation with 
                                                
93 A. MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, Duckworth, 
1999, at 146. 
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others are more generally acknowledged, but for the most part only then 
to be put on one side.94  
I agree with the entirety of MacIntyre’s statement. However, following Nedelsky, I 
think he underestimates the scope of our dependence and interdependence. Our 
dependence on others and vulnerability is indeed most obvious during childhood, 
illness, disability and old age. Infants and small children would not survive for very 
long or develop the basic capabilities necessary to survive without the care of some 
sort of parenting figures. But even during times of relative health and vigour, most 
individuals depend upon the care of family, friends and more distant others to help 
them satisfy their basic needs, develop or maintain their basic capabilities, or 
alleviate pain. Drawing from Hannah Arendt, Jennifer Nedelsky argues that some of 
our cognitive faculties, including both thinking and judging, require the presence of 
others. She argues that judging requires our ability to take the perspective of others – 
without others, and our ability to communicate with them, there would be no 
capacity for judgment.95 Following Nedelsky, it is not just our material needs that 
render us dependent on others. Our basic emotional, imaginative and reasoning 
capabilities are not simply and fully developed by childhood’s end, but continue to 
grow and evolve in our relations to others throughout our lives. In other word, our 
interdependence is not episodic, but a constant part of the human condition.96 Behind 
every apparently autonomous individual is a constellation of care that works 
collectively to ensure livelihood, security and well-being. This constellation 
comprises a variety of actors and institutions at many levels of personal, societal and 
political life. In many instances, in the practice of the Human Rights Court this 
constellation is hidden from the view. 
To summarise: the reality is that we are all unavoidably and deeply dependent upon 
others. We depend upon others for caring during childhood, sickness, disability and 
old age. Most of us depend upon others in our day-to-day lives and during times of 
particular hardship. During the course of life the balance of how much others are 
dependent on us and how much we are dependent on others shifts, but the fact 
                                                
94 Ibid., at 1. 
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remains that human life is deeply implicated in relations of dependency. This is part 
of being human.  
If the self is understood as implicated in relations of dependency, this 
acknowledgement generally implies that in different ways people are vulnerable to 
each other’s actions and choices. Those closer to us, of course, tend to be more 
vulnerable to our actions and choices. Because of this vulnerability, care ethicists 
have argued that there are attendant obligations between individuals to be sensitive 
towards, and care for, each other.97 In other words, within the framework of caring 
autonomy, autonomous choices are made in response to obligations, responsibilities 
and meeting the needs of others. These involve both particular acts of caring and a 
general “habit of mind” to care that should inform an agent’s moral life.  
5.3.2 The virtues of care 
Our interdependence means that there are attendant obligations between individuals 
to be sensitive towards, and care for, each other. The substance of this, however, 
remains too vague and its impact on how we view autonomy requires more 
elucidation. In the following I propose four elements of caring autonomy that every 
person should be entitled to and that every person should follow his- or herself. 
These elements of caring autonomy are constitutive of exercising one’s autonomy in 
the sense that one cannot achieve successfully meeting others’ and one’s own needs 
without them. Correspondingly, “their recognised presence or absence necessarily 
affects our mutual willingness to be in each other’s power and so necessarily affects 
the climate of trust we live in.”98 These elements are: attentiveness, responsiveness, 
respect for autonomy and competence. 
Attentiveness. Attentiveness means recognising the ones around us and noticing 
when another person is in need.99 The attentiveness to others requires an 
understanding of their/our story and its concrete detail. It requires knowledge of the 
situation of the person in need of help is in. Without this, one cannot know how it is 
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with others towards whom I will act or what the meaning and consequences of any 
act will be.100 An attentive person is, hence, also appropriately aware of how her 
attitudes and actions affect those around her, and if necessary she alters them so as 
not to cause fear, hurt, annoyance, insult or disappointment in others, particularly in 
those who hoped for cooperation or help.101  
Attentiveness also usually involves an ability to anticipate additional needs that a 
person might have. If an individual is not attentive to others, he or she might meet 
their most obvious needs, but overlook underlying ones.102 For example nurses may 
provide the patients in the hospital with medicine, but do not cover them with 
blankets to keep them warm. The Human Rights Court might provide for a pregnant 
woman with additional complaints procedures to test her doctors’ accountability, but 
not to see how the regulation would meet the needs of a woman with a severe type of 
myopia, who lives on a monthly disability pension and raises her three children 
alone.103  
Responsiveness. Responsiveness means engaging in some form of dialogue with 
others in order to discern the precise nature of their needs and monitoring their 
responses to our care to make sure they are receiving the care they actually need.104 
An individual who fails to engage with others when providing care for them, or fails 
to monitor their reactions to the care, will in the end usually be less effective than 
someone who remains open and responsive to them.105 For example, health-care 
professionals who are receptive and responsive to the needs of patients see the 
patients as individuals with special needs, beliefs, desires and wants. 
At this point it is important to note that caring autonomy does not involve only 
unidirectional activities, in which “an active care-giver does something to a passive 
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and dependent recipient,”106 that only the care-giver has the obligation to be attentive 
and responsive to the needs of the recipient. Caring autonomy equally emphasises 
the role of the care-receiver for providing the carer with e.g. gratitude, 
acknowledgement, or emotional support.107 As Herring notes: “The ‘cared for’ can 
have a range of powers they can exercise. The emotional well-being of the carer can 
depend on the attitude and response of the ‘cared-for’ persons to the carer. The 
‘cared-for’ has the power to make the life of the carer unbearable.”108 
Responsiveness, hence, entails the ability to communicate: turning to each other, 
talking and listening and imagining possibilities together.109 
Respect for autonomy. Respect for the autonomy of others means that a good 
caregiver will not impose his or her own notions of care on others or refuse to meet 
their needs on the ground that they conflict with the care of self or others.110 Despite 
how close the relationship is and how strongly one is involved with his or her fellow 
person’s care, one must, nevertheless, recognise and respect this person as an 
autonomous subject. For example, if a doctor fails to recognise the otherness of the 
patient, then he or she is in danger of reducing the patient to a function of themselves 
or making the patient subservient to their self-development. 
Respect for autonomy also involves respect for oneself. One has to take one’s own 
autonomy seriously in order to evaluate the relationships one is in, and in order to 
evaluate whether the needs of others can be met considering other legal or ethical 
arguments. 
Respect for another person also includes respect for his or her rights. A commitment 
to rights is sometimes just an expression of care and rights-based practices often 
provide practical avenues to effectively channel care for others.111 As Brennan 
argues: “sometimes what it is to care for a person is to take on concern for their 
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rights. Concern for the rights of a loved one does not mean that one cares only for an 
abstract moral concept. One can be concerned about rights because of the direct love 
for the other person.”112 
Competence. Meeting others’ needs in today’s complicated world often means 
requiring special skills and technological or professional know-how. The tools have 
become too complex for us sometimes to do even the simplest repair works. 
Medicine, for example, has become so much more sophisticated, that almost every 
condition or treatment calls for the involvement of a different specialist. Intending to 
provide care, therefore, entails the ability to perform as expected, according to 
standards appropriate to the role or task in question. The caring work needs to be 
competently performed in order to meet others’ needs.  
Within the care framework, competence is, however, not always technical, and it is 
not only being competent in skills. In the case of a family member or friend, the 
competence we expect them to display is what Jones terms as moral competence:113 
we expect the person close to us “to understand loyalty, kindness and generosity, and 
what they call for in various situations.”114 In the case of physicians, not only are 
their skills and knowledge important, but also them “having a good will”115 – to pay 
attention to what they are doing, to take into account the feelings and concerns of 
their patients, to be “not merely competent doctors, but good doctors.”116 An 
important reason for including competence as a moral dimension of care is also to 
avoid the bad faith of those who would “take care of” a problem without being 
willing to do any form of care-giving.117 
In this section I have suggested a list of virtues that should be the “maxim” behind 
one’s exercise of autonomy. Considering that the basis of caring autonomy lies in the 
acknowledgement of human interdependence, these virtues apply equally to those to 
whom we are vulnerable, and who are vulnerable to us.  
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5.4. Implementing caring autonomy in the practice of 
the European Court of Human Rights  
In this final section of this chapter I will consider how the concept of caring 
autonomy, proposed above, can be put into practice. For this purpose I will go back 
where I started and revisit, arguably, one of the most authoritative Article 8 
autonomy-related cases in the Court’s practice: Pretty v the United Kingdom.118 In 
the light of the above-presented discussion, I will consider how the Court could have 
approached this case in terms of people being relational and interdependent, and the 
obligations of care this interdependence calls for. 
5.4.1 Revisiting Pretty v the United Kingdom 
The facts of the case of Pretty v the United Kingdom as they were presented in the 
ECtHR judgment are clear. They were discussed at length in Section 1.2.3 of Chapter 
1, and I will not reproduce the details of the case again save for emphasising the 
circumstances that I find important for the present purposes.  
Caring autonomy understands persons are relational and interdependent, and this is 
the norm around which legal and ethical responses should be built. The analysis has 
to start, accordingly, with consideration of the relations in which Mrs Pretty was 
involved in, and, thereafter, it has to take into account the interests and needs of all 
the parties.  
As we know from the case, Mrs Pretty was suffering from motor neurone disease, 
which severely affected the control and functioning of the muscles of her body. At 
the time of the application of the case to the Human Rights Court, the disease had 
progressed so far that it had left her practically paralysed from the neck down. She 
had virtually no decipherable speech and was fed through a tube. In other words, Mrs 
Pretty was a severely disabled person and she was wholly dependent on the care of 
her close ones and, at least to some extent, on that of the medical personnel. The fact 
that she could not take her own life on her own, and needed the help of her husband, 
only confirms the case of her dependency. 
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This picture of Mrs Pretty contrasts to that of the findings of the Human Rights 
Court. According to the ECtHR, since Mrs Pretty was a “mentally competent adult 
who knows her own mind, who is free from pressure…cannot be regarded as 
vulnerable and requiring protection.”119 According to the parameters of individual 
autonomy, Mrs Pretty was, hence, to be adjudged independent and self-sufficient. 
Moreover, considering the space – or the lack of it – in the judgment dedicated to the 
ones closest to Mrs Pretty and, arguably, most affected by her decision, it gives an 
impression that Mrs Pretty was functionally alone – she was both emotionally and 
physically detached from others around her. Her right to self-determination and 
autonomy, her right to choose when and how to die, were rejected only because there 
might be other people who are at risk of outside influence and who could, then, be 
considered vulnerable, dependent and weak.120 According to this case, independence 
is the positive thing, and is the norm; dependence, by contrast, is a negative thing, 
which implies weakness and only prohibits and restrains the independence of others. 
Framing the case in these terms, important issues become hidden. The ones affected 
by the decision have become “ignored and invisible.”121 
Mrs Pretty was not physically alone. She was living with her husband of twenty-five 
years, their daughter and granddaughter. Since this is the only information available 
from the judgment about her close-ones, what follows can, in large part, only be a 
speculation. Following the reasoning in light of caring autonomy, the Court should, 
however, have paid attention to Mrs Pretty’s family members with as much attention 
as was given to Mrs Pretty, and to their needs in the context of their close relative’s 
wish to die. 
To start in Mrs Pretty’s case, we have the Court’s finding that she is a mentally 
competent adult, who has freely made up her mind to commit suicide in order to 
avoid a distressing and undignified death. Individual autonomy does not ask for 
reasons behind one’s decisions concerning the intimate aspects of one’s life. I do not 
think that caring autonomy should do that either. What the latter should inquire into 
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is whether the terminally ill patient and her or his carers have received the care they 
need – whether the patient has been provided with adequate palliative care, 
including, for instance, care for possible depression that can be a common adjunct to 
a serious illness. This also entails whether patients have been provided with adequate 
information about the palliative options and/or prognosis. 
Also the carers need to be taken care of. Looking after a severely disabled person 
normally limits the caregiver’s options to engage fully in the labour market, restricts 
the caregiver’s options to take part in activities outside of his or her home, etc. More 
and more often worries have been raised that care work has been unvalued and 
unnoticed.122 It is not given the same respect or recognition that other higher profile 
“economically productive” activities have. My point is that these aspects may have a 
direct impact on the person’s choice to choose assisted suicide. In a world, where 
independence is the norm, a person in a condition similar to Mrs Pretty may 
understandably feel that she has become a burden and opt for death in order to save 
the caregiver or his or her family the trouble of looking after him or her. In this 
respect, Biggs argues that underlying Mrs Pretty’s motivation to claim for her right 
to choose when and how to die, was the “desire to protect those they cared for.”123 
Biggs further suggests that Mrs Pretty  
[f]ought for her autonomy to be respected not only so that she might die 
in the manner and at the time of her choosing, which some would regard 
as selfish, but also in order to protect those they cared for and spare them 
the hurt associated with watching her die over a protracted period.124 
We do not know, and will never know, if that was the case, and if so, how much it 
affected Mrs Pretty’s overall decision to end her life at her chosen time. The point 
being made here is that by looking more closely into the context of Mrs Pretty’s 
predicament, by being attentive, responsive and respectful to her needs, maybe 
different options would have presented themselves, such as how to respond to her 
needs. Taking better care of the caregiver would arguably eliminate the patient’s 
need to “protect those they care for.”    
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Next, although the case was framed as Mrs Pretty’s right to autonomy and her right 
to make choices about her own body,125 it was her husband who was asked by her to 
help her to commit suicide and who was, allegedly, wholly supportive of his wife’s 
decision and willing to do what was asked.126 I have no reason not to believe or 
doubt that the husband’s motivations were honest and he sincerely wanted to help his 
wife. Probably, as her primary carer he saw how much pain and suffering the disease 
caused for his wife and that she was terrified about the prospect to undergo the final 
stages of the disease. I take it that Mr and Mrs Pretty’s relationship can be 
characterised as a caring relationship, and in caring relations, it becomes sometimes 
difficult, if not impossible to separate the interests of the person who cares and the 
cared for.127 But, as was discussed earlier, that does not mean that the caregiver can 
become a tool for the service of the recipient’s autonomy. I think that Mr Pretty’s 
part and his autonomy were critically overlooked by the Court. Caring autonomy 
should ask about the responsibilities the parties owe to each other in a context of a 
mutually supporting relationship. Was Mrs Pretty considerate of his needs and 
preferences, or that of her daughter and granddaughter, when making a decision? 
Participation in assisted suicide is most likely not the easiest thing to endure. As 
Donchin argues:  
For the death of someone who has been a significant force in one’s life 
can tinge the fabric of familiar associations in unforeseen ways. The bed 
or chair in which she ended her life may continue to exert an unnerving 
effect long after the event. The trauma of that day prompts revisions of 
the entire history of the relationship adding new dimensions to the 
recollection of scenes from family life.128 
There might be for him further implications of the act to the relationships with other 
members of the family.  
I do not propose that Mrs Pretty’s decision cannot be valid simply because it, 
possibly, did not suit to the relatives’ preferences. Rather, what I suggest is that the 
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other affected parties should be involved in the discussion of the case and their views 
should be heard. I think that this pays due respect and helps to maximise both the 
patient’s and her or his relatives’ autonomy. Sometimes, as Gilbar suggests, this 
might lead the patient voluntarily to make a different decision from the one she or he 
initially preferred and reach a compromise which suits to all of the parties.129  
Mrs Pretty asked her husband to help her to commit suicide. Obviously this is a 
request that must be difficult to take not only because your wife wants to die, but 
also because you are expected to execute it. Given the important part Mr Pretty had 
in her wife’s autonomy request, it is then surprising that the Court did not include 
any consideration about his predicament. 
The same argument can be extended to that of medical personnel, who according to 
one commentator were unwilling to help Mrs Pretty to commit suicide.130 Only when 
she was unable to find a clinician to help her, she turned to her husband. Leaving for 
the moment aside the reason that the doctors simply refused to help Mrs Pretty 
because of the prospect of them facing criminal charges, what other reasons might 
come into consideration? One of the arguments possible to advance here is that this 
kind of request would conflict with the values embedded in their professional roles 
and their self-conception, which involve responsibilities to save lives rather than end 
lives. The question is, can the Human Rights Court compel doctors to assist patient 
dying? To pay due respect to all participants, caring autonomy would also require the 
consideration of the moral and psychological needs of the medical profession. Once 
more, this indicates, that a decision to choose assisted suicide cannot be limited to 
the patient or applicant alone. Other parties are involved and they should be given 
the recognition they need. 
Even if in Mrs Pretty’s case all indicates that her choice was voluntary and that it 
does not have a negative impact on anyone else close to her or treating her, her 
decision may still influence the family and doctor-patient relationships other than her 
own. The Court addresses this group of people as “weak and vulnerable.” But in a 
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way we are all weak and vulnerable – we need to trust that our partners and doctors 
do not “propose” us to opt for “early” death, and we equally need to trust that our 
close ones do not opt for death as a daily choice like anything else.  
Whereas my proposed conclusion to the Pretty case is not different in the end from 
the conclusion reached by the Human Rights Court, solving the case in the light of 
caring autonomy would entail going deeper into the contextual circumstances of the 
case and trying to include the autonomy interest of the other parties involved. In this 
way it becomes more clear that whatever personal, autonomous, decision we make, it 
affects most likely someone else as well.    
5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has advocated for the Human Rights Court to adopt the concept of 
caring autonomy, based on the insights of the ethics of care, to approach issues under 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Including the insights of 
care ethics into the concept of autonomy, arguably, adds value to the concept by 
providing a richer view of the human condition and by offering, thereby, a more 
adequate and appropriate basis for human interaction in matters pertaining to 
different areas of private life – e.g. reproduction issues, medical decision-making etc.   
The concept of caring autonomy proposed in this chapter is based on the relational 
account of self and focuses on the moral obligations and responsibility our 
interconnectedness and vulnerability call for. Caring autonomy recognises that we 
are not independent or self-sufficient, but interdependent on each other in various 
ways. In one moment or another we all are vulnerable and depend on each other. 
Because of this interdependence, one’s autonomy can flourish only in an atmosphere 
of trust, which is sustained by caring relationships. As the chapter proposes this 
means that we have to be attendant, responsive and respectful towards each other and 
provide competent care when needed. These virtues of caring autonomy create a 
more appropriate basis for interpersonal relationships than the virtues of 








In her analysis about whether the proliferation of rights serves always best the idea of 
justice and human well-being, Marta Cartabia concludes that rights have their place, 
but their place is limited.1 She argues that most privacy rights focus on freedom of 
choice and autonomy while leaving obscured other dimensions of the human 
experience: “needs and desires, relationships and responsibilities, virtues and care, 
are all elements abound to fall outside the scope of the rights approach.”2 As she 
says, “rights require not hurting others, but they do not prompt a positive move 
towards other, they fall short of encouraging care and concern about others.”3 The 
multiplication of rights turns, according to Cartabia, human relationships into being 
more confrontational and people become more litigious in their personal interaction.4 
This thesis agrees with Cartabia on one account, but disagrees with her on another. 
While the thesis sets out an argument against the present interpretation of the concept 
of autonomy under the European Court of Human Rights Article 8 jurisprudence, it 
also proposes a new reading of the concept that is rooted in an acknowledgment and 
appreciation of human interdependence. I agree with Cartabia that the current 
autonomy related case law of the Human Rights Court depicts individuals under a 
specific angle, insisting on some limited, if important features, and leaves out aspects 
that are equally integral to the human condition. However, I do not share with her the 
view that, therefore, the place of rights has to be necessarily limited or not applicable 
to certain contexts or relationships. 
The culture of rights need not be a culture of complaint and litigiousness, or a culture 
of confrontational atomistic individuals fighting for the fulfilment of their egotistical 
desires. While I share the critics’ worries that rights are often constructed in overly 
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individualistic ways that may foster a culture of self-interested individuals, I think 
that rights can successfully embody a richer view of the human condition. It is 
possible to conceive a system of rights as a framework of rules that can be drawn 
upon to promote fundamental human interests without a culture in which individuals 
seek only their own self-advancement. Human beings are both uniquely individual 
and essentially social creatures. Capturing both of these features of humanity means 
that rights may be instrumental for a variety of purposes, including the capacity to 
confer benefits on others within a culture, which includes a role for autonomous 
judgment by morally good people as to how and when and in what way they exercise 
their autonomy rights.5   
This thesis is inspired by the view that law is a powerful means of structuring human 
relations. It is informed by the idea that law is part of the cultural environment that 
shapes and impacts the dispositions and behaviour of those operating within its 
sphere. As such, through its expressive functions, law can serve as conveying or 
promoting socially valued attitudes, norms and mores. As Conor Gearty has said: 
“‘Human rights’ is a phrase that comes to mind when we want to capture in words a 
particular view of the world that we share with others and that we aspire to share 
with still greater numbers of people.”6 But this particular view of the world cannot be 
taken as a self-evident good, whenever it carries the human rights label on it.  Human 
rights – their practice and expressions – need to be challenged and discussed, in 
order for them to reflect more accurately what is valuable about them and whether 
they live up to the values they promote. To inquire and challenge the value of the 
concept of autonomy under the European Convention on Human Rights Article 8 
framework was the main aim of this work. 
When the Human Rights Court chooses a particular concept of autonomy to furnish 
its Article 8 case law, it simultaneously chooses a particular way of organising 
relationships within family life, medical settings or other close personal encounters. 
By choosing a particular concept of autonomy, the Human Rights Court guides us to 
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behave in certain ways that are deemed appropriate for an autonomous person, and, 
correspondingly guides us away from other behaviours towards one another. 
The thesis argued that following the prevailing political, legal and socio-cultural 
ideas and ideals about autonomy, the ECtHR chose the notion of individual 
autonomy to underlie the interpretation of Article 8 guarantees.  
Individual autonomy under the practice of the Human Rights Court expresses and 
gives high regard to the values of independence, self-sufficiency, and the ability to 
conduct one’s life in a manner of one’s own choosing. The thesis contended that 
adopting this kind of normative picture of individual conduct is highly problematic in 
the context of personal relationships. The “moral space” in which interpersonal 
relationships reside is not necessarily coincident with a set of rules that may 
successfully govern interactions between state and individual or between that of 
strangers. This picture of morality might work adequately as long as we are in fact 
talking about interactions between strangers, especially strangers whose relationship 
is adversarial. The concept of individual autonomy may fit into the relationship of 
state versus individual, but it acts differently when applied to medical or family 
settings. It overlooks many kinds of questions that are crucial to morality, and 
ignores the features of personal relationships that make them personal and worth 
having. Hence, by exalting a rather thin and limited conception of autonomy into the 
centrepiece of more and more areas of personal life, there is not just the worry that it 
gives us a distorted picture of the human condition, there is also the worry that 
something valuable gets lost. Placing autonomy at the heart of doctor-patient 
relationships, or regulating the relationships within the family or partnership circle, 
substitutes the, so far, implicit expectations of care with explicit contractual rules of 
calculability and self-defensiveness. Because of these inherent limits, individual 
autonomy cannot be constitutive of social life and interpersonal relationships and is 
potentially detrimental for the quality of interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, 
thinking in terms of independence and self-sufficiency may blind us to the extent of 
our reliance upon others. As we regard ourselves more and more as self-constituted 
individuals, we may fail to realise how we depend upon each other not only in early 




The thesis further challenged the appropriateness of the concept of individual 
autonomy to underlie the interpretation of Article 8 guarantees from the sociological 
perspective. The inquiry presented a, perhaps paradoxical, conclusion that the more 
“autonomous” we become, the more uncertain our lives are. The disappearance of 
guaranteed jobs for life, the increased visibility of diverse sexualities and identities, 
the elective and ambiguous character of interpersonal relationships and 
institutionalised pressures on self-sufficiency, have all contributed to a growth of 
anxiety and uncertainty in people’s lives. It was maintained that autonomy claims 
originated from uncertainty caused by the decline of traditional ways of living, 
dealing with the abundance of choices presented to us by the modern world, and the 
institutionalised pressure to live an autonomous, individualised life. It was the search 
for security, confidence and control, the thesis argued, that lies at the origins of 
autonomy claims. By casting human beings in the contexts of family life and 
medicine as self-sufficient individuals and guardians of their own interests, the 
ECtHR, however, only exacerbates the problem. In this way, the Court upholds and 
enforces the negative side of individualisation, rather than responds to any of the 
problems the present social transformations create and cause for personal lives and 
human well-being. However, the way the Human Rights Court responds to these new 
disputes, potentially, carries a crucial message in defining the new type of social 
commitments that inevitably come about when previous bonds and rules break down. 
It was argued that the indeterminacy of social action coupled with an ever-widening 
range of social interaction and interdependence, makes trust increasingly relevant for 
social interaction. In fact, it was suggested that the capacity for autonomy and the 
ability to exercise one’s autonomy is dependent on the existence of trust in 
interpersonal relationships. 
While trust cannot be directly willed nor demanded by law, it was argued that 
through law’s expressive functions certain legal regulations are likely to support, 
create, or extend trust in interpersonal relationships. 
The problem with individual autonomy and the particular approach taken by the 
European Court of Human Rights is that it imports the mechanisms of enhancing 




impersonal relationships rather than in noneconomic and personal ones. As a 
consequence, the particular construction of autonomy starts with the premise that 
distrust rather than trust is the factual basis or reality of contemporary relationships. 
An unforeseen and unexpected consequence of this approach is that the ECtHR does 
not engage in building trust, but it encourages distrust. And distrust only feeds more 
distrust. Further, introducing more accountability measures to guarantee individual 
autonomy potentially causes the reduction of trust since these measures reduce the 
internal motivations of professionals, such as doctors, for trustworthy action. If 
people receive signals that they are not trustworthy, they are likely to become less 
trustworthy, and vice versa. Finally, the approach the Court has taken towards 
breaches of trust – deception, lying and the breaking of promises – is not supportive 
towards building trust. The way law stands at the moment under the regulations of 
individual autonomy acts as a social incentive to deceive, and is therefore not 
conducive to trust.  
In its final chapter, the thesis proposed that in order to cultivate practices of trust, to 
enhance social cohesion and to strengthen trustworthiness in interpersonal 
relationships, the European Court of Human Rights should take the approach of 
advocating the language of caring autonomy – a concept of autonomy informed by 
the insights of the ethics of care.  
The concept of caring autonomy proposed in this chapter is based on the relational 
account of self and focuses on the moral obligations and responsibility our 
interconnectedness and vulnerability call for. Caring autonomy recognises that we 
are not independent or self-sufficient, but interdependent on each other in various 
ways. In one moment or another we all are vulnerable and depend on each other. 
Because of this interdependence, caring autonomy acknowledges that one’s 
autonomy can flourish only in an atmosphere of trust, which is, in turn, sustained by 
caring relationships. As the chapter further proposes, this means that we have to be 
attendant, responsive and respectful towards each other and provide competent care 
when needed.   
The thesis concludes with the note that considering the impact human rights have on 




needed, but what kind of rights are needed and what kind of rights are appropriate in 
what setting. It is also important not just to see their limited role in certain contexts 
under certain construction, but to recognise their full potential, including the role that 
rights can play as an expression of care and trust. Although there is much more work 
to be done to refine the concept of caring autonomy and its application in human 
rights law, I hope to have shown that it is possible and needed to go beyond the 
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